МИГРАЦИЯ И РАЗВИТИЕ

МИГРАЦИЯ И РАЗВИТИЕ / MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

LOMONOSOV MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ECONOMICS

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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The authors' views may differ from those of the Editorial Board.

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[1] The articles of the present volume are arranged in alphabethic order.

INTRODUCTION

Five years ago, in 2002, the 10th volume of our series "International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World" was published. It collected papers by distinguished experts in migration, like Reginald Appleyard, Douglas Massey, Dirk van de Kaa, Marek Okolsli, Janez Malačič, and others. That was the first issue to be published in Russian and English in parallel. That publication gave a chance to many scholars in Russia, CIS states and Eastern Europe to know the results of recent theoretical works in the field of migration, and gave food to exchange of opinions for the sake of better understanding of contemporary trends of international migration and their conceptualization.

Later several other volumes were bilingual (12th, 14th, 15–16th and 18th) in which many world known researchers have contributed.

Today, we are making a new step advance: the jubilee, 20th volume is timed to the international conference "Migration and Development" (the Fifth Valenteevskiye Chteniya) that will take place in the Lomonosov Moscow State University on 13–15 September 2007. The title of the 20th volume coincide with that of the conference — "Migration and Development". It is dedicated to the 10th anniversary of our scientific series and includes papers of session chairs, some key speakers, and authoritative scholars like Paul Demeny (USA), Uma Segal (USA), Jean-Claude Chesnais (France) and others.

The theoretical essay of J.-C. Chesnais "Migration as an instrument of development" opens the book. His main idea is that migration not only affects different facets of social development but, moreover, can be an instrument to make positive shifts in this development.

The same idea runs through the paper of R. Skeldon: speaking about close interrelations between migration and development the author emphasizes contradictory elements of these interrelations and comments the associated discussion.

The academic debate on international migration trends is also reflected in the article of D. Massey who persistently grounds his idea for comprehensive synthetic migration theory (see: volume 10). His new paper Massey demonstrates at what stage is the contemporary migration science from the perspective of the emerging comprehensive migration theory.

I would like to draw attention of our readers to two papers that, to my mind, have principal importance from the perspective of the further development of the world, its regions and certain countries.

The paper of P. Demeny dealing with the role of international migration in the process of modern globalization and its conflicting prospects, brings the author to the conclusion that appears paradoxical at the first sight: maybe it is reasonable to turn down the attempts to manage migration since the previous experience proves their failure.

These are the "conflicting prospects" of international migration at the globalization era of the modern world. However, this situation inevitably puts a question: "What is to be done? How to manage world migration flows in the interests of the global community and individual countries?". These are uneasy questions. It is hardly possible to find answers within the frames of capitalist model only.

Similar contradictoriness we can see in the article of D. Coleman, which is a slightly revised version of his paper published in "Population and Development Review", No 3, 2006. In these papers Coleman grounds his concept of the "third demographic transition" focusing on replacement of indigenous population of the Western Europe by immigrants who are ethnically distanced from European populations.

In fact, he speaks about replacement of European civilization by another one, most likely, Asian civilization in case the current demographic trends stay stable. We have already mentioned the possibility of such a prospect for Europe in 1999–2002. As to Coleman, in order to avoid this scenario, it is necessary to impede or reject immigration.

Is it possible in the circumstances of continuing globalization when the wheel of migration movement has gained strong impulse of acceleration and developed economies have become so much dependent on migrants labor? I would say no. Moreover, a hypothesis occurs: maybe in order to keep Europe populated, the logic of the Earth's development calls for replacement of decrepit, dying out European population with more viable and numerous Asian population?

In this connection it is worth mentioning the geopolitical role of Russia that has become an important staging post for transit migrants forwarding from Asia to the West. To my mind, this role is underestimated by the West Europe, like the role of Russia in the Eurasian migration system. The paper by I. Ivakhnyuk deals with formation and development of the Eurasian migration system at the post-soviet space. She persistently proves this idea in a number of her recent publications.

The mechanisms of formation of migration flows in the Eurasian migration system, as well as in other migration systems, are clearly analyzed in the abstract of L. Rybakovsky who successfully develops the migration factors concept, along with the three-stages migration model concept.

Other papers in this book are not less interesting. They present authors' concepts on the role of international migration in the demographic and economic development of the world and its regions, on the role of migration in integration processes at the regional level, on prospects of immigration policy, etc.

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Professor Vladimir Iontsev,

Editorial-in-Chief

Jean Claude Chesnais

LA MIGRATION, LEVIER DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Dans les ouvrages classiques d'analyse démographique, la migration est absente. Tout se passe comme si elle était un phénomène "sale".

Chez les économistes, elle existe, en revanche, mais son rôle est controversé. Le plus souvent, la vue est obscurcie par deux limites, d'une part la myopie, d'autre part, l'ignorance des faits historiques.

Les migrations internationales ont un rôle d'atténuation des déséquilibres démographiques ; il en va de même pour les déséquilibres économiques.

Contrairement à une vision simpliste de type binaire, inspirée de la catégorie "dominant / dominé", d'héritage marxiste, la migration est un jeu à somme positive, pour les trois parties prenantes : l'immigré, le pays d'accueil et le pays de départ. Passons en revue les éléments principaux de l'argumentaire, en nous penchant davantage sur le cas du pays d'origine, mal analysée, vu à travers le prisme de l'idéologie bien-pensante, détachée des réalités vécues.

– Pour l'*immigrant*, qui, souvent, franchit la frontière au péril de sa vie, la motivation est claire: c'est une question de survie, *pour lui et sa famille*; il veut oublier le chômage et la misère de son pays pour accéder à un Eldorado, où les salaires sont souvent 10 à 20 fois supérieurs à ceux du milieu qu'il quitte; il est fréquemment "exploité", en terme d'horaires, de salaires, de pénibilité, mais il ne compare pas sa condition à celle des nationaux du pays où il s'installe, mais à ses homologues de son pays, à la trajectoire qu'il aurait pu connaître en restant sur place. Il se prête aux travaux de type 3D ("dégueulasses", difficiles, dangereux), que délaissent les autochtones, dont l'effort productif s'est relâché en quittant les campagnes et en accédant au confort urbain. C'est pour lui un choix personnel, qui le valorise aux yeux de sa communauté, qui lui donne une expérience et des compétences, une vie décente. Rien n'est plus significatif, à cet égard, que l'échec des politiques d'"*aide au retour*", engagée par les principaux pays receveurs d'Europe occidentale (Allemagne, France, Suisse, etc.) au lendemain du premier choc pétrolier en 1973–1974 (ralentissement de la croissance économique, hausse du chômage, crainte des poussées xénophobes). Même assez élevées, les incitations financières au retour sont restées sans effet, car l'immigration s'inscrit dans un *projet de vie collective* (ascension sociale, envoi de fonds à des proches vivant dans la misère, volonté d'accumuler un capital pour bâtir une maison ou créer une entreprise familiale, etc.).

Le migrant tend, le plus souvent à présenter un taux de chômage plus faible et une plus grande ardeur au travail que l'"autochtone"; il est acculé par le besoin, la nécessité, la soif d'être reconnu (il doit faire ses preuves).

– Pour le *pays d'arrivée*, c'est la *compétitivité de pans entiers de l'économie* qui est en cause. Cela vaut, certes, pour certains secteurs à main-d'œuvre qualifiée (ingénieurs, techniciens personnels de santé, etc.) ; mais cela vaut davantage encore pour des tâches manuelles ou des emplois de service déconsidérés par les nouvelles générations instruites du pays hôte: c'est le cas des

services de nettoyage, de domesticité, de garde d'enfants ou de personnes âgées, du travail agricole, des travaux dans le secteur du bâtiment et des travaux publics (grands chantiers à échéance programmée, par exemple), de même que dans la filière "horesca" (hôtels, restaurants, cafés), ou dans le métier de taxi (horaires de nui, etc.); ou de concierge; la liste est loin d'être exhaustive. De la sorte, certaines entreprises échappent à la faillite, aux licenciements, et l'économie globale retrouve des facteurs de souplesse ; quant au consommateur, du fait des différences de taux de salaire horaire (voire de protection sociale, s'il s'agit de travail clandestin), il réalise une épargne qu'il peut réinjecter dans les circuits économiques. La peur de la "dérogeance" (A. Sauvy) crée une discrimination de fait ; les grandes entreprises de nettoyage-balayage des ministères, hôpitaux, bâtiments publics, administrations, entreprises, etc., ne trouvent que du personnel noir, les Blancs refusant d'accomplir des tâches qu'ils jugent indignes de leur personne et préférant bénéficier du système d'allocation de chômage (tout en pouvant cumuler le revenu obtenu avec des activités non déclarées). Bien entendu, il ne s'agit pas de retourner la charge, car les excès au sein de la population migrante sont souvent plus fréquents, notamment parmi les ethnies pratiquant la polygamie (le père tend à s'approprier les prestations devant aller à ses épouses).

Globalement, l'immigration permet un gain de pouvoir d'achat (la main-d'œuvre, étrangère est moins coûteuse) et améliore les perspectives de mobilité sociale au sein de la société d'accueil. Il ne s'agit pas ici de nier ni les tensions sociales, ni la délinquance, ni les coûts de l 'intégration, mais de rappeler certains faits économiques, volontiers dissimulés dans les médias, car lisses et non spectaculaires.

Autrement dit, l'immigration se traduit par des gains de productivité, d'autant plus forts que ce sont généralement les meilleurs, les plus brillants, les plus qualifiés des pays de départ qui prennent le risque de tout quitter. Ce sont aussi ceux qui ont la plus forte propension à créer des entreprises ("family / community-business").

– Pour le *pays de départ*, le débat finit par se clarifier car, à la suite d'analyses bancaires et de décomptes faits sur les remises opérées par internet, chacun s'accorde à consater que *l'argent des immigrants irrigue l'économie des pays pauvres*. Selon la Banque Mondiale, les sommes rapatriées par les migrants en 2004 s'élevaient à 100 milliards de dollars, sans tenir compte des remises directes non enregistrées (billets sous enveloppe), évaluées à 300 milliards, soit un total de *400 milliards*. *Le montant dépasse largement celui de l'aide publique au développement ou même des investissements étrangers vers les pays concernés*. Surtout, il a l'avantage de profiter *directement, sans détournement aux plus démunis*, allégeant d'autant leur insuffisance de revenu. Dans nombre de pays, le transfert de fonds des travailleurs migrants représentent la *première ou la seconde source de devises étrangères*, permettant ainsi de financer l'achat d'importations, la réalisation de projets d'infrastructures (construction de routes, d'hôpitaux, d'écoles, etc.), le lancement de microcrédits au profit des populations locales ou encore la création d'entreprises privées. Au total, des *opportunités*

d'emploi pour les jeunes, ou de scolarisation pour les filles. Si les migrants sont les "soutiers" des économies riches, ils sont les bienfaiteurs des économies pauvres, car ils apportent leur contribution, régulière et croissants, à la réalisation de l'objectif du millénaire pour le développement (réduire de moitié la pauvreté à l'horizon 2015), ceci de façon plus sûre, plus discrète, que par les canaux officiels, et sans les à-coups des marchés financiers. Selon l'Office International des Migrations (OIM), chaque année, environ 250 000 Bangladais quittent leur pays dans l'espoir de pouvoir travailler à l'étranger. Admettons, simple hypothèse, que chacun, par ses remises, procure un revenu marginal permettant à dix personnes de sortir de la trappe de pauvreté, on mesure alors l'effet de levier pour les catégories les plus démunies. Ce type de redistribution privé est plus efficace, plus ciblé, plus personnalisé que tout dispositif officiel de "thrickle down" (compensation financière).

Ainsi, la migration enrichit le pays de départ ; elle est un moyen de lutte contre la pauvreté ; dans la plupart des cas, l'argent envoyé à la famille restée au pays peut représenter un cinquième à un quart du salaire du travailleur. Mais compte tenu de la différence de niveau de vie, allant en moyenne, disons, de 1 à 5, l'argent des migrants peut représenter la moitié du revenu des familles du pays de départ. D'où un extraordinaire effet de levier.

C'est, semble-t-il, à propos de l'Amérique latine, que la prise de conscience s'est faite. En Europe, l'effet redistributif était bien connu ; on l'avait observé dans les cas de pays comme l'Italie, le Portugal ou l'Espagne, au temps de leur forte émigration. Or la *Banque Interaméricaine de Développement* ne s'était, jusqu'à présent, guère intéressée à ces flux financiers car ils semblaient marginaux, informels, négligeables ; elle mesure aujourd'hui avec la présence croissante des Mexicains et leur ascension sociale aux Etats-Unis, que le phénomène a une dimension majeure. Ainsi, avec un chiffre record de 16,6 milliards de dollars de "remesas" en 2004, le Mexique est le *principal bénéficiaire* de tels transferts à l'échelle de l'Amérique latine et il occupe le *deuxième rang mondial, derrière l'Inde*. Le Président mexicain lui-même admet que ces transferts dépassent le montant des investissements publics dans les campagnes, et qu'ils contribuent sensiblement à la lutte contre la pauvreté, au développement rural, et à l'allègement de la dette extérieure. L'essor des transactions bancaires officielles et des transferts directs de compte à compte, via internet, ont permis une prise de conscience ; on estime même que si les envois d'argent cessaient, la pauvreté augmenterait d'au moins 10% au Mexique (les Américains d'origine mexicaine représentent aujourd'hui 9% de la population des Etats-Unis, soit 26,6 millions de personnes). C'est dire que l'argent de la diaspora représente la clé de voûte de l'économie de nombreux pays, en particulier de pays plus pauvres que le Mexique (Salvador, Guatemala, Colombie, Cuba, République Dominicaine, etc.) ; il joue le rôle d'une perfusion continue.

Mais il faut aller au-delà de cet aspect, visible de l'iceberg, car la migration instaure une *mobilité*, contribue aux *échanges de toutes natures* et contribue à *l'apprentissage de savoirs utiles à la modernisation*, donc, à terme, à entrer sur le sentier du développement.

Ce n'est pas un jeu avec un perdant et un gagnant, ni même un jeu à somme nulle, mais un jeu où chacun sort gagnant. De nombreux responsables politiques d'Asie l'avaient constaté depuis longtemps, que ce soit au Sri Lanka, aux Philippines ou en Inde, par exemple. Même dans le cas d'exode des cerveaux, Indira Gandhi, ne manifestait aucune indignation, car elle n'ignorait pas les retombées indirectes sur la longue durée: d'une part, nombre de partants reviennent au pays, pourvus des meilleures qualifications et des contacts avec leurs universités ou leurs laboratoires de l'étranger ; d'autre part, ceux qui s'installent dans des pays plus prospères ne rompent pas les liens avec leur mère-patrie; ils font partager leur savoir, invitent de jeunes étudiants dans leur nouveau pays, incitent des professeurs étrangers réputés à aller transmettre leur connaissance en Inde, d'où la création de transferts de connaissances, de ponts scientifiques, de familles transnationales, qui sont le meilleur garant de dialogue, des échanges, et de la convergence, sectorielle et structurelle, des niveaux de vie.

La migration est donc un processus dynamique interactif, porteur de gains cumulatifs, mais ignorés par les médias ou les analyses statistiques, dichotomiques, courantes. Son analyse économique est plus complexe et plus subtile que selon l'opinion commune.

Concluons sur deux points, le premier portant sur les enseignements de l'histoire, et le second sur les pièges de la notion commune d'"identité".

– Les pays ayant connu une forte dépendance migratoire (Etats-Unis, France, Luxembourg, Suisse … Estonie) affichent tous une robuste santé économique. Réciproquement les pays "saignés" par l'émigration, comme l'Angleterre ou l'Irlande dont la diaspora est très supérieure à la population vivant sur le territoire national n'ont aucunement été ruinés. Du reste, si la migration était néfaste, elle cesserait d'elle-même.

Le cas le plus fascinant est celui de l'Espagne contemporaine. En 1981, la présence étrangère était estimée à 200 000 personnes, en 1991, elle était de 400 000, en 2001 de l'ordre de 1,5 million et en 2007 de 5 millions (immigration illégale incluse). L'Espagne a rattrapé son retard économique, la croissance attire les migrants qui, eux-mêmes, renforcent le cercle vertueux.

– La notion courante d' "identité" est trompeuse ; sa racine latine ("idem" = le même) évoque quelque chose de fixe, d'inchangé. Or rien n'est plus malléable que l'identité. Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre le paysan français analphabète du début du XX^{e} siècle et son homologue citadin, du début du XXI^{e} siècle, mobile, surinformé, ayant passé une bonne vingtaine d'années dans le moule scolaire ? Le concept d'"identité française", utilisé par facilité dans le langage quotidien est donc trompeur ; la roue de l'histoire n'arrête pas de tourner. Les nuances sont encore plus grandes, plus multiples quand on évoque l'idée de "civilization" "musulmane". Toute la question est de savoir ce qui est du domaine de la permanence et ce qui appartient au potentiel de changement. Les institutions propres à favoriser le dialogue et valorisant le patrimoine commun ont, sur ce plan, un rôle central à jouer.

David Coleman[1]

IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC CHANGE IN LOW-FERTILITY COUNTRIES: A THIRD DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN PROGRESS?

Introduction

This paper proposes that a third demographic transition is becoming apparent in Europe and the United States. The ancestry of some national populations are being radically and permanently altered by high levels of immigration of remote geographical or distinctive ethnic and racial origin, in combination with persistent sub-replacement fertility and accelerated levels of emigration of the domestic population. The projections on which these statements are based relate to seven European countries with a total population of 183 million; about half the population of Western Europe. Most of the others, however, share the same essential features of low fertility and high immigration.

This proposition resolves itself into two claims. The first has two components: (i) in some developed countries a rapid change in the composition of the population according to national or ethnic origin, arising from the direct and indirect effects of immigration in the last few decades, is already apparent and (ii) projections on plausible assumptions imply, within the conventional time-scale of projections, a substantial alteration of the composition of that population which if continued in the longer term would lead to the displacement of the original population into a minority position. All that is relatively easy to demonstrate in empirical terms, given explicit and defensible assumptions.

The second is that such a process, were it to continue and materialise in demographic terms over such a relatively short historical period, would be important and would warrant the label of 'transition'. Acceptance of such a label would depend whether the transformation would be permanent and general, and of great social, ethnic, cultural and political significance and thereby to bear comparison with the first and second demographic transitions that are familiar in demography.

Previous transitions

The first demographic transition described the reduction of vital rates from traditional high levels to the familiar low levels now nearly universal in developed societies. Whatever the arguments about its causation, few question its irreversibility, its significance as a measure of the transformation – and improvement — of individual life experiences or its unprecedented consequences for population growth, size and eventual ageing. Even so, its end-point is still far

[1] The Editorial Board of the Scientific Series "International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World" expresses deep gratitude for the permission given by "Population and Development Review" and Blackwell Publishers for the reprinting and translation of the article.

from clear and the expected stabilisation of population, and convergence in birth and death rates, has yet to emerge (Vallin 2004). Its far from complete state in the countries of the 'South' is one of the driving forces behind the migration processes discussed here.

The 'second demographic transition'(SDT), following hard on the heels of the first, describes and explains the revolution in living arrangements and sexual behaviour, and in the setting for fertility, now transforming the lives of many in Western societies and, it is argued, eventually in developed societies elsewhere (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). Its novelty and its expectation of progress towards a fairly universal manifestation is questioned by only a minority (Cliquet 1991; Coleman 2004). Others have made more radical criticisms of the assumptions any 'sequence' of transitions (Harbison and Robertson 2002), but for the purpose of this paper we will accept the establishment view. Its significance here is less in its demographic aspects (this author does not accept that the SDT has much to do with low fertility) but with the change in values supposedly behind it: the rise of tolerant views and weakened national feeling which have enabled elites, at least, to view with equanimity ethnic changes arising from migration that hitherto would have been opposed.

Neither transition concept considers migration explicitly, or any consequent changes in the composition of populations, although van de Kaa (1999) assumes an increase in immigration to be a natural indirect consequence of the low fertility of the recipient countries. On the other side of that equation, emigration tends to be highest at the peak of population growth in the middle of the transition, for Europe in the 19th century and the third world today (Ortega 2005).

The processes described and projected here, resulting from low fertility combined with high immigration, are significant because they are changing the composition of national populations themselves and thereby the culture, appearance, social experiences and self-perceived identity of their inhabitants. Vital rates, population growth and living arrangements, the focus of the first two transitions, are also affected, as is the age-structure. But here they are not the centre of attention. If current trends continue, the majority population of indigenous origin of many, possibly of most European countries, would give way to equivalence, or even numerical inferiority, with ones of relatively recent immigrant or mixed origin. That would be an ultimate 'replacement migration' of a kind not previously seen over large geographical areas without invasion or force.

The first part of this paper will review some demographic evidence for these propositions. The second part will consider whether the projected changes actually matter. The third part, confined to an appendix, presents in rather more detail the projections made in six European counties (all that are known to the author), few of which are available in English.

Theoretical background

Until relatively recently the effects of migration on stable population structures and on the composition of populations were almost completely ignored.

Such interest as there was focussed on the effects of immigration on stable population structure and size. For example it emerged that any constant level of migration into a population with below-replacement fertility and constant mortality always leads to a stationary population (i.e. one neither growing nor declining in numbers) as long as immigrant fertility eventually converges upon that of the aboriginal population. That has some relevance to this discussion because all the populations under consideration (except the US) have below-replacement fertility. And because the immigrant numbers serve to top up total numbers as the aboriginal population diminishes and eventually disappears. The size of the final stationary population depends upon the size of the net migration (Pollard 1973). For example given the eventual adoption by all groups of the (sub-replacement) US vital rates of 1977 a net annual immigration of 840,000 would eventually sustain a stationary population of 226 million, of entirely immigrant origin, irrespective of the original population size (Espenshade, Bouvier et al. 1982).

With sub-replacement fertility combined with constant levels of immigration, the proportion of population of foreign origin increases constantly. In general, the important conclusion relevant to this paper is that any population with sub-replacement fertility that maintains a constant or a growing population size through immigration must acquire a population of predominantly, eventually entirely, immigrant origin (except for descent-lines in mixed unions). And in any population with average fertility that is below replacement rate, any one minority population with higher growth rates must in the long run become numerically dominant (Steinmann and Jäger 2000). The original population is transformed either way, whether the growing new populations retain a strict separation of identity or become mixed. The ultimate outcome of replacement is unaffected by whether the immigrant populations adopt domestic low fertility rates quickly, slowly or not at all (Coale 1986). It may be objected that these theoretical formulations are irrelevant because the conclusions apply 'in the long term' and this paper discusses a shorter time-scale. That does not affect the predicted outcome, however. Simulations using a range of more or less plausible numbers bring all this closer to home, showing substantial effect of large-scale immigration on population composition for, for example, the EU12 and selected European cities, and the Netherlands (Lesthaeghe and Page 1988, Kuijsten 1995) before mid-century.

The United Nations presented a comprehensive set of illustrations of the effects of migration on several countries using the same methodology in 2000. That showed the possibility of very large growth in the immigrant origin population from 2000 to 2050 on the assumption of various levels of immigration sufficient to preserve overall population, workforce and age-structure respectively in low-fertility populations (UN 2000). For example average net immigration of 1.4 million per year to the European Union (EU15) would preserve the working – age population at the 1995 level up to 2050 (1.4 million happens to be about the actual average net immigration since 2000). If continued, on simple assumptions that would produce a population of 108

million post-1995 immigrants and their children by 2050, 26% of the projected EU total. That figure does not include the existing immigrant origin population in 1995, and is approximately in line with the average projected for the national projections discussed here.

Persistent low fertility and high immigration – the prerequisites for a third transition

Continuing low fertility

The demographic situation in almost all developed countries today meets rather well the basic prerequisites for the outcomes discussed above. It is well known that period fertility in all except the United States is below the level of replacement, and has been for some decades in Western Europe, more recently in Southern and Eastern Europe and in the Far East, and in the countries of European origin abroad. Cohort fertility, reflecting the reproductive behaviour of 15–20 years ago, has fallen below replacement level in almost all of those countries (Frejka and Sardon 2004). However in Western Europe, period fertility has remained steady since the 1970s despite continual rises in mean age at childbearing. In France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Iceland and Sweden, period total fertility has risen.

In response to survey questions, women in most European countries still claim that their ideal family size would be at least two children. That generalisation, hitherto robust and universal, has been undermined by recent downward trends in the preferences of women in Germany and Austria (Goldstein, Lutz et al. 2003) and even more, of men in those countries. In the United States, however, both theory and practice remain robust (Hagewen and Morgan 2005). Some calculations that attempt to 'correct' for the delay in childbearing and its supposed eventual recuperation suggest that the outcome of current trends is likely to be closer to, or even at, replacement level ((Bongaarts and Feeney 1998, Kohler and Ortega 2002, Philipov and Kohler 2001). There is little agreement about the best way to make this adjustment, or even if it can be meaningful (van Imhoff 2001; Kohler and Philipov 2001; Sobotka 2003). The level of recuperation required to re-establish replacement fertility of current younger cohorts in the reasonably near future would require implausible increases in older-age fertility (Lesthaeghe 2001; Frejka and Sardon 2004). Official projections are unanimous in expecting that in the future average family size will not exceed 1.85 or 1.9 (UN 2004; Eurostat 2004). Most demographers, therefore (although not this author) believe that sub-replacement fertility is here to stay (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999).

Persistent high immigration

Immigration to Western Europe and to the US has increased greatly since the 1950s and persists at a high level (see Figure 1). Annual net immigration to the EU15 countries has been over 1 million in recent years, although variable. Gross inflows to the EU15, and net inflows to the US, are not easy to estimate

(Mulder et al 2002). But if both series could be expressed in gross terms, they would probably be similar in proportion to population size, at least for legal entry. Gross inflow to Western Europe in 2001, based only on the 12 countries that reported flow data to SOPEMI (OECD 2004), was 1.84 million, compared with 1.06 million to the US. As a result, by around 2000 over 10% of the populations of some Western European countries had been born abroad, and in the case of Austria, Germany, Luxemburg and Switzerland, a greater proportion than in the United States (12.3% in 2000). Those proportions continually increase. In the developed world, only parts of Eastern Europe, and Japan and Korea, have modest migration inflows.

Natural increase, immigration and contemporary population growth

Accordingly, migration has become the driving force behind demographic change in many European countries, both directly and indirectly through the natural increase of populations of immigrant origin (Coleman, 2003, Héran, 2004, OECD, 2004, Salt, 2005). In some cases (Germany, Italy) immigration prevents or moderates decline; in others, it has re-started considerable population growth (Belgium, Netherlands, Noreway, Sweden, UK (see e.g. Haug et al., 2002, Poulain and Perrin, 2002, pp. 85–86, Nilsson, 2004, p.117, Government, Actuary's Department, 2005).

Figure 1. Migration trends to Western European countries 1980 - 2002, various definitions (1000s)



Note: the sharp increase in immigration to the US around 1991 was due primarily to legalisations under the 1986 IRCA amnesty. Sharp increase to Europe around 1992 arose from forced migration from Yugoslavia.

In some European countries around 2000, almost two-thirds of immigrants were from non-European countries (66% in Great Britain, 62% in the

Netherlands, 59% in France). In others such as Belgium and Sweden, those proportions are reversed (see Dumont and Lemaitre 2005). In Europe and the US, the natural increase of non-European foreign-origin populations is often greater than that of the indigenous population, thanks to a more youthful age-structure, higher age-specific fertility rates, and transient distortions in family -building arising from the migration process itself (Thompson 1982, Toulemon 2004). In the early 2000s 18% of births in England and Wales and in France, and 23% in the US, were to immigrant mothers, indicating the shape of things to come. However, some immigrant groups have lower, not higher, age-specific birth -rates compared with the national average (Figure 2) as noted further below.

TFR of native and foreign populations - selected European countries 1980 - 2002.

Sources: SOPEMI, national statistical offices.



Sources: England and Wales ONS 2003 and earlier. Netherlands: Statistics Netherlands website. Sweden: Statistics Sweden. France INSEE

The growth of foreign-origin populations

Since the 17th century until well into the post-war period most European countries except France have been 'countries of emigration'. Since the 1950s most have experienced substantial inflows including, for the first time on a large scale, inflows from non-European countries. As intra-European migration has moderated, the dynamic has passed more and more to non-European inflows, their rapid growth made salient by novel distinctive differences in appearance, culture, language and religion. In Great Britain, for example, the non-white ethnic minority populations, irrespective of nationality or birthplace, were estimated to be about 50,000 in 1951. They numbered 1.3 million at the census of 1971, 3.0 million in 1991, 4.5 million in 2001: an average growth rate of 5% per year. Some components grew even faster: the population of African origin has doubled every ten years, from 108,000 in 1981 to 480,000 in 2001 – growing at 7.9% per

year in the 1990s. In the Netherlands, the foreign background population grew on average by 2.7% per year between 1995 and 2003. This has been an important contribution to overall population growth and has expanded the ethnic and racial diversity of populations that hitherto considered themselves to be relatively homogeneous, ancient regional differences apart. The significance of that is discussed in a later section.

Before the modern projections can be considered some comments must be made on the definition of 'foreign' and 'foreign-origin' populations.

Defining 'foreign' population

Non-demographic definition and categorisation complicate the estimation of the current size and structure of populations of foreign origin in European countries, and of their projection into the future. Most European countries routinely define foreign origin populations on the criterion of citizenship (nationality), and births of foreign origin by the citizenship of the mother. Those are the data provided by Eurostat, the OECD and the Council of Europe. In some countries, children of foreign citizens are not automatically citizens of the country of their birth themselves but must choose on reaching maturity.

In many countries, high annual levels of naturalisation have made data based upon citizenship meaningless as indicators of foreign stock in all but a technical legal sense. Annual naturalisations have often exceeded the annual inflow of immigrants. That has substantially diminished statistically, but not in reality, the numbers of people of foreign origin in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and elsewhere. In those countries, citizenship data under-state the stock of population of foreign origin and its rate of increase by one half or more.

Figure 3. Netherlands 1972 - 2004. Foreign citizen and foreign-origin population (thousands).
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 2004.



Note: Persons from the Dutch West Indies of Antillean origin, and of Surinamese origin before 1980, are of 'foreign origin' but are not foreign citizens.

For a more representative picture, some European countries are adopting statistical definitions of foreign origin population that include both immigrants and the second 'immigrant generation' ('descendants', 'foreign background') by linkage with the birthplace or citizenship of parents through population registers. For example, in the Netherlands any person with one parent born abroad is defined as 'foreign origin'. All others, including persons with third generation foreign ancestry, are assumed to be 'Dutch' (Alders 2001). This exclusion of most of the 'third' and subsequent generations leads to a progressive under-estimate, and 'under-projection', of the population of foreign origin compared with more enduring ethnic or racial criteria. On that basis, the 'foreign origin' population was estimated to be 3.04 million out of the 16 million total population in the Netherlands in 2003 (19%), compared with the 700,000 persons of foreign citizenship (4%). This 'foreign origin' population has increased fast, unlike the 'foreign citizen' population, which has declined since 1995 (Figure 3).

Ethnic classifications

Where the cultural characteristics of immigrants, and their self-identity endure over generations, an 'ethnic' classification may give a more truthful picture of demographic and other consequences of the migration process, as long as identity and the official categories are stable and inter-ethnic unions are not too common. Where ethnic identification is self-ascribed, individuals are free to change their minds. This does not seem to be substantial between censuses (Platt et al. 2005) unless specific inducements are at work. Inter-generational change may be greater. The use of ethnic criteria may itself reinforce perceptions of difference, of course. Such ethnic classifications are widely used in the countries of the English-speaking world, both for new immigrants from outside Europe and for old or indigenous minorities (Lee 1993, Coleman and Salt 1996, Statistics Canada 1993). These are based on self-identification to an ethnic group. No Continental Western European country uses ethnic categories. In France the concept is considered to be fundamentally contrary to the principles of the equality of citizenship (Haut Conseil 1991). That state does not collect statistics on ethnic or religious criteria, although manipulation of data on the birthplaces of individuals and their parents permits partly equivalent estimates to be made (Tribalat 1991, 2004).

Projecting the foreign-origin populations: assumptions, methods, results

In response to the demographic, social and political implications of the new diversity, cohort-component projections of national population that incorporate separately the immigration and differential vital rates of foreign origin populations have been prepared by a number of European statistical offices and by some academic demographic researchers. These include Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The US Bureau of the Census has made projections according to race and Hispanic origin since 1993, and Statistics Canada and Statistics New Zealand (2001) have made

projections for indigenous minorities only. In the context of this paper it may be worth remembering that three hundred and fifty and one hundred and fifty years ago respectively these 'indigenous minorities' were the majority, indeed the only, populations.

Evaluating and projecting the demographic characteristics of 'foreign' populations

No national statistical system in Western Europe records vital events by race or ethnic origin, only by citizenship or (as in the UK) by the birthplace of the mother or of the deceased. However those with population registers can determine rates of fertility and mortality separately for immigrants and for the children of immigrants, in order to relate the rates to the base-populations over two generations.

In making projections of this kind, assumptions of future levels of fertility and of migration are obviously crucial. In general, the fertility of foreign-origin populations in industrial countries has tended to converge upon the national average, and in some cases go below it. But only in a few cases is that process complete. Complete convergence might be expected from a traditional view of demographic transition theory. But fertility differences may persist if immigrant groups do not achieve socio-economic equality, if they retain strong attachment to religious or other elements of foreign culture, if they continue to be numerically and culturally re-inforced by large-scale migration, especially through importing unacculturated spouses from high-fertility countries. Their actual minority status *per se* may make some groups resistant to change (e.g. Siegel 1970, Goldscheider 1999, MacQuillan 2004).

Total fertility among Indians in the UK and people of Caribbean origin in the Netherlands and the UK has fallen to about the national average, and below it among many European immigrants, and among Chinese and East African Asians in the UK (Coleman and Smith 2003). Muslim and African fertility remains elevated although mostly declining: among Turks and Moroccans everywhere, and among Algerians in France (3.2 in 1998/99; Legros 2003). In Great Britain in 2001, the total fertility of women born in Pakistan and Bangladesh was 4.7 and 3.9 respectively (ONS 2004). Increased inflows of unacculturated population may conserve or even drive up fertility rates, as among African populations in Sweden and the UK. In the latter the total fertility of women born in Somalia was about 5 around 2000.

Assumptions behind the projections

Overall, the projections described below assume a convergence of Western-origin fertility to the 'native' average (if not already identical), and to around replacement level or slightly above it among non-European populations.

Current and future levels of mortality are not so problematic. Such evidence as exists suggests that foreign-origin or immigrant mortality in the Western world is not very different from that of the national-origin populations and some cases

is less heavy (Courbage and Khlat 1996, Hummer et al 1999, Griffiths, Brock et al 2004), despite their often depressed socio-economic position. In all the projections discussed below except those for Sweden, age-specific death rates are assumed to be the same for all groups.

Migration assumptions are the most troublesome of the three. Statistics on current actual levels of migration are rather unsatisfactory. Future assumptions are more difficult. Migration streams are very heterogeneous and no generally satisfactory model even to account for their current level yet exists, never mind to predict their future value (Massey, Arango et al 1998, Ch 1, 2; Howe and Jackson 2005). Projections of migration may promote restrictive policy responses that will lead to their own falsification.

But there are reasons for supposing that levels of migration will at least continue at their present levels for the foreseeable future and are more likely to increase. Empirically, recent trends in migration to Europe, despite fluctuations, have been high and rising (Figure 3). At least the first two of the 'revolutions' that underpin high migration flows (in mobility, information and 'rights') are unlikely to be reversed.

Most components, except recently for asylum claiming, have tended to grow. The chief external factors driving migration from many poor countries persist: up to twenty-fold differentials in real earnings and in population growth. So has to various degrees corrupt, inept, oppressive or non-existent government. Of course some formerly poor countries such as India and China are modernising rapidly, which will moderate flows and encourage return migration of the highly skilled; indeed return to India is already increasing. Elsewhere relative economic disparities persist. Indeed disparities have widened in African and other countries which also have the highest level of population growth. Even assuming some decline in fertility, the poorest, such as Ethiopia, Somalia and most countries in West Africa, are projected to increase by three to four - fold by mid-century (UN 2005). These countries are already the source of substantial flows of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants to Europe. These unstable, poorest-poor countries, many in arid zones, also face the most severe effects of global warming. Up to mid-century, migration may well be more than current levels. By then, migration pressures from some source countries may have abated (Ortega 2005), but probably not from Africa.

In this regard the Mediterranean represents the biggest demographic, economic and cultural fault-line in the world (Chesnais 1995, Ch 10, 11). In particular the population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase from 950 million today to two billion by mid century. As President Chirac noted in his 2006 Bastille Day speech, 'if Africa is not developed, Africa will flood the world' (le Monde 14 July 2006). But many African countries are now poorer than at independence despite massive development aid over forty years. Partly for this reason, most of the projections assume that much of future migration will come from such 'non-traditional' sources. Furthermore, attempts to improve

economic performance in the third world through aid and investment are likely to increase, not reduce migration flows in the short term (Martin 2002) before they have any damping effect. In any case migration may be needed. Many analysts believe that projected labour shortages in low-fertility countries can only be met through immigration (e.g. McDonald and Kippen 2004, Bijak et al. 2005). Labour demand – legal or illegal – is likely to increase especially in those European countries that are unable or unwilling to reform their labour markets and mobilise their demographic reserves to augment their workforce (European Commission 2004). Indeed a future Italian economy has been proposed based upon continued lowest-low fertility of an educated population combined with high levels of low-skill immigration from North Africa and Eastern Europe (Dalla Zuanna 2006): a proposal, it might be thought, certain to turn *Italia* into *Carthago Nova*.

Most important, future immigration levels from poor countries are underwritten by chain migration and by the rights that perpetuate it. That expands ethnic minority enclaves through family re-unification and, increasingly, family formation and other community-based movement. With asylum claiming, that has comprised the major part of legal migration to Europe – and the US - for the last thirty years or more. The post-war 'rights' conventions that guarantee these movements have been little challenged. Some immigrant populations preserve their preference for arranged marriage with spouses from the countries of origin into the second generation (e.g. Turks in the Netherlands (Lievens 1999), and Pakistanis in the UK). As those populations grow, so do the inflows. This process of 'cumulative causation' also accelerates migration more generally through the transformation of the institutions, culture, language and politics of host societies into forms more friendly to continued migration, so that in some respects they come to resemble more those of the sending countries (Massey 1998, Massey and Zenteno 1999).

Against this, immigration can, of course, go down as well as up, as Figure 1 shows. For example, asylum claims to Europe fell to 314,300 in 2004, the lowest since 1997 (UNHCR 2005). However the root causes of asylum claiming seem unlikely to diminish. The consensus of the faithful in migration studies (not shared by this author) is that migration will inevitably increase in the train of the juggernaut of globalisation. It is claimed that policies of control cannot work (Castles 2004) or at least are difficult in democracies (Freeman 1994) because the revolutions in information, transport and rights that facilitate recent migration are impossible or difficult to reverse. Accordingly many commentators believe that substantial further immigration to Europe and other developed regions is unavoidable (Freeman, 1994; Castles 2004). As Massey et al. conclude (1998, p. 287) 'Few of the causal processes we have identified as underlying mass immigration are easily controllable using the policy levers normally available to public officials'. While the role of state policy in restraining migration has been neglected (Hollifield 2000; Teitelbaum 2002) so far only the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands have shown the political will substantially to restrict

immigrant entitlements to family migration and other aspects of chain migration. Only a few have seriously curtailed asylum entitlements (e.g. Germany in 1992) and no government has yet withdrawn from, or sought to modify the Geneva Convention or from the European Convention on Human Rights.

In general, the projections described below assume that migration from poor countries will continue at the same absolute (not relative) level as in recent years while that from richer countries will diminish somewhat (Table 1). Given the considerations above, those are conservative assumptions. Usually the medium variant migration forecast, at least from poor countries, is imposed rather brutally as a level straight line at the end of a time series of actual recent data that mostly show substantial, if fluctuating, upward growth. Such simple approaches are typical of migration projection (Eurostat et al 2000). Few attempts have been made to model recent upward trends (Glover et al 2001 is an exception) and few except the successive Danish projections attempt to incorporate the effects of policy measures. No feedbacks between the evolution of working-age population and migration are assumed except in the 1999 US projections.

***Table 1**. Outline of projection assumptions and results, selected populations*

	Austria		Denmark		Germany		Netherlands	
	2005	2050	2005	2050	2005	2050	2005	2050
Population (millions)	8,1	7,8	5,4	5,5	82,2	68,3	15,9	16,9
Immigration rate	0,07	0,2	0,29	0,21	0,25	0,27	0,17	0,27
% 'Western'	5,4	7,9	2,4	3,3	3,3	5,4	8,6	13,2
% 'Non-Western'	3,9	5,1	6,0	11,5	6,6	18,2	8,9	16,5
% 'Foreign origin'	9,3	***28,0***	8,7	**14,8**	9,9	**23,6**	17,5	**29,7**
	Norway		Sweden		UK		USA	
	2005	2050	2005	2050	2005	2050	2005	2050
Population (millions)	4,6	5,6	9,0	10,6	52,0	63,1	287,7	403,7
Immigration rate	0,37	0,30	0,37	0,29	0,50	0,27	0,35	0,24
% 'Western'	4,1	9,2	9,7	10,5	2,7	11,6		
% 'Non-Western'	3,4	14,3	6,3	10,7	8,7	24,5		
% 'Foreign origin'	7,5	**23,5**	15,9	**32,3**	11,4	**36,1**	17,6	***33,2***

Note: *Migration: net, in thousands. rate, per 1000 total population. Fertility: TFR.*

Methods used to project the population of foreign origin

All the projections in this study are based on the cohort-component method. Vital rates are projected on the lines noted above, often with central and variant projections. In most, the first and second generation are projected separately. The population sizes of each of the various foreign-origin categories are determined by the numbers with parents or grandparents born abroad or of foreign citizenship, the proportions naturalising, and the proportions of mixed unions, expressed as coefficients. In the German, Norwegian and Swedish projections, persons are classified as second generation 'foreign ancestry', 'foreign origin' or 'foreign background' if both of their parents are born abroad, in the Netherlands and Denmark if only one is born abroad, in the latter case on a

proportional basis. For exact details it is essential to refer to the original publications.

An additional probabilistic projection is available only in the case of the Netherlands (Alders 2005) and experimentally for the United Kingdom, which is not discussed here (Coleman and Scherbov 2005). All are made on a 'bottom-up' basis; that is, the individual foreign-origin categories are projected separately and then added to make the national total for each year. This raises the question of compatibility with national projections made without subdivision. No difficulty arises in the case of the US, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish projections because the foreign-origin and native-origin components are an integral part of the national projections; there are no others. In other cases, the two forms of projection are made separately and the aggregate results of the subdivided projections are constrained to fit the projected national totals obtained from a conventional projection. All the Continental projections assume that all or most of the third generation (grandchildren of immigrants) become assimilated and are included as 'natives' not 'foreign origin'. That tends to produce linear, not exponential, growth in the proportion of population of foreign origin. None of the projections incorporate 'mixed-origin' categories.

In some cases (e.g. Austria) the proportion of population of foreign origin can also be derived approximately by simple subtraction of a 'zero-migration' projection from a standard projection in which no allowance is made for naturalisation in any generation. That was the procedure adopted in the ''Replacement Migration' report (UN 2000). Such a method is only acceptable if the level of emigration of the national – origin population is small enough to be ignored; otherwise the foreign-origin population will be under-estimated. In such a case, the growth of the foreign origin or ethnic population tends to be gently exponential. The best-known examples of projections by racial or ethnic origin (where ethnic attribution is potentially perpetual) are those made in respect of the United States, e.g. US Bureau of the Census (1993, 1996, 2000, 2004), US National Research Council (Smith and Edmonston 1997), following the pioneering work of Bouvier and Davis (1982).

Results of the projections

By the starting-point of these projections, around the year 2000, immigration had already created novel and substantial foreign-origin or ethnic minority populations in the countries under consideration, up to 17% of the total population (Table 1). For example, in Sweden the proportion of the population born abroad had increased from 3% in 1950 to 11% in 2000, and 'foreign origin' to 15%. Within that foreign-origin population, the proportion that was of European or 'Western' origin varied from country to country: 29% in Denmark, 47% in the Netherlands; 65% in Sweden. Some summary data are given in Table 1.

On these assumptions discussed above, the populations here can expect the proportion of the future total population of foreign origin to grow to a much higher level than today. Foreign-origin populations are projected to comprise

between 15% and 32% of the total population in a number of Western European countries by 2050 (Figure 4). The roughly constant rate of increase of that proportion foreign shows little or no sign of diminution by the end of the projection period. Within that total, the proportion of 'Western' origin diminishes over time, as higher projected immigration and fertility shifts the balance in favour of non-European populations.

Were the projected trends to continue without change, Sweden and the Netherlands would have majority foreign origin populations by the end of the century, even on the conservative 'two-generation' criteria (the projections for Austria do not even include the second generation explicitly). Only those based on ethnic (UK) or racial and ethnic criteria (US) avoid the 'two generation' assumption, together with those estimates derived by subtraction. The 1999-based US projection includes only minorities of immigrant origin, Black and Native American populations being excluded. It shares a similar trajectory to some of the European countries. That may seem surprising, but European countries typically have lower indigenous fertility rates than the US and lack the momentum built into the population structure given to the US by its large and protracted 'baby boom'. European populations therefore lack a '"protective mantle of natural increase" that softens and to some extent obscures immigration-related compositional trends' (Espenshade 1987 p 257).

Figure 4. Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as percent of total population.



Note: US projection here omits US Black population, over 90% of which is not of immigrant origin, and the American Indian population.

Sources: Germany: Ulrich 2001, Statistics Denmark 2004, , Netherlands: Alders 2005, Austria: **Lebhart** and Münz 2003, Statistics Norway 2005, Statistics Sweden 2004, US Bureau of the Census 2000.

A predictable component of this future growth - up to 50% - is underwritten by the relatively youthful age-structure of the foreign-origin population, particularly that of non-European origin. Variation in mortality between groups is unlikely to be important. Fertility differentials are likely to diminish although probably not to disappear. Projections with variant fertility levels do not greatly affect the outcome at least in the medium term. The projections are most sensitive to assumptions about migration, where the major uncertainty lies. That judgement, of course, does depend on the magnitude of the supposed variation in the two variables, but in reality the range of fertility is much more constrained. In recent years the scale of migration has been much more variable than that of any other demographic factor. For example as late as the mid-1990s, net migration into the UK (all citizenships) was zero, and net foreign immigration was about 50,000. In 2004, mostly as a result of policy changes from 1997, net immigration was 245,000 and net foreign immigration 350,000. The central projections from different countries show surprisingly parallel trends of growth of the proportion of foreign-origin in the total population. Although the projections were all independent, the rate of foreign net immigration assumed by the end of the projections is very similar in most cases: between 0.27 and 0.30 percent of population per year in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and England and Wales, and 0.20 and 0.21 in the cases of Austria and Denmark respectively.

Figure 5. Percentage foreign origin: standard projections and zero-migration projections 2000 - 2050



Sources: Austria: Lebhart and Münz 2003,. Denmark : Statistics Denmark 2002; Germany Ulrich 2001.

Comparing the 'main' scenarios with the zero net immigration scenarios, where these are available, immigration has great demographic weight (Figure 5). Zero immigration reduces, by between one-third and one-half, the projected foreign-origin populations by mid century. The proportion of population of foreign origin, which otherwise would reach about 25% - 35% by mid-century would instead be limited to between 10% and 15% on a zero-net migration assumption, with little or no further scope for increase. In the Netherlands example, zero immigration combined with naturalisation would reduce the foreign-origin population from the current 17%, to 14% of the national total by mid-century.

If their fertility remains at or below replacement level, foreign origin populations would eventually peak, and under the naturalisation conventions of these projections, they would in the long run diminish and disappear as statistically defined entities. Neither of the Austrian projections above include naturalisation and they develop in exponential form, not linear.

Discussion

An avoidable transformation? The role of policy.

These trends are, of course, not written in stone. The assumptions behind them may all be falsified, not the least by reactions to the projected outcomes.. The level of migration is nominally at least under public policy control. The population changes projected above can be regarded as determinable, insofar as they are predictable, if unintended, consequences of the continuation of high migration levels. Sometimes, long–term increases in immigration are the unforseen consequence of policies intended to have, and stated at the time to have, much more limited and short-term aims, such as the 1965 US Immigration Act (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998; Ch. 7). Only the government of Canada has had, since the late 1980s, an explicit demographic aim in its migration policy, of increasing population by immigrant numbers equivalent to 1% of population per year. Many European governments promoted temporary 'guest-worker- policies to meet short-term labour needs in the 1950s and 1960s, the long-term consequences of which are apparent today. Labour migration under work permit continues, and all western governments are committed to rights of family reunification and to refugee conventions. The longer-term consequences of these commitments and inflows have remained little considered; their discussion discouraged. Governments may be unaware of their implications, or in the UK case, refuse to take a view on it. In France the preparation of projections such as those described above would be impossible. In the United Kingdom they have been approached as though through a minefield.

Immigration policies can change radically in response to political events or pressures, either to restrict or to relax controls. In this respect the factors affecting migration are different from those determining death and birth rates. As noted above, there is little consensus about the possible effectiveness of measures

intended to limit movement. However, as Castles and Miller point out (2003, p.8) '…international migration is not an inexorable process. Government policies can prevent or reduce international migration and repatriation is a possibility'. For example, the more restrictive legislation adopted in 2002 in Denmark and in the Netherlands show that migration inflows can be substantially moderated, at least in the short run, and that projections need to be modified accordingly. For example gross inflows of non-Western immigrants to the Netherlands were reduced from 64,000 in 2002 to about 32,000 in 2004. Emigration of foreign citizens also increased and for a short time net migration fell to zero, and is projected to stabilise at about 20,000 annually in the medium term compared with about 35, 000 in the previous decade. Net annual immigration from Western countries was reduced to about 8,000 from a peak of 22,000 (Alders 2005, Fig 7.). In 2002 the Danish government tightened the conditions for migration for purposes of marriage. Family migration declined from 10,950 in 2001 to 3,525 in 2005. This has affected both actual trends and subsequent projections. Before the legislation, the proportion projected in 2001 of foreign-origin population in Denmark by 2040 was 18.4 % ; afterwards it was revised downwards to 13.8%. Policies intended to expand immigration can also be very effective, of course, as in the UK since 1997.

A new demographic transition?

Should the transformation of the ethnic or racial composition of European countries in the 21st century, which is presaged in these projections, be regarded as a potential new, third, demographic transition in the making? To warrant the label 'transition', population change must presumably be fast in historical terms, without precedent, irreversible and above all be of substantial social, cultural and political significance. The sections below explore these points.

Is there a precedent?

Migration and population change have been a persistent if variable feature throughout Europe's history. Change in population composition itself was pervasive in Eurasia and elsewhere in the first millennium AD and earlier from Northern Europe, Central Asia and Arabia, with the expansions of Mongols and Ottomans as the last major example. But then it was invariably accomplished by force. The movement of peoples during the *Völkerwänderung* period changed language, political and economic structures everywhere in Eurasia; the violent dismemberment of the Western Roman Empire (Heather 2006) is only one example, although as elsewhere not devoid of accommodation and negotiation. That migration has left persistent genetic traces in today's European populations (Falsetti and Sokal 1993; Miles 2005). The extent of the population replacement is difficult to judge; different kinds of evidence do not entirely re-inforce each other.

Thus historical, linguistic and much genetical evidence has suggested a comprehensive replacement of Celtic by Anglo-Saxon population in England from the 5th to the 8th century (Wormald, P. pers comm; Weale et al. 2002). That

has been difficult to reconcile with some archaeological evidence and demographic considerations, for example that the likely inflow may not have been more than one-tenth the size of the settled population, which points more to elite dominance (Hamerow, 1997). Other genetic analyses suggest a more nuanced picture, with substantial replacement of the Britons by Anglo-Saxon and the later Norse invaders in the North and East, and (surprisingly) less in the South, with some Western areas revealing little intrusion since the Palaeolithic (Capelli et al. 2003). Thus in some areas an 'immobilist' model of elite dominance, not replacement, seems appropriate, and elsewhere a more 'migrationist' one. In favouring one or the other, partisans of either approach have not been insensitive to contemporary ideologies (Chapman and Hamerow 1997, Härke 1998, Hills 2003). A demographically-informed review of archaeological, historical and genetic evidence suggested that the Anglo-Saxon invasions might have contributed up to 20% to English ancestry, the later Danish invasions 2–4% and finally the Norman kleptocracy not more than 1–2%, all over a protracted period of time. In none of these cases is there any evidence of a great surge of population. In the former case the native British were assimilated and acculturated by the immigrants; in the latter two the invaders were absorbed by the natives (Härke 2002). The most recent genetic research has strengthened the 'replacement' view of the Anglo-Saxon migration despite their initially small numbers (Thomas et al 2006) through an hypothesised reproductive advantage and social segregation. At any rate it is certain that nothing remotely like it has happened since in the British Isles. The effect of migration into England from the 11th to the 20th centuries have been undetectable using those methods, as would be expected from England's political and demographic history, one of the best documented of any country (see Hinde 2003).

Similar considerations apply to the potentially much larger-scale movements associated with the spread of farming, or of farmers, from the Levant during the Neolithic. The traditional 'demic diffusion' model emphasised the movement of people (Ammermann and Cavalli-Sforza 1984; Cavalli-Sforza and Menozzi 1988), while Y-chromosome and mtDNA evidence suggests a continuity of European ancestry little changed since the late Palaeolithic (Sykes 1999, Richards et al. 2000; McEvoy et al 2004). However finer-grained data on polymorphic systems gives greater weight to the partial replacement of hunters by farmers rather than a cultural replacement of hunting by farming (Barbujani and Bertorelle 2001). Either way, on the broad scale, no new major additions to the European gene-pool are apparent since the Neolithic, recent immigrant populations excepted.

In recent centuries demographic change from peaceful migration within Europe has usually been more modest until the industrial mobility of the later 19th century (Moch 1992), mostly involving local and regional migration. With the major exception of the huge forced movements of the 20th century (Kosinski 1970), populations have been relatively stable in their ancestry and in their

language and culture, most major flows being directed overseas, provoking radical replacements in the New Worlds.

For our purposes, all that emphasises the discontinuity created by immigration to Europe since the 1950s. The changes currently under way, unlike those of the past, are not violent but do involve, in part, substantial population inflows from cultures of unparalleled remote origins. The effects on ancestry in the long run may eclipse anything that has gone before, in the degree of replacement, in the geographical remoteness of origins and the speed of change.

Timetables and threshholds

How does the speed of change compare with other major transformations? The US Bureau of the Census (2000, 2004) projects an ever-diminishing minority status for the US white non-Hispanic population from around 2050, although that group would not become a minority compared with immigrant-origin groups only until about 2120. If the rise of the immigrant minorities in the US that are responsible for this projected twilight of the WASPS can be dated somewhat arbitrarily from the Immigration Act of 1965, then the process would have occupied less time than it took for the first demographic transition to run its course.

At what threshold, if any, can a 'transition' may be recognised, as opposed to a new state of diversity? Fifty years ago the first demographic transition was defined after the event in respect of Europe. It was presented as an hypothesis for the rest of the world, where it had then hardly begun. The 'second demographic transition' rests its case on population prevalences of lifetime cohabitation without marriage, divorce and lone parenthood that seldom yet exceed 50% in any population. But the trend is mostly one-way; in many countries popular acceptance of such behaviour is general. It remains an hypothesis that such behaviour will become general in all the developed world.

Likewise here. *A priori,* a decline of former majority population to below 50% of the total, seems an obvious benchmark for 'transition'. However its significance would obviously depend upon the continued distinctiveness and self-awareness of the populations concerned; on the integration of minorities to national norms, or conversely the mutual adaptation and convergence of all groups. But even on the assumptions presented above, the countries concerned would not become 'majority foreign origin' overall for a further period of time, in some cases into the next century.

However overall averages conceal great diversity in geography and by age-group. Even a foreign-origin population stabilised at the projected 25% - 35% of foreign origin by mid-century, with about two thirds of non-European origin, would imply majority foreign origin populations in many, if not most, major European cities. Even in the 1990s 40% of the population of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and 28% in Brussels and Frankfurt were foreign (Musterd et al. 1998), while by 2001 40% of London's inhabitants were of non-British ethnic origin, and over 50% in nine boroughs each with populations of about a quarter of a million.

Transformations would also be more striking among younger cohorts, powerfully influencing perceptions and assumptions among younger cohorts at school and college, which would become somewhat divorced from those of their parents and elders. For example, in the overall projection for England and Wales, by 2031 all minorities together would comprise 27% of total population but 36% among the 0–14 age-group. Among those aged 65 and over, the minority proportion would be just 11% — the national overall average in 2001. The distribution of minority proportions by age would thus reflect the process of transition. By then births of minority origin would be approaching 50%, with further change in the total inevitable. A final criterion might be specified, at a lower overall total, when the electoral and political system makes the migration process irreversible. By no means all members of minority groups support further immigration, but most do. As numbers and naturalisation grow, so will influence, as all political parties must compete for immigrant support. This effect is particularly powerful in the UK, where Commonwealth immigrants may vote without becoming UK citizens. Policies to restrict immigration may then disappear from the agenda. The recent Congressional impasse suggests that a turning point has been reached in the US. The UK may be at the same point following a recent re-alignment of policy in the only major party traditionally opposed to migration, explicitly in order to attract more support from ethnic minorities, among others.

A universal transition?

The changes discussed here are unlikely to be 'universal' in the way that the first demographic transition is expected eventually to be. They are likely to be confined to the countries of the current developed world. Even there, some major areas have so far experienced only modest immigration and limited ethnic diversification. In Japan and Korea, fears of rapid ageing and decline, and demand by some employers for immigrant labour, contend with opposition to migration in a homogeneous society. Similar conflicts of interest are apparent in Russia, despite immigration from the 'near abroad'. Elsewhere, over the last century the populations of many third-world countries have been made more homogeneous, not more diverse, by the departure, forced removal or destruction of immigrant and minority groups, some of great antiquity. Examples include Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia, Jews, Greeks and other Europeans from the Middle East, and of most Europeans from Africa. Some third-world populations are already so large that no amount of globalised migration in the far future is likely to make much difference to thee composition of their populations. All that raises a question mark over the use of the term 'transition' here except in a limited geographical context.

Further complications – the absorption and hybridisation of groups

However these projections assume that population groups remain distinct. Many substantial European migratory groups have been absorbed completely; the

17th century Huguenots in England, the Italians and Poles of 20th century France, and Jews to a more varied degree. Future populations, however, are likely to include many people of self-consciously mixed origin. For simplicity, none of the projections described here incorporate 'mixed' categories. Instead all assume that the children of mixed unions are absorbed into one or the other parental groups. However, individuals may prefer to identify explicitly with a new identity of 'mixed' origin, not one or the other of their parental groups (Shaw 1988, Phoenix and Owen 2000, Tizard and Phoenix 2000). In the US the children of parents of multiple origin are themselves mostly described as having multiple origins (Hollman and Kingcade 2005). In the British census of 2001, 661,200 people voluntarily identified themselves as 'mixed' (1.1% of the UK population), or were so identified by their parents, and 7.27 million in the US census of 2000 (2.58%; Jones 2005). A simple probabilistic projection of the growth of the mixed population in the UK, not described here, gave a median value of 8% of the total population 'mixed' by 2050, and 26% of infants (Coleman and Scherbov 2005). Preferences vary greatly. In the 2001 census of England, 22% of Chinese mothers, 18% of West Indian mothers and 7% of African mothers described their children as 'mixed', but just 3% among the primarily Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, where over half of marriages are arranged with spouses from the country of origin. The likely growth of mixed-ancestry populations further underlines the irreversibility of the processes discussed here. All this is reflected in, and possibly encouraged by, the increasing complexity of the ethnic categories used in UK and US censuses (Goldstein and Morning 2002, Jones 2005).

The potential significance of ethnic transformation

Should these demographic changes come to pass, would they actually matter? That issue raises various political and philosophical considerations untouched by earlier demographic transitions. In non-Western societies the importance and undesirability of any such change would be so axiomatic as not to warrant discussion. In majority popular opinion in the West the response would probably be similar (one can only speculate in the absence of specific opinion polls). But elite opinion is more nuanced, some finding it difficult to articulate acceptable reasons for objecting, others actively welcoming a more diverse society on various liberal humanitarian grounds. Much would depend, among other things, on the persistence of distinctions of culture, identity and attitude between immigrants and natives, whether the immigrant societies adopted native norms or their own prevailed or some hybrid society evolved, on the relative rights of the natives and immigrant populations to their own perpetuation, and whether the outcome could be accommodated in a prosperous welfare society at peace with itself.

Contrasted perceptions in Europe and the United States

The social, cultural and political impact of the projected changes could be substantial, indeed transforming, as urban daily life outside the home was

conducted more and more in the company of strangers, with an older indigenous population increasingly suburban and rural. Alternatively the transformation could be accommodated smoothly in a process of gradual adjustment, so that posterity would regard the trends described here as of little significance. For example, American success in integration is claimed to ensure that future inflows, however large and diverse, will continue be a national asset and an example to the rest of humanity (Hirschman 2005). Today's European anxieties are compared with similar fears prevalent in the US in the early 20th century, then confronted with large novel inflows of Southern and Eastern European population thought to be unable or unwilling to adjust to American norms. In Europe, however, all this is something new. Most European populations lack much pre-war experience, except for France which attracted many immigrants from Poland, Italy and elsewhere in Europe, and some from North Africa, in the early 20th century (Dignan 1981), although not without friction. Their descendants today have no identity as a 'minority'. Moreover, those inflows to the US provoked a severe and successful restriction on immigration for several decades after 1924, and major inflows to France ceased for two decades with the advent of the Second World War. That greatly facilitated integration (Graham 2004). Both countries had, and still have, strong senses of national identity with an absolute assumption, at least until recently, that immigrants will naturally adopt the identity and values of their new home, there being none better in the world.

The greater cultural, racial and religious distances between native and newer non-Western immigrant populations in Europe allied to their population growth, may lead to a less favourable outcome both for immigrants and for natives (Dench 2002). Among non-European minorities in European countries, Muslims, not Hispanics, predominate. Integrative pressures, and desires, are weaker, except for the natural inclination towards economic success. Diverse post-war immigrant cultures, with robust identities and religious faith, encounter in the receiving countries secularised liberal societies with weakened feelings of self-esteem and national identity. The revolution in rights that facilitated the immigration also tended to erode the assumption that immigrants should adapt to national norms, favouring instead more multicultural responses.

Potential difficulties with the growth of diversity

Some concerns about minority growth arise not specifically from alarm about 'ethnic replacement' but from a more general view that even the current level of diversity is problematic, and that therefore in the absence of more successful integration polices, that further growth will simply exacerbate difficulties. These points are all controversial but need to be noted. Some immigrant groups now occupy a more elevated educational, economic and social position than the average native population, as among Indians in the UK (ONS 2002). However material success may co-exist with a transnational, not a transformed identity, where population size and international communication sustain parallel societies whose numbers are continually reinforced by a

continued preference for arranged marriage from the country of origin. A high proportion of the population of other groups, usually less economically successful, remain encapsulated, especially Muslim populations: Turks in Belgium (Lesthaeghe 2000), Bangladeshis in the UK (Eade et al. 1996). Later generations may be no more assimilated than the first, or even more alienated, as appears to be the case among young North Africans in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands and Pakistanis in the UK, leading to serious problems of security. When democratic societies acquire multiple cultures (Coleman 1997) new wedges may be driven into the social structure. Identities and welfare concerns can remain focussed on kin, community and religion, not on a universal secular citizenship in a broader society – the familiar incompatibility of traditional *gemeinschaft* with modern *gesellschaft*. Imported disputes about Kashmir, the Punjab, Kurdistan, the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere, not previously thought to be related to the national interest, have become embedded in European domestic politics, and the concerns of immigrant minorities constrains foreign policy. The US itself is claimed – controversially - to provide one notable example (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, Mearsheimer et al 2006). Inter-communal friction has become more complex with more diverse inflows. It is also claimed that diversity threatens the solidarity required to maintain and fund universal welfare systems, undermining the moral consensus that underpins them (Alesina et al. 2001, Goodhart 2004).

With larger numbers, populations of foreign origin may feel less need to adapt to local norms, instead becoming more confident in extending their own values, language or laws in a wider society. The population could become disconnected from the history of the territory in which they live, and from its values, shared identity and legends (Rowthorn 2003). Different appearance would reinforce that discontinuity. As numerical balance changes, assimilation may become more and more a two-way street, and old assumptions about 'majority' values and shared identity cease to be tenable. Literalist religion may thereby regain the salience that it had mostly lost in Western Europe. A few small signs are already apparent. In the UK, for example, Muslim organisations, citing the increase in numbers shown by the 1991 and 2001 censuses and underlined by the 2001 question on religion, have pressed for the introduction of *shari'a* law in parts of the UK where they predominate, a view apparently supported by 40% of Muslims in Britain (ICM Opinion Poll, Sunday Telegraph, 19 February 2006). A recent 13-nation survey in Europe revealed strong feelings of hostility and mistrust between Muslim and indigenous populations, with anti-Western sentiment particularly marked among Muslims in the UK (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006).

No European immigrant policy, neither the accommodating multiculturalism of the UK with its group rights, nor the prescriptive secular principles of France with its theoretical insistence upon the equality of the citizen unqualified by religious or ethnic divisions, has yet overcome these difficulties.

Rights and Responses

Other concerns relate more specifically to the balance of numbers, locally and nationally. The political process in most countries has not addressed these long-term consequences of current high migration levels (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998), although in 2006 both the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany drew attention to them. However as births to immigrant or minority women approach 50% in major European cities (47% in London in 2003) the prospect is becoming more visible at least at local and provincial level.

Human rights are the starting-point for much modern political argument, and here the balance of discussion is markedly asymmetrical. Almost all concerns about 'rights' in connection with migration focuses upon the rights of immigrant populations (e.g. the Global Commission Report 2005), not upon those of the natives to conserve their own way of life, language, laws, neighbourhoods and communities, or prior privileges (Gavron et al. 2006). Principles of cultural conservation nowadays recognised and defended on behalf of the Yanomamö and Tapirapé of the Amazon forest (Colchester 2002) find little parallel on behalf the native inhabitants of Tower Hamlets or Toulouse, although their complaints would meet most of the criteria proposed for such protection (see Kendrick et al. 2004). In Europe, local nativist protests tend to be denounced as racist, xenophobic and deluded, including by anthropologists who do not accept the 'native' parallel (Kuper 2003). Instead the usual response is that such dissenters need simply to be more thoroughly re-educated on the actual benefits of immigration to themselves and to global GDP. For the most part non-European migration for permanent settlement has developed with the indifference or favour of élite opinion but in the face of consistent popular opposition. For example in the UK for some time public opinion has put immigration first or second among the issues that concern it (British Social Attitudes Survey 2004, Yougov, MORI). Even in the United States, there have been few years when opposition to current levels of immigration has not been the single largest view. (e.g Zogby Poll May 3 2006). So it is perhaps surprising that discussion of the prospect discussed here has not been sharper. It has received some critical scholarly attention (Bouvier 1991, Smith and Kim 2004, Huntingdon 2006), along with some scholarly refugation (Rumbaut et al 2006), some from thoughtful journalists (Booth 1998) and more from some think tanks and special interest groups (e.g. The Center for Immigration Studies in the US) but until recently has been politically rather quiescent.

Critical comments are muted in the media, in publishing and in academic life by pervasive pressures and self-censorship (Browne 2005). In the UK, for example, the government will not comment on the longer term consequences of high immigration ; instead merely condemning as irresponsible those who raise any less than favourable reflection on tit. However, following one of the rare media airings of 'population replacement' in the UK, minority activists and race relations workers, in the CRE, in London local government and the media,

welcomed the prospect of ethnic transformation variously as marking the final solution to white racism, as an appropriate response to colonial exploitation, or at the very least a matter of no consequence (see Browne 2000).

Conclusions

If the changes projected above come to pass, it seems reasonable to regard them as very significant and to warrant the term 'transition', even though restricted to the developed part of the world. The process is likely to be asymmetrical: the composition of the population of the developed world will come to resemble more that of the third world, but not conversely. Transformations of population composition on the scale projected have not hitherto been experienced in peaceful circumstances. Major changes would be apparent within the timescale of a century. Their effects would be irreversible although their significance is arguably contingent on the pattern of integration and assimilation, or its absence.

All this is still sensitive to policy change, noted above in Denmark and the Netherlands. Union-formation migration for marriage is the major open-ended, and accelerating, migration channel (Lievens 1999, Storhaug 2003). New immigration policy can change that. A return to the lower immigration levels of the 1980s would render obsolete the projections above, and stifle any 'third demographic transition'. On the other hand, growth in inter-ethnic unions would moderate the projected trends in a different way, generating a variety of new populations of inextricably mixed multiple origins. That is the major missing element in the projections described here.

A new homogeneity might eventually emerge, in which ethnic labels would cease to be meaningful or identifiable except to genealogists. The boundaries of some existing populations are already becoming blurred, for example those of West Indians in the UK. The children of mixed unions can identify themselves in a diversity of ways. In the end, this trend may make the identification of separate national-origin or ethnic groups, which has been taken for granted in the descriptions above, more and more difficult or even meaningless. Depending on migration levels, that would not, however, weaken the case for describing such future changes as a 'transition'.

These prospective changes are proceeding in the absence of overt intentions to procure their predictable outcome and despite widespread public opposition to the levels of migration that are driving them. Without restraint from policy, or spontaneous moderation of trend, the process is likely soon to become irreversible in some countries. In ignoring its longer term consequences the West is facilitating a radical transformation of the composition of its societies and the ending of a specific heritage: a transition by default, through embarrassment at discussing difficult issues, or in a fit of absence of mind. Democratic approval might have been thought necessary for so notable and permanent a change, the prospect of which would have been dismissed as absurd just a few decades ago.

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Paul Demeny

GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: CONFLICTING PROSPECTS

Admission of new members by a group — whether a family, a club, or a nation—that imposes significant potential costs and / or confers potential benefits on those who belong to it is of evident concern to the existing members. Directly or indirectly, if often with a time lag, the number and quality of the new entrants will affect, positively or negatively, existing members' material welfare and social well-being. The distribution of costs and benefits experienced by the existing members consequent upon admission of new entrants may be highly uneven. For an orderly admission process decisionmaking rules need to be adopted that can effectively reconcile conflicting interests. Inevitably, these rules, hence their ultimate outcome, will reflect the distribution of power and influence within the group. Outcomes that are satisfactory to some may not be welcomed by others. Group size and homogeneity of interests as perceived by the relevant decisionmakers strongly affect the prospect for agreement on the desirability of adding new members. Small group size facilitates bargaining and tradeoffs as does similarity of tastes and values. The smallest unit of society beyond the individual, the family, illustrates this potential. Although interests even within a family can diverge, and decisionmaking power is not necessarily equitably distributed, family decisions on whether to opt for expansion—by having a child, or an additional child—or against it tend to be accepted by observers as optimal from the point of view of the family itself.

Membership rules in large groups

In inclusive large groups, such as nations, defined essentially by territoriality, the issue is far more complicated.

There are two and only two avenues for entry into membership in a population that constitutes a nation: through immigration or through birth.

Group interest in determining the desirable degree of expansion, if any, is explicitly claimed by all modern states. Control of immigration, whether or not such control is effectively exercised, is recognized in international law as the sovereign right of every nation. This rule is subject only to qualifications, notably admission of bona fide political refugees, whose numerical importance is generally modest. The decision to grant entry to membership is a collective prerogative, governed by the accepted rules of the political decisionmaking process. Given the differences in economic and cultural interests as perceived by the various members of an existing national population, immigration policy in any given time and nation is likely to reflect a compromise.

For example, in the United States, long the major immigration country in the developed world, expressed group interests range from calls for complete

prohibition of further immigration to advocacy of open borders. Apart from sharply differing numerical preferences, there are also great differences of opinion with respect to selection criteria that ought to be applied in accepting immigrants. As a result, the existing policy may be considered unsatisfactory by most members of the American polity, yet accepted as the best outcome available in the bargaining process that led to its adoption. Immigration policy is recognized as a classic collective good — an institutional arrangement serving the common interest for the satisfaction of which individuals acting through private markets can make no provision. The arrangement requires collectively financed structures and personnel for its effective functioning.

Migration demographics

Given the marked differences among countries with respect to levels of income, economic opportunity, and quality of social and political institutions bearing on individual freedom, the incentive to migrate from countries situated at lower levels of this gradient to countries higher-placed is expected to be strong. Since the end of World War II, despite barriers to immigration, net inflows into the richer countries, most notably those of Western Europe and Northern America have shown a steadily increasing trend. Thus, for example, net immigration to the United States in the decade of the 1950s was less than 3 million. By the last decade of the twentieth century, net immigration exceeded 11 million. The trend of inflows from outside Western Europe to Western European countries was less steady, but still exhibited a strong upward trend. By the first quinquennium of the twenty-first century the average annual net inflow to the United States and to the European Union (EU25) was well above 1 million each.

But to extrapolate such trends into the future is extremely difficult. This can also be said about the other drivers of population change, fertility and mortality. Nevertheless, there is a dominant behavioral and policy underpinning for predicting future mortality trends — unforeseen and presumably low-probability catastrophes aside. Albeit to a lesser degree, theoretical considerations and empirical observations similarly delineate plausibly constrained ranges for future fertility trends. In contrast, as to the magnitude of future international migration flows, the effect of policy factors is likely to be paramount, hence predictions are on extremely shaky ground.

The influential population projections of the United Nations Population Division (United Nations 2007) illustrate this difficulty clearly. Citing a few figures should suffice here. The projections are prepared country-by-country, but their aggregation by broad regions provides a meaningful if rough summary picture. For 2000–2005, the United Nations estimates regional average annual net migration flows presented in table 1.

What will the future bring according to the United Nations? Remarkably, the UN assumes that the first 5 years of the new century were somehow exceptional: beyond 2005 these magnitudes will be attenuated, albeit by a relatively modest

degree. Thus, specifically, the annual average estimates for net flows for 2005–2010 are (in thousands) –389 for Africa, –1209 for Asia, +951 for Europe, –849 for Latin America and the Caribbean, +1399 for Northern America, and +98 for Oceania. The estimated net flow from LDCs to MDCs drops to 2514 annually in 2005–2010 and stabilizes at 2272 annually after 2025. All-in-all, for the entire 45-year period 2005–2050, the UN assumes a net inflow of 103 million persons into the more developed regions from the less developed ones.

Table 1. Regional average annual net migration flows, 2000–2005, in thousands

Africa	–442
Asia	–1413
Europe	+1590
Latin America and Caribbean	–1366
Northern America	+1507
Oceania	+125
Less developed regions (LDCs)	–3290
More developed regions (MDCs)	+3290

These are stylized scenarios, presented without strong suggestion of verisimilitude. Indeed, when the UN Population Division undertook preparation of long- range projections beyond 2050 (United Nations 2004), international migration was simply ignored as a factor affecting country– or regional-level population dynamics. Beginning in 2050, international migration was assumed to drop precipitously to zero.

Are the UN-assumed future migration flows "large" or "small"? The question is perhaps fatuous, but relating the presumed number of migrants to total population size is not meaningless. The 103 million migrants leave only a little dent in the projected growth of the less developed regions: despite that outflow, the UN medium-variant projections (the projections that incorporate fertility assumptions considered the most likely) yield a 2050 total population figure of 7.9 billion. This represents a net population gain over the 2005 figure of more than 2.6 billion. On the receiving side, the picture is qualitatively different: the 103 million inflow (plus the descendants of these migrants that might, grosso modo, add to that figure another 30 or so million) prevents a substantial population decrease that the medium projection would otherwise imply. With immigration, the MDC group grows from 1216 million in 2005 to 1245 million in 2050 — a modest gain of some 30 million.

The stasis envisaged by the UN's international migration assumptions for the next four-plus decades is of course prima facie implausible. This is not to say that more likely alternatives can be persuasively specified. What *is* certain is that the radical shifts in relative population sizes of regions and countries will occur during this period, paralleled by even greater shifts in relative economic and geopolitical weights. The dominant element in the latter is commonly seen to be

the rise of China and India as major industrial powers, perhaps also complemented by the emergence of Brazil as a third new economic player on the global scene. Mirroring that shift will be the relative loss of weight, both in demographic and economic terms, of Europe, Japan, and the United States. The UN medium projections (incorporating the international migration assumptions noted above) would set the 2050 population size of a perhaps 30-member European Union (not including Turkey) at about 500 million, that of Russia at 108 million, that of Japan at 103 million, and that of the United States at 402 million. In contrast, the new large industrial powers will combine economic strength with much larger populations: China's mid-century population being projected at 1409 million, India's at 1658 million. Brazil's population size puts it into a lower demographic league, but at 254 million it will still appreciably exceed the combined demographic weights of Japan and Russia.

The prospects for development in the rest of the world are cloudier, except in the matter of population, especially notably so in the case of Africa. Despite the assumed outmigration, population size in that continent is projected by the UN medium-variant to go from 922 million in 2005 to 1998 million in 2050. In combination with political and institutional problems, that will be likely to handicap economic gains. But even in the case of the economic success stories, average income differences in per capita terms are virtually certain to persist between today's more developed countries and countries that are today still less well off. Relative differences may narrow but absolute differences will remain large. If so, the main motive force in international migration will continue to exert strong pressure for people to move.

Globalization's pull

The central factor in the rise of the less developed countries is globalization: the increasing integration of the world economy as a result of the international mobility of capital, technology, and organizational know-how and the intensification of international trade in goods and services. This development until recently encompassed only a fraction of the world's population, being largely limited to the economies of the older industrialized countries — Western Europe, Northern America, Japan, and countries of relatively small demographic weight, notably the "tiger" economies of East Asia. In the last two decades the process, enhanced by formal agreements among countries, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), has accelerated, increasingly assuming a truly global character.

The institutionalized free (or at least much freer, in comparison to past times) movement of capital and technology and of goods and services, however did not and does not include the free movement of the other crucial factor of production: human labor. International migration has remained, at least as a fundamental principle, under the sovereign control of national states, to be regulated in the national interest as country governments define it. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights expresses the special status of migration regulation. Paragraph 13 of the Declaration tersely states: (1) Everyone has the right of freedom of movement

and residence within the borders of each state; and (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Thus, freedom of movement across national boundaries is not a right, and the right to leave one's country is a right that can be exercised only if another country is willing to accept the would-be migrant.

This unilateral authority of each state to set the rules of immigration has been increasingly questioned in modern times. Desultory attempts in the interwar years, notably through the International Labor Office of the League of Nations, toward bringing international migration under some degree of supranational regulation amounted to little.

Indeed, international migration in the 1930s reached its nadir in modern times. After World War II, reconstruction and rapid economic development created strong demand for imported labor in the leading capitalist countries, resulting in increasingly liberal provisions as to the permitted level of immigration, both in the United States and in Western Europe. In some cases these took the form of bilateral arrangements for importing workers on a temporary basis — such as the *bracero* program in the United States and a variety of guest worker programs in Western Europe. Further on, legal permanent immigration was allowed on a larger scale, barriers to non-legal immigration were only loosely enforced, and illegal immigration, through periodic legalization, came to provide an important back door to permanent residence or even to formal citizenship. Thus, astonishingly, the present-day United States population contains 12 million-plus foreigners well incorporated in the American labor force yet in a formal legal status of deportable law-breakers.

Not surprisingly, the reality and the perception of large-scale immigration as a problematic transformer of the domestic economy and society have become an increasingly controversial issue in the receiving countries. This is amplified by the expectation that recent inflows may be only a harbinger of even larger-scale immigration in the coming decades. The economic logic of capitalist international development would clearly favor weakening or abolishing national barriers to the creation of a globalized labor market. Grass-roots sentiment and often official government policy in populous low-wage countries are supportive of this tendency. Yet freedom of international labor movements has effects that are qualitatively different from the consequences of free international trade of goods and services and of capital and technology. Under national control the latter can be modified should the balance of economic and social costs and benefits suggest that some roll-back of globalization is advantageous for a given country. But labor movements entail settlement of people that to a large measure tends to be permanent. Roll-back then is not even a theoretical option.

Internationalizing international migration policy?

The notion that regulating immigration in the spirit of the prevailing Westphalian system, that is, in the national interest, however defined, is an

unsatisfactory arrangement for the international community at large has led, in recent years, to increasingly frequent proposals for reform. Countries of large immigration have resisted such proposals and prevented the creation of formal international bodies occupied with the issue on an operational level, such as within the WTO. Discussion of international migration even at talk fests such as the series of intergovernmental population conferences has been only perfunctory, in deference to the wishes of major immigration countries. A number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions have nevertheless addressed the question of migration, typically exhorting member states to strengthen international cooperation "at all levels" in the area of international migration "in order to address all aspects of migration and to maximize the benefits of international migration to all those concerned."

Eventually, in December 2003, "acting on the encouragement of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan," the Global Commission of International Migration was established as an independent body. The mandate of the Commission was to "provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration." The work of the Commission was assisted by a Geneva-based Secretariat and a "Core Group of States," including 32 governments from all world regions, that acted as an informal consultative body to the Commission. The Commission presented its Report in October 2005 in New York.

The Commission's Report, an 88 page document entitled "Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action," supported by a number of background studies, remains far the most notable reflection to date of views on this matter among influential international elites. Its globalist perspectives are at odds with strong political voices in migrant-receiving countries that seek to maintain strict national control over migration and favor reforms restricting rather than expanding international migration flows. The Report deserves attention as a possible harbinger of future efforts to qualify national sovereignty in regulating the movement of persons across national borders with the intent of more or less permanent settlement. While the Report has considerable merit in discussing important problems affecting the welfare of international migrants and related human rights issues, in the following I focus, however briefly, on its weaknesses rather than its positive contributions.

- Policies on international migration are inherently controversial. Even when factual findings are agreed upon, their evaluation is affected by values, ideology, and particular material interests. Reconciling conflicting views can be extremely difficult, as is illustrated in the current acrimonious and thus far unresolved debate about immigration legislation in the US Senate. Remarkably, little acknowledgement of the existence of such sharp conflicts surfaces in the Report. It is a consensus document, crafted by good will and good intentions but showing that its authors see the world through a common lens. Unanimity thus is not reassuring: it suggest unanimity by selection — in effect by invitation list.

- At the center of debates on international migration are the issues of scale and composition. Emphasizing that international migration is a "normal" process that has powerfully shaped human history since the earliest times and is bound to be a permanent feature also of the modern state system is vacuous since the point is plainly true. To give the proposition tangible content, numbers and structures need to be brought in and the desirability of those quantities and qualities needs to be assessed. Yet the Report is a virtually numberless document, neglecting to calibrate its analyses. It does offer a 3-page appendix ("Migration at a glance") with such tidbits as "Almost half of the world's international migrants are women (48.6%)", or "The Chinese diaspora has an estimated 35 million people". The substantive analysis of the Report, however, does not deal in quantities.
- The strong and laudable emphasis of the Report on human rights is entirely lopsided. It focuses on the rights of the migrants but pays little attention to the receiving populations whose rights may be negatively affected by the changes that international migration imposes on their way of life and social arrangements.
- There is a glaring asymmetry between the emphasis on the positive impact immigrants have on the economy — performing jobs natives presumably are unwilling to perform, providing special skills that may be in scarce supply — in the receiving country and the perfunctory attention to negative consequences: economic, social, environmental, and security-related. Concern with such factors is often attributed to "fear" of the foreigner.
- The Report stresses the advantages of greater diversity consequent upon international migration. But it leaves open obvious questions on how much diversity is optimal or is desired by the receiving population and omits discussion of much negative evidence from many countries of the world on social, economic, and political problems associated with great cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity.
- The Report fails to give attention to the differential impact of immigration on strata of the receiving population differentiated by economic status, income, class, social position, and according to jobs held. Domestic conflicts concerning immigration policy revolve around the differences in gains and losses expected or experienced by the receiving population classified along such criteria.
- The Report does not offer a description or critical analysis of the process through which domestic migration policies are adopted. The bias resulting from a possible asymmetry between relatively few actors, such as those representing business interests, that favor immigration, hence have an incentive to influence the relevant political decisions on the one hand, and numerically large segments of the population that may have negative but not strongly held views on large-scale immigration, on the other hand, remains unexamined.
- Globalization — freer trade and freer flow of financial and technological resources — has brought, and holds out the promise of, major benefits to the

vast majority of the world's people even though those benefits are unevenly distributed. Continuing expansion of globalization is highly probable. Pure economic logic, as noted above, strongly suggests that globalization's benefits would be enhanced if international migration of labor, a key factor of production, were less restricted by domestic policies or even left entirely unimpeded. The Report fails to critique the applicability of that logic for formulating immigration policies at the country level. Yet the implications of labor mobility across international borders are qualitatively different from the mobility of other factors of production.

- Modern industrial states, the major receiving countries of economic migrants, are welfare states, with elaborate arrangements about income redistribution in the domains of health and educational services, unemployment insurance, and pension rights. Such schemes serve as crucial supports for social cohesion and relative civility in political discourse. Massive inflows of immigrants undercut the social consensus supporting the welfare state and generate new sources of social and economic tensions. The implications of the likely incompatibility of large-scale immigration with maintenance of the institutions of the modern welfare state are not examined in the Report.
- The distinction between liberalizing control over labor movements between countries at similar levels of economic and social development, on the one hand, and liberalizing such control between countries that strongly differ with respect to average income levels and patterns of demographic behavior, notably fertility, on the other hand, would be expected to be a potent factor in formulating discriminating immigration policies that advantage the former relation. Free movement of persons allowed within the European Union, in contrast to barriers to immigration from the outside into the EU, illustrates this pattern. The Report's focus is squarely on LDC to MDC migration.
- Attention to buoyant labor demand in dynamic industrial economies where domestic labor supply is presumedly inadequate to meet that demand is considered an important factor calling for compensating immigration. But the implicit premise that that particular adjustment is preferable to alternatives not involving importation of labor is not argued. For example, in the United States the projected addition to the population of another 100 million persons by mid-century would be largely attributable to immigration. Yet for achieving higher levels of income per capita, securing greater environmental amenities, and assuring sustainability, the desirable size and pace of population expansion, if any, may be that arising only from natural domestic demographic dynamics rather than from labor inflows. Such alternative options to migration are not pondered in the Report. Even in situations characterized by prospective absolute shrinkage of the size of age groups considered relevant in labor supply, as is the case in many European countries and in Japan, adjustment policies other than importing foreign labor may be preferable as seen from the vantage point of immigration countries.

- Importing labor to alleviate economic problems imposed by population aging is seemingly a valid argument for more permissive immigration policies. The Report recognizes that such relief is temporary, unless migration is continuously sustained, because the migrant population also ages. The inequity in such a remedy, however, is not brought out. The downward adjustment of fertility mandated by low mortality causes rapid population aging also in the economically less developed countries. For them, a similar policy of counteracting the effect of aging will not be open; they will find themselves, as it were, latecomers in a global Ponzi scheme. Just as the problems of rapid population growth cannot be effectively negated by encouraging migration to low-fertility countries, high-income countries should be obligated to find home-grown solutions for population aging.

Formal recognition of the principle that the formulation of immigration policy is properly a task for the government of each individual state did not prevent the Global Commission from urging further steps that would continue its work. One aim of the Report was to serve as input to the High-Level Dialogue on the nexus between international migration and development that took place in September 2006 at the UN General Assembly. A voluminous report of the UN Secretary-General on that subject, issued in May 2006, that largely reflected the Commission's work, was also debated at the Dialogue.

In effect the ultimate aim of these activities appears to be achievement of some degree of supranational regulation of migratory movements, much in the same spirit as this was first proposed in 1927 by Albert Thomas, the then Director-General of the International Labor Office (Thomas, 1927). Given the resistance to such ideas by many of the affected governments, this promises to be a slow process, with uncertain outcome. The key proposal of the Commission, stated in the closing paragraph of its Report, was "the immediate establishment of a high-level inter-institutional group to define the functions and modalities of, and pave the way for, an Inter-agency Global Migration Facility. This Facility should ensure a more coherent and effective institutional response to the opportunities and challenges presented by international migration." This proposal was heeded, but what has ensued to date is a far cry from a WTO-like creation. The Facility is complemented by the also newly formed Geneva-based Global Migration Group, with membership of 10 UN organizations "involved in international migration and related issues". The Group "seeks wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration".

The High-Level Dialogue also spawned a Global Forum for Migration and Development, a gathering to assemble first in Brussels in July 2007, hosted by the Government of Belgium. Yearly meetings to follow, the 2008 one in Manila. The overall tone is one of cheerleading for the promotion of international migration. In the words of the Belgian minister welcoming the opening of the

web site of the Forum and praising its logo: "it shows movement, dynamism, enthusiasm, which is for us characteristic of the migration and development phenomenon. It symbolizes exchange of ideas, collaboration and integration. People are moving more and more, not only from the South to the North, and vice versa, but also from the South to the South and within States." The migration phenomenon, the minister said, is "probably the most important stake of the twenty-first century."

Assumptions of the UN population projections notwithstanding, perhaps people *will* move more and more in the twenty-first century, especially "from the South to the North." Or perhaps they will move less. As a sober passage in the Global Commission's Report states (paragraph 28), "migration policies will not be guided solely by the laws of economics or demography. Many states and societies remain uncomfortable with the notion of large-scale and continuous immigration, especially if the new arrivals have a different ethnic, cultural and religious background from the majority of citizens. Large-scale labour migration will not be promoted by governments if it is perceived as a threat to social cohesion and electoral success." Agnosticism concerning the unfolding of this most important stake of the twenty-first century is well warranted.

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Vladimir Iontsev, Ivan Aleshkovski

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In the second half of the 20th century the mankind became a witness of insuperable and irreversible power of globalization processes, which affect all spheres of social life and create global system of interdependency between countries and nations. This growing interdependency is related to:

- development of integration processes and expanding economic interdependency between national economies;
- growing gap in the levels of economic development between developing and developed countries caused, inter alia, by demographical factor;
- improvement of communication facilities and transport system, which allows information, goods and people to move free and quickly even between territories which are located very far from each other;
- activities of international institutes and transnational corporations, which engage employees from different countries and promote their movements across the borders;
- social connections that develop due to international migration of population and as a result of interracial marriages, in particular. This migration promotes formation of the global system of mutual aid.

Globalization processes within impetuous changes in global political and economical systems have abrupt intensification of global migration streams and witnessed dramatic shifts in global migration trends that are resulting in formation of a new stage of migration history of the mankind.

The most significant of these trends are:

– unprecedented growth of the international migration scale and formation of "nation of migrants";
– widening geography of international migration flows by involving practically all the countries of the world in migration flows;
– qualitative changes in the structure of the world migration flows in compliance with the requirements of globalizing labor market;
– determinant role of economic migration, primarily labour migration;
– sufficient growth and structural insuperability of illegal migration;
– growth of the scale and geographical widening of forced migration;
– growing importance of international migration for demographic development of the world, both sending and receiving countries;
– dual character of migration policy at international, regional and national levels.

We have summarized these trends already in the 1990s (see Iontsev, 1999) and by now, they have become well-formed. That's why we turn back to these trends taking into account new data and new peculiarities in the 21st century.

Growth of the international migration scale

The collapse of former USSR and appearing on its place separate independent states, important political and social changes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of former Yugoslavia and prolonged conflict between Serbians and Albanians, crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990, civil war in Rwanda and in Afghanistan – all these and other events of 1990s set in motion vast and often uncontrolled international migration flows and moved out international migration of population among the most important global phenomena, which had an influence on the world economy and, accordingly, conditions of its globalization.

Even because of the scale of international migration we can talk about it as about the phenomenon, which has a global influence. According to the United Nations Population Division 2006 estimates, more than 191 million persons live outside their country of birth, 61 per cent of all international migrants live in the more developed regions. Currently "classical" international migrants make up nearly 1 of every 35 persons in world; totally migrants make up almost 1 of every 10 persons in the developed regions and nearly 1 of every 70 persons in developing regions. Taken together, international migrants would now constitute the world's fifth most populous nation if they all lived in the same place — after China, India, the United States and Indonesia (UNFPA, 2006, p. 6).

It should be noted that these figures do not include illegal immigrants whose number according to the different estimations amounts from 10 to 15% of all international migrants (from 20 to 35 million persons) and international tourists whose number exceeded 840 million in 2006 in comparison with 69 million in 1960 and 687 million in 2000. Whether we would add 150–180 million labour migrants together with their family members and more than 10 million seasonal and frontier workers, and not less than 60 million forced migrants (refugees, displaced persons, asylum seekers, 'ecological refugees', etc.), so we will have the total number of persons who are involved in international migrations in this or that form is more than one billion persons. It means that if we summarize al the categories of migrants, every sixth Earth's inhabitant is international migrant, in fact!

The latter makes us talk about formation of the so called "nations of migrants", which can be compared by its quantity with quantity of biggest nations of the world. In fact, the fate of "everlasting exile" mythical Ahasverus is not just a myth but the real destiny of many people wandering over the world in search for better life, getting knowledge, getting informed with world's progresses in culture and science, for the rest and cure etc.

It is not by chance that arguments like "the essence of our epoch is expressed by a nomad — a man who is wandering from one place to another" or "in the future society all people despite their culture will be migrating" or "the most important factor of integration that has been acting since the very beginning of humankind and that provides an opportunity to overcome various processes of alienation, is the continuing disposition of population to move" are becoming wide-spread (Iontsev, 2002, p. 10).

Table 1. Dynamics of international migration, 1965–2005

	Stock of international migrants, mln. of persons						Annual growth rate of international migration, %				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	1960-1965	1970-1975	1980-1985	1990-1995	2000-2005
World	75,46	81,34	99,28	154,95	176,74	190,63	0,8	1,3	2,2	1,3	1,5
Developed regions	32,31	38,36	47,46	82,37	105,00	115,40	1,8	2,0	2,4	2,8	1,9
Developing regions	43,15	42,97	51,82	72,58	71,73	75,24	-0,1	0,6	2,4	0,4	0,2
Europe	14,24	18,79	21,89	49,38	58,22	64,12	3,1	1,4	1,4	2,3	1,9
Africa	9,13	9,94	14,10	16,35	16,50	17,07	0,7	2,0	0,5	1,9	0,7
Asia	28,48	27,82	32,11	49,89	50,30	53,29	-0,2	0,2	2,9	-1,1	1,2
Latin America and Caribbean	6,01	5,68	6,08	6,98	6,28	6,63	-0,6	0,2	0,6	-2,9	1,1
North America	12,51	12,99	18,09	27,60	40,39	44,49	0,3	3,3	4,1	3,9	1,9
Oceania	2,13	3,03	3,75	4,75	5,05	5,03	3,6	2,0	2,2	1,2	-0,1

Source*:* International Migration 2006. New York, United Nations, 2006; Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision http://esa.un.org/migration; International Migration Flows: to and from Selected Countries: The 2005 Revision. New York, United Nations, 2006.

The important indicator of the growing dynamism of international migration flows is international migrants number' growth rate, which permanently increase. In the last decade of 20th century it was 3,1% a year; it was primarily connected to the collapse of socialist system and involvement of peoples former USSR, countries of East and Central Europe in global migration flows.

Table 1 demonstrates that the number of "classic" international migrants (including refugees) has more than doubled over the last 45 years,, from an estimated 75 million in 1960 to nearly 191 million in 2005. In other words, number of migrants during 1960–2005 grew annually at 1.9% on average, which is higher rate in comparison with the total world population growth rate (1.8% annually). Between 1990 and 2005 the number of international migrants in the world grew up on 36 million persons, and their growth rate increased from 1.4% in 1990–1995 to 1.9% in 2000–2004. In 1990-2005, in the developed countries the number of migrants grew up on 33 million while in developing regions – by 3 million people. Nowadays net migration accounts three quarters of population size growth in developed regions while in developing regions emigration has not led to significant decreases in population growth.

Table 2. Largest countries by the proportion of international migrants in the total population, 1960 and 2005

Country	1960	Country	2005
Israel	56,1%	Qatar	78,3%
Jordan	43,1%	U.A.E.	71,4%
Kuwait	32,6%	Kuwait	62,1%
Qatar	32,0%	Singapore	42,6%
Singapore	31,7%	Bahrain	40,7%
Brunei	25,2%	Israel	39,6%
Cot-d'Ivoire	18,0%	Jordan	39,0%
Bahrain	17,1%	Saudi Arabia	25,9%
Australia	16,6%	Oman	24,4%
Canada	15,0%	Switzerland	22,9%

Note: included only countries which population is more that 500 thousands people.
Source: United Nations. Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision http://esa.un.org/migration.

The important indicator of international migration scale is the growing part of international migrants in the total population in assuming states. Despite the proportion of international migrants worldwide has remained relatively low, growing only from 2.5 per cent of the total world population in 1960 to 3.0 per cent in 2005, changes in certain states became more essential. In 1960, there were 27 countries in the world where the percentage of international migrants was up to 10%, while in 2005 the number of such countries reached 50; in 10 countries the share of international migrants in total population exceeds 20%. Most significantly the share of migrants in the total population during 1960–2005 increased in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf: in Bahrain from 17.1% to 40.7%, in Kuwait from 32.6% to 62.1%, in Qatar from 32.0% to 78.3%, in U.A.E. from 2.4% to 71.4%, in Saudi Arabia from 1.6% to 25.9% (table 2).

So, in the contemporary world international migration flows became the global phenomena, which have an influence on all spheres of life of the world community, and international migration became one of key factors of social and economic development of states.

Expansion of geography of international migration flows

Nowadays in fact all countries of the world are involved in international migration to smaller and bigger extent. Even such "closed" states as Northern Korea, Cuba, or China are involved more and more actively in world migration processes, at that emigration from them is controlled much more strictly than immigration, contrary to many other countries. In China, for example, illegal emigration from the country is severely punished, up to death penalty.

It's necessary to note, that in spite of the fact that the majority of international migrants originate from developing countries, contemporary migration flows have not only a "South-North" or "East-West" vectors. Nearly half of all reported migrants move from one developing country to another and approximately the same part move from developing countries to the developed ones. In other words, number of migrants who move from «south to south», approximately balances number of migrants who move from «south to north» (UN, 2006, p. 7).

In the 21st century, all countries and territories in the world are, in one way or another, countries of destination for some migrants. The age of fast transportations within the world affect every countries, and international migrants appear everywhere. According to the UN Population Division, in 2005 the only sovereign state in the world, in which the number of international migrants was less than 1 thousand persons, was the republic Tuvalu (number of it's inhabitants doesn't exceed 10,5 thousand persons).

If in 1965 there were 41 countries with number of migrants more than 300 thousands persons, in 2000 the number of such countries became 66, and by 2005 it reached 78, and in 37 of them the number of international migrants exceeded 1 million persons, while in 20 countries it exceeded 2 million.

Diagram 1 based on the UN data shows 20 largest countries by number of international migrants staying there. At the top of the list are the USA (38.4 mln. persons), Russia (12.1 mln. persons) and Germany (10.1 mln. persons).

Russia is at the second position in this list. Though Russia's national statistics data is different from the UN criteria of *foreign-born persons*, the total number of immigrants to Russia between 1992–2006 — 11.5 million persons (among them: 7.3 million of officially registered as "arrived for permanent residence", 1.2 million of refugees, 3 million of non-status immigrants[9]) — also confirms Russia's second position in the world hierarchy of receiving countries.

[9] Non-status immigrants are not illegal migrants. This category has appeared as a result of "transparent" borders between former Soviet states when people who moved to Russia in the beginning of 1990's succeeded in living and working there for years, however, due to poor legislation couldn't obtain the Russian citizenship



Source: International Migration 2006. United Nations.

When speaking about the geography of international migration of population, it is necessary to pay attention to its regional differences. As one can see from tables 1 и 2, considerable changes in regional distribution of international migrants have taken place over the last 50 years. In 1960, the major part of international migrants (57,2%) were in developing regions, while nowadays 61% of all international migrants live in developed countries.

Table 3. Regions structure of international migration stock, 1960–2005

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	2000	2005
World	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Developed regions	42,8	47,2	47,8	53,2	57,5	59,4	60,5
Developing regions	57,2	52,8	52,2	46,8	42,5	40,6	39,5
Europe	18,9	23,1	22,1	31,9	33,5	32,9	33,6
Africa	12,1	12,2	14,2	10,6	10,9	9,3	9,0
Asia	37,7	34,2	32,4	32,2	28,6	28,5	28,0
Latin America and Caribbean	8,0	7,0	6,1	4,5	3,7	3,6	3,5
North America	16,6	16,0	18,2	17,8	20,3	22,9	23,9
Oceania	2,8	3,7	3,8	3,1	3,1	2,9	2,6

Source: United Nations. Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision http://esa.un.org/migration.

The latter is connected with the fact that in developed countries the number of migrants increased more than 83 million between 1960 and 2005 (3.5 times), whereas in developing countries the increase was barely 32 million (1.7 times). The growth of the migrant stock has been mostly concentrated in Europe and North America, where the number of international migrants rose 4.5 and 3.5 times accordingly.

Disintegration of the socialist system and formation of the new Eurasian migration system at the territory of the former Soviet Union with total population more than 230 mln persons, considerably influence on the geography of international migration flows. Due to historical and socio-economical reasons, Russia has become the center of this system attracting millions of migrants from the former Soviet states[3].

Nowadays Europe is the region with the greatest number of international migrants (over 64 mln in 2005), it is followed by Asia (53.3 mln), North America (44.5 mln), and Africa (17.1 mln).

The main "suppliers" of migrants are developing countries, from where, by estimations of Hania Zlotnik, more than 59 mln persons moved to the developed countries during 30 years (1960 – 1990) (Zlotnik, 1996, p. 314). This fact proves growing intensity of world migration flows and their globalization, because it took almost 120 years for movement of the same number of Europeans across the ocean since 1820. It is worth noting that almost all "new" international migrants between 1991 and 2005 were received by the developed countries (33 mln from 35,7 mln).

Thus, the shits in the global migration situation over the last 50 years were primarily were related to considerable changes of geography of international migrant flows and increasing number of countries involved in international migration processes.

Quality shifts in migration flows structure

Deep changes that have happened in the world in the second half of the 20th century are rooted in the development of the post-industrial sector of economy and corresponding transformation of the global labor market demands, as well as liberal reforms and democratic shifts in the post-communist and developing countries. This has called for qualitatively new stage in international migration. The key changes in international migration regime are the following:

Shift from permanent to temporary migration

Existing data do not provide reliable information on temporary migration flows (because either entry visa is not required or the migrations are irregular) and the major part of temporary movements are not fixed by statistics, while detailed information on temporary migrants is not regular. Meanwhile, surveys

[3] For more details please refer to the paper of Dr. Irina Ivakhnyuk in the present volume.

conducted in some countries of destination and tourist statistics prove that during the recent five decades number of permanent (or long-term) migrants was gradually growing, however, numbers and frequency of short-term movements was growing much faster (see tables 4–5). By "short-term movements" we mean seasonal, circular, episodic migrations, including those with tourist visa. As contemporary "tourists" are often economically motivated migrants (up to some estimates, over 2/3 visitors with tourist visas are in fact economic migrants who enter a country of destination with an intention to find job, most often illegally, there). Thus, we tend to include tourists in the totality of international migrants despite the preconceived idea (for more details please refer to: Iontsev, Ivakhnyuk, 2002, p. 38–42).

Among all the forms and types of international migration, labor migration was growing most rapidly during the last decades. Table 4 shows that between 1992 and 2000 number of temporary labor migrants entering the USA increased four times, in Austria — threefold, in the UK — twofold.

It is connected, on the other hand, with spreading and more greater availability of transport facilities, making migration of people easier and «reducing» distance between countries and continents. In these conditions temporary work abroad is more preferable for individuals, than emigration, because it is connected with less material and non-material costs (see Aleshkovski, 2005, p. 26–27; UN, 2006a, p. 42–45).

Table 4. Number of labor migrants, annually entering ceratin developed countries, 1992–2003, thousands

	1992	2000	2001	2002	2003
Australia	40	111	122	129	136
United Kingdom	64	113	136	150	…
Germany	333	290	330	348	359
Italy	2	31	90	…	…
USA	48	219	262	223	227
France	18	15	20	23	…
Japan	152	184	201	204	…

Source: UN, 2006.

Table 5. Number of international tourists, 1990–2005

	1990	1995	2000	2003	2004	2005	2006
World	439	540	687	694	764	806	842

Source: World Tourism Organization, 2006.

On the other hand, globalization of world labor market requires more flexibility of migration behavior that can be partially guaranteed by labor migration. Attraction of foreign workers on temporary basis also corresponds to goals of immigration policy in developed countries that are the "globalization elite" and in many respects define conditions, under which other countries participate in globalization processes (Ivakhnyuk, 2005, p. 134).

Shifts in the qualitative structure of migration flows

On the labor markets of developed countries that determine direction and activity of international labor migration flows there exists stable demand for foreign labor at 2 qualification "poles": workers with low skills and workers with high skills in technologically advanced occupations. At the same time, demand for foreign labor in countries of destination evolves towards more qualified labor force, and receiving countries strenuously encourage attraction of qualified immigrants in the branches and sectors of national economy that face labor deficit. So, in July 2007 the Commissar of the European Commission on Justice, Freedom and Security Franko Frattini announced that soon high-skilled citizens of countries, which are not the EU member states, will be able to come easily. It will be first of all doctors, engineers, scientists and computer specialists. Some European countries (among them Germany) choose the way of liberalization of their national immigration legislation for qualified workers and issue "green card" for some categories of labor migrants (see Aleshkovski, 2005).

Shifts in the qualitative structure of migration flows mean first of all the growth of the percentage of skilled professionals among international migrants. This trend is closely related to probably the most painful phenomenon in international migration, "brain drain", i.e. non-return migration of highly skilled specialists — scientists, engineers, physicians, etc. (including potential intellectuals such as students, post-graduate students, trainees). The policy having a special purpose to attract skilled personnel from other countries is widely used by developed countries, first of all by the USA. However, according to the UN estimation only financial losses of developing countries from "brain drain" exceeded 60 billion USD in the last three decades, and total values of intellectual emigration from developing countries formed from 10 to 30 percents of their intellectual potential (ILO, 2006).

On the other hand, low- and non-skilled migrants face new and new barriers on their way that close for them access to the countries of final destination. At the same time, push factors in less developed states still exist, together with pull factors in receiving countries (readiness of employers to hire cheap foreign workers 9even illegally) due to unwillingness of local citizens to take 3D vacancies. So, the receiving states are obligated to develop guest workers programs for temporary attraction of low-skilled migrants (ILO, 2006, p. 127–151).

Feminization of migration flows

It is traditionally considered, that the majority of international migrants are males. Females, when they took part in international migrations, were usually family members of male migrants. But in the beginning of the 1990s researchers noted, that today more and more women migrate not to join their partner, but in search for employment in places where they will be better paid than in their home country. By the end of the 1990s women's share among migrants in a number of developed countries exceeded 50% (in the world in a whole — 49%). In labor migration flows from Philippines, Indonesia, Peru, East European countries the share of women prevails (more than 60%) (table 6).

Table 6. Proportion of females in international migrant stock by major area, 1960–2005

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	2000	2005
World	46,8	47,2	47,2	49,0	49,3	49,7	49,6
Developed regions	48,9	48,9	49,8	52,0	51,9	52,1	52,2
Developing regions	45,3	45,8	44,8	45,7	45,8	46,1	45,5
Europe	48,4	47,7	48,1	52,8	52,7	53,4	53,4
Africa	42,3	42,7	44,1	45,9	46,6	47,2	47,4
Asia	46,4	46,8	44,6	45,2	45,2	45,4	44,7
Latin America and Caribbean	44,7	46,8	48,2	49,7	50,0	50,2	50,3
North America	50,5	51,5	52,6	51,0	50,8	50,4	50,4
Oceania	44,4	46,5	47,9	49,1	49,8	50,6	51,3

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision http://esa.un.org/migration.

In many respects, the latter fact is connected with structural modifications in the world economy, which accompany globalization processes. Development of the services economy encourage growth of this sector in the labor market structure in developed countries (textile industry, leisure industry, social service, sex services, etc.) and constantly growing need in female migrants including those occupied in unqualified jobs. At the same time, the majority of the existing labor facilities for females are in fact "risk spheres" connected with sex-employment or so-called "near sex" employment (employment, which is often mated with sex-services). These spheres offer major migration possibilities for female migrants today. (Ivakhnyuk, 2005, p. 138)

Thus, feminization of migration flows is one of important trends of the contemporary international migration, which, in its own turn, is accompanied with growth of human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and other exploitative practices. The latter happens because women tend to work in the gender-segregated sectors of economy, such as domestic services and leisure sphere, and due to the fact that they are much more prone to suffer discrimination on account of their gender than their male counterparts (IOM, 2006, p. 20). These trends issue the challenge of defending human rights of labor migrants (first of all women) in the line of priority tasks of national and international institutes, which are occupied with migration problems.

Determining role of economic migration

International migration flows develop under the influence of different factors, among which economical factors are preliminary. In its turn, the growing role and scale of economic migration (labor migration, first of all) is the most stable and long-lasting trend of international migration. It has gained crucial impulse with expansion of capitalist economy and commercialization of labor. From the point of view of globalization of the world economy the most important issue is the formation of world labor market that exists in export and import of labor resources; nowadays it has reached unprecedented scale.

In spite of the fact that it's difficult to estimate total scale of international labor migration flows because not all the countries make such control and considerable part of labor migration is illegal, international labor migration has, undoubtedly, considerable scale and growing trend. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates, at the beginning of the 21st century the total number of legal labor migrants is estimated as over 86 million (120–180 million including family-members) compared to 3.2 million in 1960; approximately 32 millions labor migrants work in the developing countries (see table 7).

Table 7. ILO estimates of migrant workers by region, 2000.

	mln. persons	%
World	86,3	100
Europe	28,2	33
Africa	7,1	8
Asia	25,0	29
Latin America and Caribbean	2,5	3
North America	20,5	24
Oceania	2,9	3

Source: Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy. Report VI. International Labour Conference, 92nd Session, 2004. Geneve, ILO, 2004. p. 7.

In spite of the fact that migrant-workers consist no more than 4,2% of the total number of economically active population of the developed countries, for many receiving countries the role of labor migration is much more significant. By estimation of the OECD, in 2004 migrant-workers consist almost 45% of labor force in Luxembourg, nearly 25% of Australia and 22% of Switzerland (see table 8). Migrant-workers are considerable part in some developing countries (first of all, in countries of the Persian Gulf). Between 1985 and 2005 number of foreigners in the six oil-producing states of the Gulf Cooperation Council increased almost twice and reached 13 mln persons (see table 9).

Table 8. Proportion of labor migrants in the total labor force, some developed countries, 2004

country	2004	country	2004
Australia*	24,90%	Japan	0,30%
Austria	8,40%	Luxembourg	45,00%
Belgium	8,00%	Netherlands	3,60%
Denmark	3,90%	Norway	3,80%
Finland	1,50%	Portugal	2,90%
France	5,40%	Spain	9,30%
Germany	9,00%	Sweden	4,50%
Greece	6,40%	Switzerland	22,00%
Ireland	5,90%	United Kingdom	5,40%
Italy	3,20%	USA	8,60%

Note: * proportion of foreign born labor force in the total labor force.
Source: Sopemi. Trends in International Migration 2006. OECD, 2006. P. 50.

Table 9. Percentage of foreign workers in the labor force and number of international migrants in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1985–2005

	1985		1995		2005	
	mls	%	mls	%	mls	%
Bahrain	137	58	219	60	295	59
Kuwait	1222	86	996	83	1669	82
Oman	327	52	573	64	628	64
Qatar	282	77	406	82	637	86
Saudi Arabia	3401	64	4611	64	6361	56
U.A.E.	1008	91	1716	90	3212	90
Total	6377	…	8521	…	12801	…

Source: OOH, 2006, p. 39.

As to geography of international labor flows, it's necessary to note that about half of registered labor migrants move from one developing country to another, where difference in wage isn't very big. For instance, about 2 million Asian workers every year leave their countries searching for jobs in other countries or regions on terms of short-term contracts. At the same time migration of workers from developing countries to developed countries steadily continues to grow up during the last decades. The USA receives the major part of increase of legal labor migrants (over 81%). As a result migrant-workers from developing countries are the biggest category of migrants in developed countries, which forms 57.8% of all labor migrants (ILO, 2004, p. 5).

It's necessary to note that many countries are sending and receiving countries simultaneously. For example, Canada is a traditional country of destination for migrants, but also it sends a great number of workers, especially having high skills, to the USA; Thailand receives considerable number of unqualified immigrants from Myanma, Cambodia, and Laos, but sends its citizens to such countries as Israel, Japan and Taiwan (ILO, 2004, p. 6). Russia is a receiving country as well as a donor country in global labor migration flows. According to Rosstat, Russia attracted more than 3,1 mln legal labor migrants between 1994 and 2004; at the same time about 1 mln of Russian work in other countries. Moreover, in the 1990s Russia was a source of millions of "commercial migrants" who are in fact international economic migrants.

Three key factors determine expansion of international labor migration and increase of its role (IOM, 2006, p. 18):

– the "pull" of changing demographic situation (first of all population ageing) and labor market needs in developed countries;
– the "push" of demographic factors in developing countries and growing differences of incomes and possibilities between developing and developed regions, and increasing gap between the most dynamically developed countries and other developing world;
– established inter-country networks based on family, culture and history.

Table 10. Top twenty countries in terms of receipts of remittances and with respect to remittances as share of GDP, 2004

country	billions of U.S. dollars	country	%
India	21,7	Tonga	31,1
China	21,3	Moldova	27,1
Mexico	18,1	Lesotho	25,8
France	12,7	Haiti	24,8
Philippines	11,6	Bosnia and Herzegovina	22,5
Spain	6,9	Jordan	20,4
Belgium	6,8	Jamaica	17,4
Germany	6,5	Serbia and Montenegro	17,2
United Kingdom	6,4	El Salvador	16,2
Morocco	4,2	Honduras	15,5

Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006, figure 4.1.

Remittances are the most immediate and tangible benefit of international labor migration. While receiving countries financially benefit from labor migration mainly via receiving tax payments, for sending countries financial inflow from migrant workers is more diverse. The World Bank estimates that, at the global level, remittance transfers more than doubled over the past decade, raising from $102 billion in 1995 to an estimated $232 billion in 2005. The share of global remittances going to developing countries has also increased, passing from 57 per cent in 1995 ($58 billion) to 72 per cent in 2005 ($167 billion) (UN, 2006, p. 54). According to the UN estimates, in 2004 the countries that receive biggest volume of migrants' transfers were India ($ 21.7 billion), China ($ 21.3 billion), Mexico ($ 18.1 billion), and Philippines ($ 11.6bilion), and remittances as percentage of GDP — Tonga (31.1%), Moldova (27.1%), Lesotho (25.8%) (see table 10).

Thus, labor migration, as a global transference of human capital, which it presents, has become an important factor of development of the global economy and at the same time it is a result and source of increasing interdependence of countries and regions of the world. Considering that international mobility of people in quest of jobs in the globalizing world will definitely increase, it is necessary for countries of origin and countries of destination of migrant-workers to develop effective and fair management of labor migration.

Permanent growth and structural irresistibility of illegal immigration

Labor migration is closely connected to another trend of contemporary international migration – permanent growth of illegal immigration.

There are no reliable data on illegal migrants in the world. According to the different estimations now from 10 to 15% of all international migrants (from 19 to 29 million people) stay in the countries of destination violating the law. Now the number of illegal migrants is about 10–15 million in the USA, 3,5 to 10 million in Russia, from 5,6 to 8,4 million in Western Europe, 1 to 3 million in South America, 1 to 3 million in the Middle East, 300 thousand to 1 million in

Japan, approximately 80 thousands in Australia, etc. In other words, totally illegal migrants are about half of legal migrant-workers, and their number is not reducing despite restricting immigration rules and special laws directed against illegal immigration. Moreover, countries where use of labor illegal migrants is widely practiced, are replenished with developing states. For example Mexico, the biggest supplier of illegal immigrants in the world, is at the same time a receiving society for about one million illegal immigrants from countries of Latin America and Caribbean. It is necessary to note that development of illegal immigration is followed by appearance of new categories and groups of migrants who violate the law (migration laws, labor codes, etc.), both in destination countries and transit countries[4].

Whatever routes and methods migrants use to enter a destination country and whatever methods are practiced to stop them, our opinion is that it is hardly possible to counteract effectively illegal migration under the existing governance of capitalistic norms when employers are interested in cheap and rightless labor of illegal migrants in receiving countries, so that illegal migrants become – as P. Linderdt argues – "pure taxpayers" beneficial for employers and receiving State. In combination with demographic pressure and economic push factors in sending countries, these circumstances make illegal migration in the contemporary world structurally irresistible.

The latter does not mean however that the scale of illegal immigration is not to be restrained. In particular, it can be done by means of more effective management of legal migration flows. The most important issue for receiving governments is to realize that illegal migration is not a form of terrorism or criminality, which is to be fought by all repression means of a State. Neither they are to run to another extreme by opening wide the doors for migrants, so that they will have to defend their indigenous citizens rights against undesirable invasion of millions of aliens.

Increase in the scale and geography of forced migration

Forced migration is a totality of spatial movements related to permanent or temporary changes in place of residence caused by extreme reasons not depending on people's will (political and ethnically based persecutions, natural disasters, technological accidents, ecological catastrophes, armed conflicts, etc.). Forced migrants include: refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers, ecological refugees, stateless persons and others. For most of them, emergency and life-threat push factors are determinative.

Increase in the scale and geography of forced migration is related to the current stage of human development filled with political tension, wars, ethnic conflicts, and ecological disasters (after World war II, over 150 global and

[4] Different forms of illegal immigration and its structure are analyzed in details in the paper of Ivan Aleshkovski and Vladimir Iontsev "Illegal immigration in the social and political discourse" in volume 18 of the present series.

regional conflicts happened over the world). During the last decade of the 20th century the number of forced migrants related to the UNHCR jurisdiction (totally 27.3 million persons in 1995) increased 1.5 times in Asia, four times in Africa, ten (!) times in Europe.

As for Europe, disintegration of Yugoslavia, long-lasting conflict between Serbs and Albanians, "ethnic cleanings" in Kosovo, NATO military operation in Yugoslavia have provoked huge waves of forced migrations. The picture was embellished with refugees from regions of civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Somalia as well as the former USSR states. Europe had never faced such a scaled forced migration since World War II: between 1989 and 2000 European countries have received about 5 million forced migrants. Russia is heavily affected by forced migration problems. After the collapse of the USSR it has become the epicenter for millions of forced migrants from former Soviet republics. Their total number is close to 3 million persons.

According to the UNHCR date, by the end of 2005 the global figure of forced migrants stood at 32.9 million, of which 13.9 millions refugees (including around 4 mln. Palestinian refugees), 12.8 mln. internally displaced persons, around 740 thousands asylum-seekers and 5.8 million stateless persons (see table 11). If 25-30 mln. of ecological refugees and other types of forced migrants are added to the above estimate, the total number of forcedly moved persons comes up to 60 mln.

*Table 11. Number of forced migrants in the world according to the UNHCR**

	1985	1990	1995	2000	2006
World	10,7	14,9	27,25	21,8	32,86
Europe	0,7	0,1	6,5	5,58	3,43
Africa	3,0	4,6	11,8	6,06	9,75
Asia	5,1	6,8	7,9	8,45	14,91
Latin America and Caribbean	0,4	1,2	0,1	0,58	3,54
North America	1,4	1,4	0,9	1,05	1,14
Oceania	0,1	0,1	0,05	0,08	0,09

* these data includes refugees from Palestine and some other categories of forced migrants (e.g. ecological refugees).
Source: UNCHR data (http://www.unhcr.org).

There are a lot of attempts to use the "refugee channel" by economic migrants who would like to improve their living standards. However, international conventions on refugees and national legislation in different countries definitely declare that persons who leave their country in quest of better living conditions or better job can't pretend for refugee status. This statement is of principal value for Russia where even official migration policy concept approves the status of so-called "economic refugees" as a part of forced migrants. This mistake results from misunderstanding of forced and voluntary forms of international migration.

Therefore, forced migration as one of essential contemporary international migration trends has gained global scale.

The increasing role of international migration in demographic development

During the major part of the mankind history changes in population size were primarily resulting from natural increase of population. Evolution of mortality and fertility, the growing gap in demographic potentials between less developed and more developed nations, as well as globalization of the world economy have resulted to the growing role of international migration in the demographic development of the globe.

Nowadays, international migration is one of the major factors of stabilization of world population. As for developed states, it is the principal (and in some countries – the only one) determinant of the population growth, while in the developing states it contributes the decrease in population growth rate and alleviates "population pressure". "Replacement ratio" is a good example: in developed countries 142 potential workers (persons at the age 20–24) run to every 100 persons over pension age (60–64 years), however, only in 100 years this ratio will be 87 : 100. In contrast, in developing countries the replacement ratio is 342 : 100.

In the context of the global tendency of decrease in population growth rate the developing regions are at the initial stage of this decrease while in the developed countries rate of natural population growth is often negative. For this reason the migration potential in developing countries remains high while developed countries are dependant on immigrants' inflow to withstand local population ageing.

Table 12 shows that since 1960 more developed countries gain population through migration from developing states. Net migration was ever growing during four decades. During 2000-2005, the more developed regions were gaining annually 3.29 million migrants from developing regions, about 40 per cents of that net flow was directed to Northern America (1.3 million annually).

Totally, about 70% of population size growth in more developed regions is resulting from migration inflow (i.e. international migration), compared to 36% in the 1960s and 48% in the 1970s. In many European countries where natural growth of population is negative, net migration is the only one factor of population increase. In the USA, the share of net migration in the total population growth is 43% (1.3 mln. persons annually), in Australia – 51% (119,000 a year); international migration is also very important for demographic growth in Canada, Israel and many other developed states.

According to United Nations Population Division data, during 2000–2005, 33 of the 45 developed countries have been net receivers of international migrants. This group includes traditional countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America, most of the populous countries in Northern, Southern and Western Europe as well as the Russian Federation and Japan (UN, 2006, p. 19).

It is important to highlight that international migration is not only a source of increasing of a total population size but at the same time it has positive efect on its age and sex structure, bringing higher reproductive standards.

In the 1990s the latter argument was used in the "replacement migration" concept, which emphasized the potential of international migration from "demographically younger regions" to compensate negative demographic trends in the "older" receiving states (for details please refer to UN, 2000). Whether "replacement migration" is able to solve population ageing problems in developed countries is a scientific discussing problem. Taking into account stable negative trends in demographic development (first of all, population ageing) in developed countries, numbers of immigrants necessary to eliminate them seem too big. Some forecasts inform us that the EU countries, in order to "compensate" ageing of their labor-active groups, are to "import" annually 12.7 million immigrants till 2050! Russia, to provide stable number of labor-age population is to admit annually (up to median forecast) about 700,000 – 800,000 migrants (net migration) and gradually increase this number up to 1.5 – 1.7 mln. by 2025.

David Coleman argues that such immigrants inflow is hardly possible. Moreover, immigration to these countries, even with the present scale, can result in replacement of indigenous population with newcomers and dramatically change ethnic structure of population in developed regions. Coleman determines this process as "the third demographic transition" (Coleman, 2006).

For Russia, international migration has gained particular importance in the 1990s because of demographic crisis, being just the sole component balancing in fact a negative demographic situation. Migration surplus for 1992–2006 was about 3.6 million persons, i.e. it compensated for 30% the natural demographic minus of 12.0 million persons. While comparing with many developed countries where migration can not only balance the natural decrease of depopulation but also be an important element of total population growth, in Russia international migration is not sufficient to reverse deep demographic crisis (which is more versatile phenomenon than depopulation). It should be noted that net migration increase considerably slowed down later: in 2006 it was 128,000 compared to 978,000 in 1994, so the compensation rate was 12,7% of natural decline in 2006 compared to 115% in 1994). Thus, the role of migration in managing demographic crisis should not be overestimated. The statement that immigration can be a solution for all the demographic problems of comtemprorary Russia is definitely a very erroneous one.

On the other hand, in developing countries international migration contributes to decrease of high population growth rate to about 4.5% a year (table 12). In 1960-2005, net migration outflow from developing countries exceeded 73 mln. persons. The major sending countries are: Mexico (797,000 net outflow a year), China (-380,000), India (-270,000), Indonesia (-200,000), and Philippines (-180,000).

In the developing countries, there also numerous receiving countries: within the Near East migration system (countries of Persian Gulf, including Qatar, Kuwait, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and others), in the Asian-Pacific region (Hong Kong (China SAR), Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea), within the South American migration system (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela).

Table 13. Annual net migration, 1950–2050, thousands

	1950–1960	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2020	2020–2030	2030–2040	2040–2050
World	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Developed regions	–3	556	1088	1530	2493	2902	2268	2269	2272	2272
Developing regions	3	–556	–1088	–1530	–2493	–2902	–2268	–2269	–2272	2272
Europe	–489	–31	288	441	1051	1271	799	805	808	808
Africa	–125	–242	–289	–267	–310	–416	–377	–395	–393	–393
Asia	194	–22	–377	–451	–1340	–1311	–1210	–1221	–1222	–1222
Latin America and Caribbean	–68	–293	–415	–781	–775	–1108	–616	–590	–595	–595
North America	403	479	748	972	1277	1453	1305	1300	1300	1300
Oceania	85	109	44	86	96	111	99	101	102	102

Source*:* World Population Prospects: the 2006 Revision. Highlights. New York, United Nations, 2006.

Table 12. The role of international migration in the demographic development

	Net migration rate, ‰	Rate of natural increase, ‰	total population growth rate, ‰	Net immigration as percentage of natural increase
World	2,7	0,9	3,6	3,00
Developed regions	–0,6	15,0	14,4	–0,04
Developing regions	2,2	–1,5	0,7	–1,47
Europe	–0,5	23,7	23,2	–2,11
Africa	–0,4	12,6	12,2	–3,17
Asia	–2,5	15,4	12,9	–0,16
Latin America and Caribbean	4,7	5,5	10,2	0,86
North America	3,9	10,4	14,3	0,38

Source: UN, 2006.

In the 21st century depopulation trends and population ageing will make international migration a non-alternative factor of population growth in the majority of developed countries. In this context, not only impact of immigration on the population size in receiving countries are to be considered, but – what is more important – fundamental shifts in reproductive behavior, gender, age, and ethnic structure of the receiving countries' populations due to inflow of immigrants from distant regions.

The Dual Character of Migration Policy

The dual character of migration policy is the main tendency of the modern development of international migration of population, which summarizes all the above mentioned trends. We also should emphasize that in regard to international migrants, a more strict and particularly regulative *migration policy* is observed*, which represents a system of special measures, legislative acts and international agreements (bilateral and multilateral) regulating migration processes that have economic, demographic, geopolitical and other objectives.*

At the contemporary stage of globalization it is possible to identify three levels of migration policy: international, regional and national (at a country level). Duality of migration policy is clearly seen at each of these levels: at the international level (as confrontation of purposes and efforts of international organizations and national interests of certain countries), at the regional and interstate level (as combination of liberalization of migration regime by means of "transparent" borders within regional unions and restriction of migration policy towards migrants from the third countries) and at the national level (as contradiction between demographic and economic interests, on the one side, and reasons for political and social security, on the other side) (Iontsev, Ivakhniouk, 2002, p. 55).

International level of migration policy

The core of the international normative framework on international migration is constituted by agreements, recommendations and others legislative

acts, which are adopted at different meetings and conferences, conducted under the auspices of the largest international organizations, mainly the United Nations and its agencies (UNFPA, UNCTAD, UNHCR), International Organization for Migration and International Labour Organization.

The international UN conferences that have an inter-governmental status hold a special place among global conferences. Five such conferences have been conducted over the past years: three on population and development (in 1974 — in Bucharest, in 1984 — in Mexico and in 1994 — in Cairo), where the two fundamental documents were adopted: the World Population Plan of Action (1974) and The International Program of Action on Population and Development (1994). The latter document is foreseen for 20 years, and its Chapter 10 is devoted to international migration (one of few chapters that caused most of the debates). It particularly contains a proposal to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was adopted by General Assembly in 1990 (paragraph 10.6). This convention gave an international definition of different categories of migrant workers for the first time and represented an important step in strengthening the responsibility of receiving countries in recognizing the rights of migrants and securing their protection. The convention came into force in 2003 (as of 2006, it has been ratified by 34 countries) (UN, 2006, p. 94). The discussions of problems related to international migration and development also took place at two other international UN conferences on environment and development (in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and in 2002 in Johannesburg), where the attention was drawn to the need in developing policies and programmes on migration, which can be a result or a cause of an environmental damage.

In addition to the normative framework provided by international instruments, the non-binding outcome documents of the United Nations conferences and summits provide a framework for action aimed at maximizing the benefits of migration in relation to development. Among these documents a special attention should be given to the final recommendations on strengthening the regulation of international migration on the national, regional and global levels developed by the Global Commission of International Migration (2005). Another important inter-governmental level activity is the Berne initiative (2001), in the framework of which "The International Agenda for Migration Management" was elaborated (for more details: IOM, 2006, p. 27–29).

The Compendium of Recommendations on International Migration and Development, published by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat in 2006, defines to what extent the adopted documents should provide a guidance to the governments to promote co-development initiatives in international migration management (see UN, 2006, p. 95–98).

On 14–15 September 2006 in New York, a high-level Dialogue on international migration and development took place. A number of various aspects of international migration and development were discussed, including an exchange of experience and information on the best practices in regard to the

possible ways of maximising the benefits and minimising the negative consequences of international migration. As an outcome of the Dialogue, it was decided to continue the global discussion of problems of international migration and development and to create a Global Forum on international migration as a place of a systematic and comprehensive discussion of problems related to international migration and development (for more details: UN, 2006; UN, 2007).

To conclude an overview of migration policy at the international level, we should also emphasize a special feature in the attitude of international community towards the problem of international migration: it was always viewed as a function of changing political, economic and social conditions. However, throughout all those discussions on migration issues one can notice three key "lines": 1) the lack of adequate and full data on migration, 2) the lack of a comprehensive theory explaining migration, and 3) a partial understanding of aggregates of interrelationships between migration and development.

The dual character of international migration policy lies mainly in the fact that the interests of the international community and international organisations often conflict with the national interests of individual states. As a result, many documents and resolutions adopted at international conferences do not come into force because a small number of participant countries ratify the agreements (see table 14).

Table 14. Status of ratification of international legal instruments related to international migration

Instrument	Year entered into force	Parties to United Nations instruments	
		Number of countries	Percentage of countries
1949 ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) (No. 97)	1952	45	23
1975 ILO Convention concerning Migration in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and the Treatment of Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) (No. 143)	1978	19	10
1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	2003	34	17
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children	2003	97	50
2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air	2004	89	46
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees	1954	143	73

Note: Status as at 19 April 2006.

Source: UN, 2006.

Regional level of migration policy

Regional cooperation for the management of labor migration can be divided into formal mechanisms of regional integration (*migration policy as a component of regional integration*), regional inter-state agreements (*migration policy in the framework of inter-state agreements within a region*[1]) and less formal mechanisms, such as regional consultative processes and other informal arrangements.

A developing integration of the countries in the same region, as a rule, foresees a certain freedom of movement of the citizens of those counties across the borders, as well as the creation of the so called "transparent borders".

The most comprehensive example of the international migration management within the formal regional mechanisms of integration is the free movement of population and labor regime of the European Union. Currently the citizens of 15 "old" EU member countries (countries that joined the EU before May 2004) can move across internal inter-state borders of the EU for different reasons (including employment or business) and stay on their territories during any period of time. As for 12 "new" member states (the countries that joined the EU after 1 May 2004), there is a number of restrictions in regard to free movement of the labor force until 1 May 2011, but after this date it will not be possible to impose any limits on free movement of workers. The EU also observes common policy in regard to immigration and asylum seekers from the third countries, strengthens the partnership with the main sending countries and develops certain measures to secure an equal treatment of the citizens of the third countries, living in the EU member countries. Legislative acts adopted in Europe so far mainly cover the rules of asylum and the prevention of illegal migration, while few cover the issues of legal migration, including family reunions, migration of students, researchers and highly qualified labour migrants (for more details: IOM, 2006, p. 212–214).

The common mechanisms regulating international migration, including the agreements on the facilitation of movement of individuals and workers, operate in the framework of other regional integration unions, including the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Andes Community, the South American common market (MERCOSUR), the Community of Independent States (CIS), the Economic Society of Western African Countries (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) (for more details: IOM, 2006, p. 211–220).

Regional inter-governmental agreements represent the official inter-governmental agreements on co-operation in the field of migration. According to

[1] Usually inter-state agreements on the management of migration processes are signed among the countries of the same region. However, there are also inter-regional inter-state agreements. For example, there is an agreement between EU and U.S.A., according to which the citizens of EU and U.S.A. can move across the territories of U.S.A. and EU accordingly without a visa up to three months during a period of six months (see more IOM, 2006, P. 211).

the research conducted by IOL in 2005, 66 countries presenting the reports signed about 600 bilateral agreements on the regulation of international migration, and ten countries accounted for about a half of all agreements[1]. The majority of agreements (63%) were signed among the European countries and 11% between Canada and U.S.A. The majority of inter-state agreements cover the programmes of attracting labor migrants; admitting interns or young specialists; seasonal migration; and issues of co-ordination of material rights and social benefits; the re-admission of illegal migrants; and measures to ensure secure and timely money transfers of labor migrants.

It is worth mentioning that a bilateral approach allows governments to be more flexible than in the case of common agreements in the framework of integration unions because the conditions of every agreement can be formulated taking into account a situation in the corresponding countries. However, from the point of view of the regulation of migration processes, monitoring of the implementation of multiple agreements, containing different conditions, increases an administrative burden.

Regional consultation councils (RCC) have become a new form of the regional co-operation and their number has grown by many times since the beginning on the 1990s. Among the first RCCs were the inter-governmental consultations on the issues of asylum, refugee, and migration policies in Europe, Northern America, and Australia, which started from1985, to discuss the issues of granting asylum. Currently according to the UN data, a number of consultation councils operate in Europe, including the Budapest process, Söderköping, the Pan-European Dialogue on migration management, "5+5" and others Regional consultation councils don't have an official character. Their outcomes, despite the fact that they receive an approval of the participants, are not obligatory. At the same time, they facilitate a dialogue and information exchange, allow to get together the official representatives of the countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants, improve the co-ordination and synchronisation of actions not only at the international, but also at the national level.

The dual character of migration policy is expressed in two aspects. First is that under the conditions of actively developing processes of the regional integration in the modern world, we witness a liberalization of migration policy, the appearance of "transparent borders" in the framework of regional unions, and the provision of the freedom of movement to population and labor force among the member countries across the internal state borders of those unions. On the other hand, in many countries there is an adoption of increasingly strict measures towards migrants from "the third countries", caused by different aspects of the national security (including a fight against the threats of international terrorism and the protection of the national labor markets).

[1] It is difficult to estimate a number of inter-state agreements without a centralized register. According to some assessments, their total number exceeds a number given by IOL by more than twice. (for more details: UN, 2006a, p. 100).

The second aspect is that the interests and goals of integration unions in general may not be similar to and can even conflict with the interests of individual member states. For example, the position of the Great Britain since the very beginning of its membership in the EU (1973) was special, which later was reflected in the fact that this country didn't sign the Schengen agreement. Another example is the North-American Free Trade Agreement (U.S.A, Canada and Mexico), giving a lot of a freedom of movement to citizens, including labor migrants between U.S.A. and Canada; however, the possibilities of labor migration from Mexico to those countries is significantly limited.

National level of migration policy

At different stages of the history, different components of government migration policy (emigration or immigration) predominate and define this migration policy during a concrete period.

In the special periodical UN publication on demographic policy (World Population Polices Database), there is a special chapter on different national government views and state policy on international migration. As is shown in tables 15a and 15b, currently only 19% of sovereign countries do not regulate the levels of immigration, while 55% of countries do not have any emigration policy. At the same time, all developed countries have their immigration policies (except San Marino and Iceland). Therefore, the immigration component is the main one in modern migration policy. Immigration policy is becoming predominant under the modern conditions, in the framework of which the governments are interested to know, who the arriving migrants are: their nationality, profession, qualification, age, the family status, etc. These characteristics receive a special attention taking into consideration the labor market situation, demographic tendencies, as well as national security aspects.

The biggest changes that took place in national migration policies since the end of 1950s are related particularly to immigration policy. For those countries that traditionally led immigration policies the main change was that the adopted laws were mainly aimed at the stimulation of immigration of highly qualified specialists and, secondly, on combating illegal immigration. Existing laws analysis shows the dual nature of host countries' policies against illegal immigration. On the one hand, policy on newly arriving migrants becomes more and more restrictive. On the other hand, there is legalization policy for those who arrived to the country earlier and were hired illegally. Thus, during the period from 1980 to 2005 over 25 migration amnesties took place in developed countries and more than 7 millions illegal immigrants was amnestied. Therefore, in fact, we are talking not about the eradication of illegal migration, but about the legalization of those ones who came to the country before and found a job illegally. It is significant that some experts oppose such campaigns as the last; in their opinion, migrants' amnesties can only increase the scale of illegal immigration (for more details: OECD, 2000, p. 53–70).

Table 15a

Government views on policy on immigration level, 2005

	Policy on immigration level			
	lower	raise	maintain	No intervention
World	22%	54%	6%	19%
Developed regions	13%	75%	8%	4%
Developing regions	25%	47%	5%	23%
Europe	14%	77%	5%	5%
Africa	25%	21%	2%	53%
Asia	36%	53%	9%	2%
Latin America and Caribbean	12%	76%	3%	9%
North America	0%	50%	50%	0%
World	19%	56%	13%	13%

Table 15b

Government views on policy on emigration level, 2005

	Policy on emigration level			
	lower	raise	maintain	No intervention
World	23%	16%	6%	55%
Developed regions	17%	15%	0%	69%
Developing regions	25%	17%	8%	51%
Europe	19%	16%	0%	65%
Africa	19%	13%	2%	66%
Asia	30%	21%	19%	30%
Latin America and Caribbean	24%	6%	0%	70%
North America	0%	0%	0%	100%
World	25%	38%	6%	31%

Source: World Population Policies 2005. United Nations, 2006.

The duality of migration policy is also expressed in the contradictions of economic, demographic and geopolitical nature. For example, the economic development usually requires a liberalization of migration policy, while the interests of national security often ask for stricter policy, which could be vividly seen after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States.

As for migration policy in Russia, on the one hand, a certain legislative basis in the area of international migration regulation was created in 1991–2006. On the other hand, Russia still lacks a strategic vision of migration as a positive phenomenon. The duality of migration policy in Russia reflects itself in the fact that on the highest political level (particularly in Presidential National Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the RF) it is declared that there is a necessity to have a comprehensive immigration policy and to attract our compatriots and qualified legal labour resources from abroad, while on the level of its implementation, the government's attitude towards the management of migration processes still remains largely a police one, and migration itself (legal and illegal) is viewed mainly as a threat to the national security of Russia. The duality of the attitude

towards migration (especially in regard to the Russian speaking population from CIS and the Baltic States), as well as the lack of understanding of the main trends of international migration, led to the situation when in the past years the Concept of Migration Policy has still not been passed.

This remaining situation contradicts with the interests of the economic and demographic development of Russia. Moreover, Russia is increasingly losing the opportunities of the uniting economic co-operation on the post-Soviet space, including in the area of effective use of the available labor potential, particularly due to the differences in the demographic development, the sound economic links, the common language, etc. Therefore, the need in migration policy that meets the demands of the shaping migration situation in Russia and can manage the increasingly complex international migration flows, is felt more clearly.

To our mind, governments are to realize that legitimate field of international migration and rational use of migrants' skills can be provided by reasonable strategic migration policy that would impede "the triumph of atavistic nationalist hatreds over economic logic" (Demeny, 2002, p. 73). The later is especial topical for the Russian Federation.

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Irina Ivakhnyuk

EURASIAN MIGRATION SYSTEM: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL APPROACHES

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, the new sovereign states, which have been earlier the administrative parts of the USSR, are the participants of international migration flows. Half-transparent borders and visa-free regime between the most of post-soviet states have made favorable conditions for international migration flows in the region, while the complex of economic, political, social, and ethnic push factors have made these flows numerous and diversified. Russia — the major receiving country in the post-soviet space — is ranked second (after the USA) among the major receiving countries, with total number of immigrants 13.3 million in 2005, according to the UN estimate. Numerous historical, economic, political, emotional links connect the countries of post-soviet Eurasia and make consider them as single migration system.

The author of this paper first offered definition of the Eurasian migration system in 2003 in the context of neighborhood of two migration systems in Europe (Ivakhniouk, 2003) and proved the importance of appreciating this factor to develop cooperation in the field of migration management in the process of the EU enlargement and afterwards.

In Russia, understanding of its place in international migration flows including those from the former soviet republics is a matter of interest for researchers [1] and policy-makers. Insufficient migration management in Russia, which has resulted in large-scale irregular migration and growing anti-migrant phobias, is grounded in misunderstanding by Russian authorities of movement of former soviet citizens within the frames of the ex-USSR as an "internal" process (as it was before the USSR collapsed) rather than international[2]. Later the government got over this misunderstanding with the revisited laws, however, "special attitude" towards the CIS[3] citizens, i.e. preferences in admission,

[1] See: the series "International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World" edited by Vladimir Iontsev, published since 1998, available at: http://www/demostudy.ru/books/; Krasinets et al, 2000; Ushkalov and Malakha, 1999; Moukomel, 2005; Vitkovskaya and Panarin, 2000; Petrov, 2004; Zaionchkovskaya, 2002, 2007; Ivakhnyuk, 2005, 2007, etc.

[2] Such attitude is reflected in the initial post-soviet laws and norms managing migration in the Russian Federation in the first half of the 1990s, when no differentiations in admission and rights between refugees from other ex-USSR republics and internal re-settlers were made (e.g. the 1993 Federal Law on Refugees and the 1993 Federal Law on Forced Migrants).

[3] CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) is a regional structure existing since 1993. The CIS member states are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, i.e. all the

residence permit, employment, and access to Russian citizenship, is the core of the present migration policy of the Russian Federation. The former soviet states are active in constructing multilateral cooperation in migration management and combating illegal migration aimed at enhancing developmental contribution of international migration.

The paper has both theoretical and applied perspectives. On the one hand, it contributes to the migration systems theory by conceptualizing migration flows between the ex-USSR states and proving that in 1990s the global migration picture was enriched with a new Eurasian migration system. On the other hand, understanding migration problems, which the post-soviet countries are facing, in the context of a single migration system, is a background for elaboration of a general migration management concept in the frames of regional structures and correspondingly, closer interstate cooperation between destination, sending and transit countries.

International Migration Systems Concept

In the world migration literature there are many approaches explaining the phenomenon of international migration, its reasons, causes, and factors. Among them, the *system approach* seems the most reasonable. On the one hand, it interprets international migration as a result of individual decisions derived from some structural factors, and on the other hand, it analyses international migration of population in the context of international flows of goods and capitals as well as global and regional political, cultural, and economic circumstances. As a result, a sophisticated system of interrelations between various elements affecting migration process is constructed, and vectors and dynamics of migration flows get their explanation[1].

The attempts to explain the diversity of migration ties with the help of the system approach have resulted in formulation of the *international migration systems concept*, which has, in fact, combined different migration concepts[2] and proved that migration flows between countries of origin and countries of destination are determined by interrelated factors[3]. While persisted migration flows between the countries create some common space (migration system) that includes countries of origin and destination, it is important to consider the system

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post-soviet states except the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). Russia has visa-free entry regime with all the CIS countries except Georgia and Turkmenistan.

[1] Application of the system approach to international migration research was practiced in the late 1980s: Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Portes and Borocz 1989.

[2] The most complete classification of international migration concepts and theories can be found in: Iontsev, 1999, p.85-116).

[3] Presently, in the Russian migration literature some authors use the term *migration system* in a different meaning – as an institutional and legal system of migration management n a country, which is a basement of national migration policies (Tiurkin, 2004). We are to note that such use of the term *migration system* has nothing in common with *the international migration systems concept* that is under review in this paper.

in a whole to understand its tends and dynamics. Geographical proximity can play a significant role but it is not a compulsory condition.

It has been reasonably noted by researchers that directions of international migration flows are not random: they are often rooted in historical, cultural, economic, or political ties between sending and receiving countries. Besides, previous migrations incite appearance and development of so called migration networks when new migrants can rely on experience and support of their compatriots who have moved to destination countries earlier and grounded there. Existence of social migration networks not only facilitates migration flows between the countries, it is a factor of stability of these flows, i.e. migration network can support continuing migration process even when conditions for migration become unfavorable, for example, when it is hampered by restricting migration policies or when destination country faces economic decline and unemployment growth.

International migration system is a group of countries that are interconnected with relatively numerous self-containing migration flows. Migration system can consist of two countries as a minimum. However, while in reality contemporary countries participate in diverse migration flows with other countries, migration systems can be inter-crossed, and smaller migration systems can be integrated in larger ones. Thus, migration system that connects France with the North African states is a part of one of the world biggest migration systems centered on the EU states.

Stability of migration ties in a system can be rooted either in historical reasons (for example, colony — parent state ties or political unions member-states) or in mutual economic interest of migration partner states that determines migration flows of certain direction and scale. It is worth noting that reasons that initiate migration flows can be different from those that maintain them and from those by which migrations dry up. Thus, migration flow to the UK from its colonies was initiated by the Britain to supply its agriculture, mining and construction industries with labor force. During the Second World War so-called ethnic minorities from the colonies were recruited to the Royal Air Force and military plants. In the 1950s to the 1970s immigrants from former colonies contributed recovery and development of the British economy. Restrictions on immigration after 1973 could not stop migrant inflow: they were entering for family reunification as by that time immigrant community in the UK was about 1 million persons. Over 70% of immigrants to the UK in the 1980s were the family members of migrants who have come earlier (Stalker, 1995, pp. 35, 225). By the end of the 20th century migration flow from former British colonies was oriented to the USA to the great extent: for example, about 15% of immigrants to the USA in 1991-1996 were originating from India and Indian computer people occupy a significant share of the IT specialist labor market in the USA.

In international migration systems, flows of people exist along with flows of goods and capitals. Migrant remittances are an important financial source for sending countries. Moreover, remittances can boost new waves of immigrants as

they give hope for better earnings to potential migrants, on the one hand, and give money for migration, on the other hand. Statistical data demonstrates growth of bilateral trade between the countries which are connected with numerous migration flows. After return, migrants demand for foreign consumer goods that they have used to when staying in a more developed country. Besides, former migrants often set their business on exports from their country to the former country of their stay or on the contrary — on imports of foreign consumer goods to their motherland.

Reasons, by which people move internationally, are diverse. Taken together, they can explain the emergence and persistence of international migration flows. Existing migration theories highlight differences in economic development and wage levels between sending and receiving countries (*theory of neoclassical economics*), structural demand for migrant workers labor in certain industries (*segmented labor market theory*), yearning of an individual to maximize return of investments made in his/her education, skills, health, etc. (*human capital theory*), micro-strategy of households in sending countries to make use of international migration as a "self-insurance" mechanism for those who stay behind via remittances (*the new economics of labor migration*), support for migrants from the side of socio-ethnic communities of compatriots who have migrated earlier (*the theory of cumulative causation*), or different formal and informal migration-supporting institutions (*social capital theory).* (Massey at al, 1998, Massey, 2002, Stark, 1991).

International migration systems concept accumulates many of the existing theories: it combines macro and micro approaches to interpret the international migration mechanism and offers empirical evidence to explain vectors of diversified migration flows.

One and a half decades have passed after the international migration systems concept has been cleared up and recognized[1]. During this time, the global migration picture has been changing; the structure of international migration flows has shifted; the ex-USSR states have actively joined cross-border movements. The new international migration system — the "young" Eurasian migration system — has emerged and developed in the post-soviet territory.

In the European and American migration literature, four-five major migration systems are usually identified: the North American, European, Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and South American. Presently, Eurasian migration system is to be added to this list, first of all due to large scale of international migration movements both within the ex-USSR territory and to it and out of it to other countries of the world. Gross non-return migration between the former Soviet states in 1992–2001 was over 24 million, and net migration to Russia from other countries of the region was + 6.4 million persons (Goskomstat 2002).

[1] Most completely the theory of international migration systems is developed in: Kritz et al., 1992.

This paper aims to fill in the 'gap' in the international migration systems concept. It is strange and unreasonable when teaching courses in the world-leading universities while presenting migration picture of contemporary world with the international migration systems concept, analyze the above mentioned systems (see, for example, Simmons, Piche, 2002) and "do not notice" the huge post-soviet space (huge, both in terms of territory and international migration scale) where the Eurasian migration system centered on Russia has already formed.

Contemporary migration systems

Detailed analysis of global and regional migration systems can be found in: Kritz et al., 1992, Massey et al., 1998, Zlotnik, 1996, Ivakhnyuk, 2005. Here, we will concentrate only on major characteristics of these systems, which give grounds to identify groups of countries as migration systems. This will supply us with methodological basement necessary to characterize the post-soviet states as a single migration system in the next chapter.

Biggest migration systems are characterized with combination of different types and forms of international migration — permanent and temporary, refugees and labor migrants, regularized and irregular, study and family, etc. However, in reality certain forms of migration are more typical for some systems while other forms are typical for the others. It can be explained by historical reasons, political or economic situation, close traditional connections between sending and receiving countries, and so on. Besides, migration policies of major receiving states in the systems define domination of definite migration forms and types. For example, in the U.S. and Canada, which are pull centers in the North American migration system, large-scale immigration (strictly controlled by the State) is a traditionally important factor of population size growth. On the contrary, in the Gulf oil monarchies, which are the centers of the Middle East migration system, tough migration policies are shaped to attract temporary workers rather than permanent migrants, and it is very difficult to be naturalized there.

In migration systems, flows of people are usually focused on one or several countries while the system is open, i.e. it has migration links with the countries that are not a part of this system, as well as other migration systems. Thus, European migration system is characterized with persistent "internal" migration flows caused by close economic, cultural, historical, political, and geographical ties among European states, as well as by open borders inside the European Union, which guarantee common rights of residence and work for the EU citizens. At the same time, Europe hosts migrants from other countries of the world as it depends on human inflow economically and demographically. Simultaneously, the European migration system is a supplier of high-skilled migrants, e.g. for the U.S.

Formation of migration systems is often stimulated by common language (Spanish in the South America, English in the North America, Arabic in the Middle East) that naturally facilitates employment and integration of migrants.

Persistence of migration systems is supported by existence of social networks that strongly link sending and receiving countries. The growing Hispanic-origin population in the USA, which is the second ethnic group in the country, creates additional conditions to encourage inflow of migrants who can rely on existing social networks.[1] Numerous diasporas of Turks in Germany, Algerians and Moroccans in France, Indians and Pakistanis in the UK, are, figuratively speaking, a strong abutment of the migration bridge, which links origin countries with Europe.

In many countries of the world, and in the recent years in Russia, strong migration networks are developed by the Chinese. The Chinese migration communities are independent enclaves in economic and social structure of host states. They encourage arrival of new immigrants, ensure their comfortable stay among friends, guarantee job placement or business, provide with bank services of Chinese banks, meals in Chinese restaurants, favorable social environment. Chinese migration networks (like other socio-ethnic networks to this or that extent) hamper integration of migrants in receiving society by supporting their isolation.

In contrast to official migration infrastructure institutions[2], non-official migrant networks usually promote irregular migration. It is precisely these networks that explain persistence of irregular migration in all international migration systems, despite continuing attempts of receiving states to fight it.

Similar or common migration policies of the countries, which are pull centers of migration systems (if there are more than one pole in a system) is considered to be an attribute of a migration system. This is true to the U.S. and Canada, the EU states, the Gulf states, and to the less extent — to receiving countries in South America and the Asian-Pacific region. Migration policies deal with admission of migrants, their stay, legal status, their social rights, and — most important — principles of integration in the receiving society. These principles differ from assimilation (France) to multiculturalism (the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada).Terrorist attacks in the USA on 11.09.2001 have shifted attitude towards migrants in the world but they have not stopped migration flows. Politicians and experts continue to seek for optimal forms of co-existence of people in multicultural societies, as monocultural societies are no longer likely in the modern world as a result of migration. Far more likely are societies in which multiple cultures exist (Rex, 2004, p. 94).

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[1] For details of migration networks mechanism in the U.S. refer, for example, to: Flores, 2005.

[2] Official migration infrastructure is understood as a complex of state and private institutions that provide legitimacy, information, and safety for migrants, i.e. state and private employment agencies, information and consultation centers, specialized juridical services, as well as social help-lines, telephone hot lines, etc.

Events of the 2005 autumn in Paris[1] and the 2006 spring in the USA[2] caused the new round of debate on immigration and integration policies in the countries with significant numbers of immigrants. However, in the states where special stress is laid on encouragement of temporary labor migrants, like the Persian Gulf states, they should also be an object of integration because even temporary stay of foreigners in a country means their contact with receiving society, respect to its norms and values, and obedience to local laws. Integration policy is to formalize the strategy of tripartite interaction between the receiving State, society, and migrants.

Regional integration unions, like the EU in Europe, MERCOSUR in the South America, or NAFTA in the North America[3], are actively used to promote reasonable forms of legal movements of labor between participating states to provide them with additional economic benefits. It often happens, that freedom of population movements in the frames of regional unions, results in dual character of migration policies of major receiving states. Thus, open borders inside the European Union contrasts to ever restricting migration control on its external borders towards the third countries citizens.

Migration systems are flexible; in their development they follow shifts in economic and political situation in the countries and regions resulting from globalization trends. New pull countries appear. New sending countries join in international migration flows. Directions of migration flows are changing; sometimes they become opposite but different in structure. In the Asia-Pacific migration system, migrants attracting states are so called "new developed countries": Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea that are at the same time migrants sending countries, both to other parts of the region (following capital flows) and to developed countries (primarily study and labor migration). The European system gives another example. After the socialist block collapsed at the end of the 1980s, the dominating south-to-north migration vector was replaced by east-to-west vector. During a very short historical period the Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) became emigration states and transit states, and since recently – destination states for migrants from the CIS states as well as from Vietnam, China and other less developed countries.

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[1] We mean mass social disturbances in the suburbs of Paris inhabited primarily by immigrants from Maghreb. Immigrant youth including second and third generations of immigrants has provoked direct conflict with police demonstrating its protest against poverty, unemployment and lack of economic opportunities typical for their environment.

[2] Attempts of the U.S. Congress to tough migration law related to illegal immigrants resulted in multi-million rallies of protest in many cities of the USA. They were aimed at demonstration of the role illegal immigrants play in the American economy.

[3] MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Cono Sur), exists since 1991. The member states are: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), exists since 1994. The member states are: the USA, Canada, and Mexico.

Besides the above mentioned – biggest – migration systems, there exist smaller migration systems in all regions of the world: in Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Latin America. The scale of migration flows there can be even bigger, like in Africa – the continent, which probably has the greatest number of international migrants who are primarily unregistered and poorly reflected by migration statistics. However, international migration flows in the African continent are mainly forced migrations between neighboring countries resulting from numerous natural disasters and ethnic conflicts. That's why it is more reasonable to shape sub-regional migration systems there, like West African, South African and so on.

Factors of formation and development of the Eurasian migration system

The Eurasian migration system is a group of the post-soviet countries interconnected by persistent and numerous migration flows resulting from interaction of a number of factors – historical, economic, political, demographic, socio-ethnic, and geographical. The major receiving states are Russia and — since recently — Kazakhstan. Disintegration of the Soviet Union into sovereign states followed by dramatic political and economic crisis has inspired numerous cross-border population flows and — most important — turned the former internal migrations across administrative borders into international ones. Since early 1990s we can argue for appearance of the Eurasian migration system.

In addition to interregional migration flows, the post-soviet Eurasian states are connected with migrant ties with many other countries, in the other words, the Eurasian migration system is open. For example, permanent and temporary migrants from Russia stay and work in about 80 countries while hundreds of thousands of migrants from European states, USA, China, Turkey, Afghanistan and other countries stay in Russia. Another example: Russia is a destination country for migrants from Moldova and Ukraine, however, at the same time Moldavian and Ukrainian migrants have formed large migrant networks in the Southern and Western Europe.

Here we classify the factors of formation and development of the Eurasian migration system:

1. ***Historical factors*** are dealing with the fact that the present trends of migration flows in the ex-USSR territory are deeply rooted in the common historical past of this region. In contrast to the other big migration systems which were developing as a result of economic, political, cultural, and finally migration interactions *between the countries*, the circumstances for appearance of the Eurasian migration system have grown up *within the frames of a single country* — the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union.

The former migrations within the USSR, internal by their nature and inter-republican by their form, were the foundation of the huge migration potential, which resulted in a sharp rise of international migrations after the USSR broken up into sovereign states.

During the centuries migration processes in the Russian Empire were of centrifugal colonial character. Resettlement of people from the center of the Empire to its margins was aimed at strengthening of the Russian State and pulling up the Central Asian provinces, Caucasus and other outlying districts (for more details see, for example: Iontsev, Magomedova, 1999, p. 6–25). During the Soviet period centrifugal trends were still prevailing, first of all as a result of purposeful state migration policy aimed at redistribution of population between labor-excessive and labor-deficit districts of the Soviet Union. Gross migration exchange between the soviet republics was up to 2 million persons a year. As a result, the nations and ethnic groups living in the territory of the USSR have "mixed", with a certain part of indigenous population of soviet republics living in the other republics. This was especially true for Russians who were sent –half voluntarily, half forcedly – to work in other republics where there was a lack of local skilled workers.

Abundance of the Russian language which has been the single official language in the USSR can also be regarded as a historical factor. Knowledge of Russian language among former soviet citizens has influenced on formation of the Russian vector of migration in the post-soviet period.

2. ***Economic factors***. Since the 1970s — 1980s economic differentials between the USSR republics accompanied by growing contradictions between population growth and limited economic opportunities in the Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova, e.g. exhaustion of agricultural potential and structural deformation of the economics, were resulting in declining standards of living and generation of economically motivated migration flows towards more industrialized regions of the Russian Federation.

Table 1. CIS, Differences in standards of living

CIS countries	GDP per capita, $US	Percentage of population living on less than 2 $US a day
Armenia	1234.0	49
Azerbaijan	2585.9	9
Belarus	3316.2	2
Georgia	1765.8	16
Kazakhstan	4386.1	25
Kyrgyzstan	507.7	25
Moldova	917.4	64
Russia	6330.8	8
Tajikistan	411.5	43
Turkmenistan	3888.6	44
Ukraine	2020.6	46
Uzbekistan	498.6	72

Sources: IMF. World Economic Outlook Database. April 2006; Population Reference Bureau. World Population Data Sheet.2005

In the contemporary Eurasian migration system, economic factors are dominating. Transition period to market economy is uneasy process for all the

post-soviet states, however, previous differentials in economic opportunities for the people between the republics and local labor markets have worsened during the post-disintegration crisis. These differentials have launched the mechanism of international migration between the CIS states. In Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine, labor migration to other countries, primarily to Russia, has become an essential element of survival strategy for millions of households.

The surveys show that monthly wage of $200–250 in Russia, which is usually neglected by Russian workers, gives an opportunity for a Tajik migrant family left behind in Tajikistan to survive during 3–4 months or even more (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006a).

Table 2. CIS: Migrant workers abroad estimates (thousands), early 2000s

CIS country	Migrant workers abroad	Migrant workers in Russia
Armenia	800–900	650
Azerbaijan	600–700	550–650
Georgia	250–300	200
Kyrgyzstan	400–450	350–400
Moldova	500	250
Tajikistan	600–700	600–700
Ukraine	2.000–2.500	1.000–1.500
Uzbekistan	600–700	550–600
Russian Federation	2.000–3.000	-

Based on: National estimates of origin countries.

Source: Overview of the CIS Migration Systems. ICMPD, Vienna, 2006.

In the 1990s, international labor migration was an important factor of social stability in the region; by the mid-2000s it became a significant *factor of economic development,* both for separate states and the region in a whole. In Russia and Kazakhstan — major receiving states — a number of industries (construction, agriculture, services, etc.) have stable demand for foreign labor. This is the labor market segmentation typical for all principal receiving states that cannot do without imported labor. (For details refer to: Ivakhnyuk, 2005, p. 224–243).

On the other hand, for smaller countries of the region, labor migration of a part of their labor resources and their remittances have become an important and stable source of national budget[1]. So, it is not surprising that concentration of international cooperation in the region on promoting legal channels for labor

[1] According to the Central Bank of Russia, the total amount of remittances sent from Russia to other CIS states increased by 7 times between 1999 and 2004: from 0.5 billion to 3.5 billion $US. According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, since 2000 the remittances by residents and non-residents sent by official channels were growing 1.5–2 times annually, and by 2005 exceeded 1 billion $US (Sadovskaya, 2007). However, the overwhelming part of migrants' money is delivered to their origin countries not by official channels (bank transfer, postal order, other money remittance systems) but non-officially — with friends, relatives, or carried on their own. According to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, migrants take away 7–8 billion $US from Russia annually.

migration is one of priorities both in the CIS and in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)[1].

The CIS common labor market would meet the interests of all the participating countries. This item is included in the agenda of the CIS Executive Committee; it is realizing by means of growing coordination of national legislations in the field of migration and social security. Meanwhile, migrants 'vote by their feet' for the single migration space and the common labor market in the CIS region.

3. ***Political factors*** play very important but contradictory role in formation of the Eurasian migration system. On the one hand, existence of regional unions in the post-soviet territory, like CIS and EurAsEC, not only structures political and economic relations between the member states but they are also an arena for elaboration of common approaches to understanding pluses and minuses of contemporary migration flows, which connect these countries, and approval of mutually acceptable mechanisms to manage them. Thus, common approaches to combat illegal migration and to develop legal migration channels are not just an element of the CIS agenda but they are settled in the CIS Concept of Interstate Cooperation against Illegal Migration[2] and implemented in the CIS Program of Cooperation in Counteracting Illegal Migration[3]. Work on elaboration of practical mechanisms of cooperation in the field of migration is going on continuing basis.

Under the existing contradictions in economic interests, maintenance of via-free regime of population movements and the course for common labor market is likely the strongest chain that is cementing relations between the CIC states. At the special meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on 17.03.2005 devoted to migration policies, President Putin stressed that "migration policy is also a key factor of consolidation between the CIS states"[4].

On the other side, alienation among the "new independent states" and growing nationalistic ideologies in the first post-collapse years have provoked numerous forced migration flows between former soviet republics. With the lapse of time the situation has stabilized and softened but even now shifts in political conjuncture can affect scale and forms of migration movements. Suffice it to mention the visa regime introduced between Russia and Georgia when political relations between the two countries worsened.

4. ***Demographic factors*** of development of the Eurasian migration system are rooted in the existing imbalance between the ex-USSR states: rapid natural

[1] The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was founded in October 2000. The member-states are: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Central banks of the EurAsEC countries coordinate their activities in information services for migrant workers on official facilities for remittances.

[2] The Concept is approved at the CIS summit on 16.09.2004.

[3] The Program was accepted by the Council of the CIS State Leaders in 2005 in Kazan.

[4] http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/03/85300/shtml

decrease and population aging in Russia and Ukraine, already resulting in lack of labor force in many industries, in contrast to growing population size and prevalence of younger age groups in the Central Asian states. Such kind of *demographic complementarity* is a "natural" reason to shape persistent migration flows of migrants, first of all, labor migrants. Table 3 demonstrates existing differences in demographic characteristics between Russia, from one side, and Central Asia, on the other side. It is clear from these data that in future demographic imbalance between the countries of the region will be continuing and growing. Kazakhstan is an exemption: already now it has in-between position and tends to the Russian demographic model.

5. ***Psychological factors***. The relative "transparency" of the borders between the post-soviet states and existence of numerous familial, emotional, professional, etc. ties, crate specific psychological factors that facilitate movements of people inside the Eurasian migration system. Previous life in a single country has formed special attitude among the former soviet citizens towards the territory of the USSR *as their own* country even after it has collapsed. Correspondingly, when thinking about migration, decision to go to the neighboring and "familiar" Russia comes much easier than to any other country outside the former Soviet Union. Presently, the sending states of the region are shaping new vectors of migration "to outside" (for example, Uzbekistan has signed the agreement on labor migration of Uzbek citizens to the South Korea; Tajik migrants are making paths to the Pakistani labor market). Nevertheless, Russia and, to a smaller extent, Kazakhstan remain major destination countries for migrants from these countries. Shifts in migration legislation of the Russian Federation aimed at simplification of registration procedure and work permits issuing, which were put in force in early 2007, are aimed at encouragement of migration inflow from other CIS states to Russia, take it out of the shadow and create clear and transparent procedures of getting legal status for migrants. These measures will hopefully strengthen the above mentioned psychological factors of preferable migration movements inside the Eurasian migration system.

Table 3. Comparison of some demographic characteristics of Russia and the Central Asian states

	Population, 2005, thousands (national current statistics)	TFR (UN, 2004)	Birth rate, ‰ (UN, 2004)	Death rate, ‰ (UN, 2004)
Russia	144,000	1.32	10.10	15.30
Kazakhstan	15,100	1.88	16.10	9.00
Kyrgyzstan	5,200	2.50	22.60	7.00
Tajikistan	6,200	3.06	29.50	6.00
Turkmenistan	6,300	2.60	22.90	6.00
Uzbekistan	26,000	2.50	23.70	6.00

Source: Population Reference Bureau. World Population Data Sheet. 2005

6. ***Socio-ethnic factors*** are related first of all to the common historical past of the post-soviet countries. Active population movements between the soviet

republics have resulted in the fact that numerous groups of indigenous nationalities of some republics live at the territories of other republics[1].

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, representatives of expatriate titular ethnic groups, attracted with nationalist slogans of the new CIS elites, preferred to return to their origin republics. However, despite these large-scale ethnic migrations national diasporas in Russia for example, are an important socio-ethnic factor of development of the Eurasian migration system. In the early 2000s, the size of the Kazakh diaspora permanently living in Russia is estimated 800,000 persons, the Uzbek diaspora — 150,000 persons, the Tajik diaspora — 160,000 persons, the Kyrgyz diaspora — 80,000 persons[2]. Diasporas are often intermediaries that encourage inflow of new waves of compatriots, their job placement — legal or illegal, adaptation in Russia, etc. So, on the one hand, diasporas facilitate making decision to move for potential migrants and, on the other hand, they provide migrants with relatively comfortable environment.

Those who have already got some experience of stay in Russia and succeeded to work and support their families, — they will come again, for example, for the next construction season, with the help of established informal contacts. They will bring new migrants with them – neighbors, relatives, friends, who will rely on the experience of the predecessors. That's how migrant networks develop, which are an important factor of stability of migration systems all over the world. Within 1.5 decades of its existence the Eurasian migration system also has become enmeshed with numerous migration networks.

7. ***Geographical factors*** play an important role in the Eurasian migration system. Geographical proximity of the post-soviet countries added with relative "transparency" of state borders and common transport infrastructure, seriously facilitates population movements between the countries.

Geographical factor has also another meaning for the Eurasian migration system making its peculiarity, for example, in interaction with the European migration system. Geopolitical position of the post-soviet territory has made it the transit "corridor" and staging post for transit (primarily illegal) migrants from Asian and African countries forwarding to the European Union countries. Half-transparent borders between the countries of the region provides rather comfortable and cheap surface route for transit migrants from Asia to Russia and further to the West. According to the estimates of the Russian Ministry of Interior, over 300,000 transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries have got

[1] Comparison between the 1979 USSR Census and the 1989 USSR Census data shows that numbers of Azerbaijanis in Russia increased 2.2 times (while in Azerbaijan – 24%), Georgians and Armenians – 46% (in their republics – 10.3% and 13.2 % correspondingly), Uzbeks and Turkmen – 1.8 times (in their republics – 34%), Kyrgyz people – 2.9 times (in Kyrgyzstan – 33%), Moldavians – 69% (in Moldova – 10.5%) (Iontsev, Magomedova, 1999, p.18).

[2] Estimates are made on the basis of the 2002 Population Census in Russia and self-estimations of diasporas available via their media and Internet sites.

stranded in Russia running into an obstacle of tight control at the EU border. They stay in Russia for months and even years (usually in illegal status) in order to raise funds for the onward smuggling fee or purchase of falsified travel documents and visas.

Turning back to the analysis of the international migration systems concept, we can say that the Eurasian migration system is a "classical" example of formation and development of a big migration system; it enriches the concept with historically-based peculiarities and illustrations. The nowadays main feature of the Eurasian migration system – domination of illegal migration flows – also reflects typical for the contemporary world situation, on the one hand, and is specific from the perspective of the reasons of illegal migration, on the other hand.

Illegal migration flows – the main feature of the Eurasian migration system

Dynamic rows and graphs built on statistic data demonstrate decline in migration flows between the CIS states. This gives a reason to some researchers to argue that migrations in the post-soviet territory are "freezing" and Russia is losing its "attractiveness" for migrants (Population of Russia 2001, p. 169). In reality, it is the structure of migration flows that is shifting. The scale of migration for permanent residence has declined indeed; however, at the same time the numbers of labor migrants have multiplied. Presently, labor migration is the most numerous migration flow in the Eurasian migration system, while migration management system is far from being perfect. Due to this fact labor migration is primarily taking place out of the legal field, e.g. legal entrance but unregistered employment.

Iontsev (2002) argues that dynamic rows built on border statistics on arrivals and departures to and from Russia with different purposes (resettlements, temporary labor migration, tourist trips, transit, private, business, which often entail unregistered employment in Russia) prove growing scale of gross migration exchange between Russia and the CIS states exceeding 40 million (!) persons a year.

Nine of ten migrant workers in Russia are irregular migrants, so they are out of the sight of official statistics. Border regime is liberal while procedures of getting stay and work permits were over-bureaucratic until recently. As a result, migrants preferred (or were forced) to stay and work without permissions, i.e. illegally. The number of registered foreign workers in Russia is 350,000 to 450,000[1]. Meanwhile, experts estimate number of unregistered labor migrants 3 to 4 million (and even higher in summer time) (Population of Russia 2002, p.

[1] It is hardly possible to get more exact numbers from official sources as the work permission system makes no difference between primary permissions and prolongation of permissions.

169). The higher officials of the Ministry of Interior trend to even higher estimate – up to 10 million[1].

Prevalence of irregular forms of employment of foreign workers is resulting from the Russian economic system with a significant segment of shadow economy and informal labor market. Experts estimate the shadow sector of Russia's economy as a quarter of GNP, and employment in it as 15–30% of the total labor force (Radaev, 1999, p. 10). Migrants who come to Russia in quest of jobs can easily find them in the shadow sector where they are not asked for papers and permissions.

It happens that the economic system and poorly thought-out migration management in Russia have provoked growth of illegal migration, which results in huge financial losses and waste of human capital.

Recently, migration policy in Russia was seriously revisited in favor of rationalization and simplification of issuing stay and work permissions for migrants from the CIS states that have visa-free regime with Russia. It became obvious that accent on police methods migration management, unreasonably complicated procedures to obtain stay and work permissions against corruption among bureaucrats and lack of control over migration have not limited migration flows but drove them underground. New principles of migration policy in Russia are selectivity and legalization, i.e. making preferences in obtaining legal status and employment for citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The major purpose of the new legislation is counteracting illegal labor migration by means of providing wider legal channels for temporary job placement of the CIS citizens.

Mutual interest of the CIS states in promoting legal forms of participation in international labor exchange and guaranteeing migrant workers' human rights provides support of the Russian initiatives from the side of origin countries. National migration services of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan right after the new laws in Russia were adopted started information campaigns for their citizens explaining new facilitated rules to get legal status of a labor migrant in Russia and benefits of regular migration.

Conclusion

To sum up, the following trends of international migrations connecting the ex-USSR states characterize the post-soviet territory as the single international migration system:

- Existence of persistent migration flows among the former soviet republics. The structure of these flows is flexible; they change with time; they are poorly reflected by statistics; however, their large scale is obvious. Migration takes place in illegal/irregular forms and it is closely related to unregistered employment.

[1] From an interview with the Deputy Minister of Interior Alexander Tchekalin. http://www.vremya.ru/news/1012366.shtml.

- The countries that are the parts of the Eurasian migration system are closely connected by economic, cultural, political ties rooted in their common history and long co-existence within the framework of a single country. The present regional structures like the EurAsEC and CIS are aimed at closer integration. In particular, formation of a common labor market of member states is on agenda.
- Migration flows are focused primarily on Russia, which is the center of the migration system. The reasons for that are rooted in a better economic position of Russia and on existence of numerous diaporas of titular nations of the former soviet republics in the country that are the basement for the nowadays social networks. For the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan is the new attracting state; it proves the shaping of a sub-regional migration system within the frames of a bigger Eurasian migration system.
- Russian language as a common language in the post-soviet territory facilitates international labor migration in the region.
- There is an obvious mutual interest of Russia and Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and sending countries, on the other hand, towards encouragement of labor migration. Such interest is based on current demographic and economic trends; it supports visa-free regime between the most of the countries in the region.

Understanding of migration processes at the post-soviet space in the context of the Eurasian migration system, is important both from the theoretical and practical perspectives. Recognition of the Eurasian migration system makes input in the migration theorizing, approves and develops the international migration concept, and fills in the obvious gap in the list of the world biggest migration systems. When the system is analyzed as a whole, future development of migration process in the region can be forecasted with more reliability.

The practical side of understanding of international migration in the post-soviet territory within the framework of the single Eurasian migration system is related to new opportunities to shape international cooperation in the field of migration policies taking into consideration present and future migration flows. View of close migration ties between the countries of the region is important to outline interrelations *between migration systems*, e.g. with the European migration system. In this context the author first offered the term *Eurasian migration system* for academic circulation in 2003 (Ivakhniouk 2003)[1]. Neighborhood of the EU means that on the other side of the CIS western border there are not just individual countries but a union of countries with common migration policy. On the analogy, the European Union is facing from the east not only Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus with their peculiar migration situations but also the whole of Eurasian migration system with its general trends and perspectives. Correspondingly, the search for the mutually acceptable agreements on

[1] Entitled "Neighboring Migration Systems in Europe: Trends of Development and Prospects for Cooperation", the Russian version of this paper is available on http://www.archipelag.ru/agenda/povestka/povestka-immigration/strategii/dve_sistemi/

cooperation in migration management and fighting illegal migration can be effective only in the case when migration and juridical interactions inside every migration system are taken into consideration.

For the moment, the CIS states are far from realization of a common coordinated migration policy as to population movements between the post-soviet states and to the third countries. However, the growing understanding of the advantages of "civilized" well-managed migration exchange and practical steps in this direction[1] prove that development of the Eurasian migration system is moving towards this goal.

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[1] Numerous multilateral and bilateral agreements on migration singed between the CIS states, elaboration of the CIS Convention on legal status of migrant workers and the EurAsEC Agreement on temporary employment of citizens of the member states in the territory of the other member states, foundation of the common economic space of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine aimed at free movement of goods, capitals and labor, as well as activities of NGOs in creating regularized migration flows between the CIS states ("migration bridges", information and consultation centers, etc.).

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Janez Malačič

THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN MODERN DEMOGRAPHIC REGIME

Introduction

International migration of population has always been closely connected to the demographic development at national, regional or continental level. It is essential part of the growth equation of every open population. The balancing equation simply states that the growth (or decline) of particular population in specified period of time is the sum of the difference between the births and the deaths and the difference between the immigrants and the emigrants. The overall population growth (or decline) is the sum of natural and migration growth. Both of them have had different roles at particular stages of the demographic development in industrially advanced and in the developing countries.

In Europe, which will be the main focus of this paper, one can observe the positive correlation between the natural growth and intercontinental emigration during the period of demographic transition. The emigration from Europe during the period 1800–1940 was about sixty million. In almost the same period, the population of Europe increased from 187 million in 1800 to 519 million in 1933, a total of 332 million (Malacic, 1993, 186). The estimated number of intercontinental emigration represents about one fifth of Europe's population increase during the period of demographic transition. The process of emigration from Europe was a natural continuation of the European colonization of overseas countries. Factors affecting emigration were numerous and very different. However, it has rarely been stressed that the mass emigration from Europe coincided with the unprecedented population growth during the period of demographic transition. Without the demographic transition and high natural population growth during this process there simply would have not been so many people for emigration and to meet the growing demand for labor in the process of domestic industrialization as well.

The present state of development of demographic theory on the other hand does not allow all four components of demographic change, namely mortality, fertility, immigration and emigration, to be included in one general theory of population development. The theory of demographic transition which is the most popular and widely used theory for the explanation of the long-term demographic development speaks mainly about mortality and fertility of the population, their interconnections, and the very complex set of factors which determine both of the processes of natural population change. Neither migration in general nor international migrations in particular is included in the theory of demographic transition.

The theory of demographic transition was frequently criticized for neglecting to consider migration as a part of the demographic change (Friedlander, 1969; Goldscheider, 1971). The authors argued that population change should be studied in terms of all its demographic components. Critics of

the theory of demographic transition would like to see an overall and complex theory of population development of the open population. The request is hardly new to the scientific discipline — demography. However, at present it seems too ambitious.

The above criticism is unfair too. The theory of demographic transition focused on the explanation of the change in the natural components of population development during the process of modernization and long-term economic development (Notestein, 1945; Notestein, 1953). The theory tries to explain the most important changes at the individual and family levels as the basic levels for reproduction decision making. Migrations, on the other hand, are only partially and indirectly connected to the natural components of population development. From the decision making point of view it is possible to say that parents do not consider migrations of their children. The time lag between the birth and migration of the adult child is too long. Parents do not give birth to their children for migration and even less for emigration. International migrations in a period of demographic transition are the consequence of other factors, mostly economic, social and political.

In this paper the role of migration in modern demographic regime will be studied more in detail. The modern demographic regime is the result of the process of demographic transition in general and, according to some authors, the second demographic transition in particular. It is more or less fully developed in advanced and industrially developed countries only. Therefore, the author of this paper will mainly focus on Europe.

The paper will be structured in four main subsequent sections which follow this introduction and ends with the conclusion and the references. The next section will briefly outline the modern demographic regime. It will be followed by the section dealing with recent international migration in the developed countries and Europe in particular. The third of the main sections will deal with migration as economically driven process. The fourth section will analyze the demographic role of migration in the modern demographic regime and will try to answer the question whether the international migrations can neutralize the negative impact of low or even the lowest – low fertility on long-term population development.

The Modern Demographic Regime

Two main characteristics of the modern demographic regime are low levels of mortality and fertility caused by the process of modernization which had started with the industrial revolution. The modern demographic regime is the result of the (first) demographic transition. Historically, the cradle of demographic transition is in Western and Northern Europe. From there the process has spread all over the world. In Western and Northern Europe both death and birth rates reached low levels in the 1930s. The decline of mortality and fertility in Southern and Eastern Europe was delayed. Therefore, the end of the demographic transition in these regions was delayed, too, into the 1950s and the 1960s. At present, only in a few

European cases the transition is not finished yet. These cases are the national populations of Albanians, Turks and Roma (Gypsies).

Outside Europe, the demographic transition is finished in the developed countries of other continents. All other countries are developing and are at different stages of the process of demographic transition. At the beginning of the 21st century there is hardly any country where the demographic transition from the traditional demographic regime with the high mortality and high fertility would have not started yet.

It is frequently perceived in the literature that the theory of demographic transition is based on the premise of equilibrium between mortality and fertility (Okolski, 2002, 154; van de Kaa, 2002, 81). On the basis of this premise some authors had expected the new equilibrium between the natural processes of population change at low level when the transition would have been finished. At the level of very simplified formulation of the theory of demographic transition that would mean certain balance in terms of crude birth and crude death rates. In more sophisticated version, it would mean stable or even stationary population with low levels of fertility and mortality.

However, the equilibrium expectations have not been realized so far in Europe and in other developed countries. The most striking novelty of the second half of the 20th century was substantial decline of fertility to unprecedented low levels in all of Europe. The new levels are far bellow replacement fertility level which can be measured with total fertility rate equal to 2.1. The fertility decline was strong and it led to the negative natural population increase in growing number of countries in Europe. In 2003, 19 European countries out of 46 (Monaco excluded for missing data) had negative natural population increase and practically all European countries had total fertility rate lower than 2.0 (Turkey excluded and no data for Albania). Total fertility rate was lower than 1.3 which is the lowest-low fertility in 16 European countries. (Recent, 2006, 56 and 78) Twelve of these countries are transitional or ex-socialist countries.

Low fertility level is causing the unprecedented population ageing in Europe. The ageing process is strengthened by increasing longevity which is the consequence of low level of mortality caused by considerable progress made in economic well-being and in health care. Rapid population ageing is accompanied by labor force ageing.

There are many other features of modern demographic regime as well. Very low fertility is determined by radical changes in family and societal structures. The transitions between various stages of life cycle in modern Europe have become really complex. They are affected by many changes in economic and social systems, modern technology, cultural changes, etc. One can observe also unprecedented increase of cohabitation, childbearing outside marriage, high divorce rates, lone parenthood, etc.

A coherent theoretical framework which would be able to explain the complex nature of the modern demographic regime is, according to my view, still missing in modern demography. The classical theory of demographic transition

was developed to explain the revolutionary changes in the population development which took place in the period when modern demographic regime replaced the traditional one. It is still relevant for the explanation of the recent demographic developments in developing countries. However, it has never been intended or meant to explain the modern demographic regime which is the result of the demographic transition. The theory which would be up to the task is not developed yet.

The most popular theory of the last two decades which claims that it sufficiently and thoroughly explains the very basic nature of the modern demographic regime is the theory of the second demographic transition (SDT). The term was used as early as 1986 by R. Lestheaghe and D. van de Kaa (van de Kaa, 1987). The authors were struck by practically simultaneous changes in fertility and family formation in North-Western Europe which led to the individualistic family model. Van de Kaa is also convinced that the SDT can best be characterized as "a change in demographic regime". The main principle of the SDT is the right to self-realization granted to the individual living in the modern society. Modern individuals (and couples) are also able to free themselves from various social controls. These and other cultural, social, economic and technological characteristics of the SDT have led van de Kaa to the generalization of the SDT which really competes with the demographic transition theory. The generalization includes all processes of the demographic change, natural as well as migrations, into mutually connected system in which low fertility is compensated with the most obvious variable – international migration (van de Kaa, 2004, 5-9).

The SDT is very ambitious. However, it is hardly convincing enough. In my view, the least convincing is the idea that the SDT is a change in demographic regime. If the demographic transition resulted in a modern demographic regime then there is no room for another change in the regime. It would be much better for the SDT to claim being the theory of the population development in modern and advanced countries of the world. In this case the term SDT is inappropriate. Some critics even say that the concept is not "second" but "secondary", is not really demographic and cannot be described as a transition at all (Coleman, 2004, 11). It is possible to find ideas in the demographic literature, argues Coleman, that there were more demographic transitions in the history of mankind. The SDT also does not address the central issues in demography and, probably most importantly, it is far from certain that the SDT processes are complete and irreversible. If nothing less the time period is too short for being certain about the real long-term characteristics of modern demographic regime.

Notwithstanding all criticism of the SDT almost everyone in the demographic community agrees that SDT is fruitful research concept. Hopefully, it will contribute much in the future to our real understanding of the basic characteristics of the modern demographic regime. However, that is far from enough for being a comprehensive theory of a modern demographic regime.

Recent International Migration in Europe

The process of migration is probably the most complicated demographic process. It is the case even from the statistical point of view. The definition of migration is directly connected to and derived from the definition of the population. However, the definition of the population has changed frequently in different countries and even in international standards recommended by the United Nations statisticians. In my own country, Slovenia, the definition of population in population censuses has changed three times so far (Malacic, 2006, 12). The differences in these definitions are very important for the migration data derived from different population censuses which are frequently the only reliable source of migration statistical data.

There are also some new social developments which contribute to the complexity of the modern migration processes. People in modern societies are much more geographically mobile than previously in traditional societies. Life styles with changing residence are nowadays much more widespread and are not limited to the small margin of the very rich people. Additionally, and most of all, there is huge increase in the importance of illegal international migrations. For these migrations we have, by the definition, much less reliable statistical data than for the other types of migration.

In the period relevant for this paper the international migration processes and migration statistics in Europe have some particular regional characteristics. The best example is probably former communist part of Europe. The whole region, with the exception of the second Yugoslavia, had almost completely closed borders for international migrations in the period 1945-1990 (Malacic, 2002). In East European countries only some sporadic examples of international migrations had taken place in this period. The nature of these examples was mainly political. There were some waves of emigration from the region caused by political turmoil. The most known are waves of emigration from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968 and from Poland at the beginning of the 1980s, if we do not mention very special case of German Democratic Republic. Political authorities of these particular countries opposed to the emigrations, therefore, they were illegal. The international migration situation in Eastern Europe gradually has normalized since the beginning of the 1990s.

It is possible to find politically motivated waves of international migration in Western and Southern Europe as well. Most of these waves were caused by breakdowns of colonial rule of European countries in other parts of the world. We can mention here Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Portugal. In all these cases there were waves of immigration from former colonies to the particular European country.

Both internal and external migrations have taken place in Europe since the end of the demographic transition. The distinction between external and internal migrations depends largely on the existence of sovereign states. In Europe, many new independent countries have been established during the last two decades. On

the other hand, two former German states have been unified. In all these examples changing status caused transformations of internal into external migrations and vice versa. It is obvious that this presents serious statistical problems.

International migration statistics data sources in Europe are very partial for the last decades. Therefore, we will focus on the very recent international migration situation in Europe only. We will use information from the literature and international migration statistical data from the publication "Recent demographic developments in Europe" published by the Council of Europe.

For the purpose of this paper only general characteristics of international migration in Europe are important. The detailed flows of migrants into and out of Europe and of particular European countries are too complex to describe here. Additionally, the data on emigration statistics are frequently absent. Statistical confusion is also caused by a lack of comparability between countries, a lack of hard statistics on stocks and flows of irregular migrants and by very different naturalization policies in particular countries.

The most general feature of the recent European international migration situation is high level of net immigration. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century European Union has reached an all-time peak of the net inflow of migrants. The figure, as estimated by Eurostat, oscillated around one million (Coleman, 2005, 26). This net figure is more or less comparable to the recent inflow of migrants into United States, although the population of the European Union is larger.

International migrations in particular countries can go up or down much more easily than other demographic processes. The available data for net migration in Europe for the period 1999 – 2004 show considerable variation (RDDE, 2006, 127). The data are published for 32 countries. For some countries the data do not cover the whole period. In eleven or almost a third of the countries with available data the net international migrations were negative in at least some of the years included in the period covered. Nine of these countries are Central and East European transitional countries. In Czech Republic the negative value was in one single year only, 2001. Other two countries are The Netherlands and Iceland where negative net migrations were occasional and appeared in two years.

Approximately two thirds of the countries with available data had positive net migrations. However, the net migration rates were quite different in particular countries. In some of the countries, the rates were only slightly positive, while in others the yearly net migration rate exceeded 1 %. In 2004, the net migration rate was 2.13 % in Cyprus, 1.06 % in San Marino and 1.47 % in Spain (RDDE, 2006, 127).

The stock data of foreign immigrants can be estimated by the birthplace data. The highest stock of the immigrants in Europe is in the Western Europe. At the beginning of the 21st century there was about 10.3 % of the population west of Czech Republic and Hungary who were born abroad (Coleman, 2005, 33). In some smaller countries like Switzerland and Luxembourg the figure can go over 20 %. However, in some Eastern European countries the foreign born part of the population is very low.

The other often available stock data of foreign immigrants in Europe are citizenship data. They are frequently misleading and notoriously hard to compare because of different naturalization policies. In some countries the naturalization is much easier than in others.

In 2005, Luxembourg and Switzerland had 33.2 and 20.6 % of the population with foreign citizenship respectively. The figure for Germany was 8.8 % which was equal to the number in the year 1996. Some other countries with relatively high proportion of the population with foreign citizenship are Austria, Spain, and Sweden with 9.3, 7.8 and 5.3 % respectively. At the other side of the spectrum we can find Slovenia, Finland, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Romania with 2.2, 2.1, 1.4, 0.4 and 0.1 % respectively (RDDE, 2006, 124). However, the data source contains figures for fifteen countries only.

If we would look in the Slovenian figure 2.2 % more in detail we would discover completely different picture. The immigrant population in Slovenia is much larger. The figure is probably higher than 10.0 %. We can guess this on the basis of 2002 population census data by mother tongue. In 2002, 87.7 % of Slovenian population declared Slovene mother tongue (SORS, 2003). More than 10.0 % of the population of Slovenia at the time of the census was immigrant population from former republics and autonomous provinces of the second Yugoslavia. However, great majority of them was naturalized at the beginning of the 1990s when Slovenia became an independent state.

Migration as Mostly Economically Driven Process

Since the beginning of the 1990s the European international migration flows indicate increasingly diversified flow patterns of migrants. Immigration countries tend to receive the immigrants from larger number of sources. The nationality profile of the European international migration is mainly caused by geographical proximity and historical and cultural ties between receiving and sending countries. Additionally, irregular migration flows are caused by many other factors as well (Höhn, 2005, 72).

However, when we ask ourselves what drives international migration processes in general and in Europe in particular, the answer is quite straightforward. International as well as internal migration processes are predominantly economically driven. Certainly, other factors should be taken into account too. We have already seen the importance of political factors in European international migrations since the middle of the 20th century. Some people move in places with milder climate, etc.

Unfortunately, the international migrations have always been highly regulated. A human person does not have the right to choose geographic location for living wherever on Earth freely. The document of the International Conference on Population and Development adopted in Cairo in 1994 says instead that a man has the right to choose freely the country for living, however, his choice is limited to the countries which are prepared to accept him (UN, 1994, Ch. X).

International migration regulations and controls have always influenced real emigration and immigration flows. Therefore, the international migration statistical data almost never reflect precisely the desire to migrate. Potential emigration is usually much higher than real one. “Would be” emigrants are really numerous in the developing countries. Their number is much larger than any guess about the possible number of immigrants Europe or developed world could ever admit and integrate.

European immigration is controlled in one way or another. Two main forms of control are border and inside the country control. Both of them are limited and combined with other instruments like residence or work permits for example. There are some forms of migration which are uncontrolled by the definition. However, even in the case of undocumented or illegal immigration there are certain indirect controls. The size of this immigration is limited by the size of the illegal or black economy.

At micro or individual level the decision to migrate can be explained best as an investment decision. A man compares benefits and costs of the move from one place to another or from one country to another. If benefits are higher than costs a person becomes a migrant. Of course, net present value of costs and benefits should be compared. The costs of migration are travel costs, psychic costs, information costs, etc. The benefits are, on the other hand, higher wages or salaries, better opportunities for the education of children, promotion opportunities, better housing, more attractive cultural and social life in the place of immigration, etc. The outlined explanation of migration decision is known as human capital theory explanation. The theory is capable to explain most of the internal and international migration characteristics or, in other words, the evidence is in accordance with the human capital theory of migration.

Aggregate or macro migration level is best characterized by net migration. The net migration is the outcome of numerous individual decisions. However, it is quite good illustration of the desire to migrate from one place, region or country to another one. The main factors influencing the net migration are actual and expected comparative wage and salary levels, comparative unemployment rates and benefits, the costs of migration, the costs and availability of housing, business cycle of the economy, etc. People simply compare the economic and social conditions at home and abroad and make the decision whether to move or not to move (Layard et. al, 1992, 21).

There are other and less economic explanations of the migration in the literature as well. The idea of push and pull factors is still around. More empirically oriented authors try to apply different mathematic, statistical and econometric models. Others see migration processes as typical chain migrations. It is impossible to deal with all these theories and models in the paper. However, most of them are supplementary to the basic economic explanatory model.

From the viewpoint of quite strong migration pressure which exists in modern world, especially between developing and developed countries, it is necessary to think about the alternatives to international migration (Malacic,

1996). The best alternative is economic and social development in developing countries as well as in the world as a whole. To achieve that aim we need the integration and globalization of the world economy. These processes will promote movements of capital from developed to developing countries and, consequently, increase international trade. The solution which brings people from developing countries to the developed countries to produce labor-intensive goods is not very wise. It would be much wiser to enable them to produce those goods at home and then sell them abroad. In this case capital comes to the labor and there would be much less need for the movement of international migrants. However, this kind of development is more likely in the long run. Important condition for the flow of capital into less developed and labor abundant countries is the general increase of efficiency of these economies and a free international trade between more and less developed countries. Fortunately, modern technological progress in information technology and other fields helps very much in this direction.

The Demographic Role of Migration: Is It Sustainable?

Demographic transition has always represented great challenge to society. It creates population pressure from higher population growth. Historically, Europe was fortunate enough to have the opportunity to relieve at least part of this pressure through emigration, mostly across the Atlantic Ocean. Today's developing countries do not have such an opportunity. Free mass emigration is no longer possible in spite of much greater population pressures resulting from the demographic transition in the majority of today's developing countries than ever existed in Europe. Quality migrations which mostly represent today's emigration from developing to the developed countries are too small to have any larger effect on population pressure. Their influence on the economic development of backward countries is even negative because they represent a loss of the educated people needed for the development of domestic economy. Anyhow, historical evidence shows two different patterns connecting mortality and fertility transition with the processes of international migrations.

The most important features connecting long-term economic development in Europe and its migration in general and emigration in particular show that a great majority of European countries with the highest emigration as well as many other European countries have been transformed after substantial development into the countries of immigration. Generally, the processes of modernization, economic development and social advancement transform emigrational countries into countries of immigration. The process of emigration usually does not start in the most backward and isolated regions. Emigration gains momentum only if a certain level of development has been achieved. Emigration abroad is frequently preceded by rural urban internal migration (Malacic, 1993, 193). It would be hard to argue that these processes have been in one way or another directly caused by the demographic factors.

In modern demographic regime with low levels of fertility and mortality international migration will probably have important role. However, there are many open questions which are important for making generalizations and conclusions about this role. To answer these questions today is not easy at all. It may be even too early because we can not be certain that the modern demographic regime is developed well enough. To illustrate this point let us look at bellow-replacement fertility in Europe. Is it possible to say that bellow-replacement fertility will be one of the main characteristics of the modern demographic regime? Some authors think so. For them the European Union and Europe in general will have bellow-replacement fertility as the result of the SDT. It will cause considerable increase in ageing levels, unfavorable dependency ratios and possibly a need for renewal of labor importation (Lesthaeghe and Willems, 1999, 227). The answers of others are less certain for Europe and especially less so for the United States of America (Coleman, 2005, 15).

In the case bellow-replacement fertility would continue in Europe the future demographic prospects of the continent would depend heavily on the extent of the net immigration from other parts of the world. Bellow-replacement fertility without net immigration is simply unsustainable in the long run. The intrinsic rate of growth of the stable population with net reproduction rate 0.70 and 27 years of generation distance is about – 1.4 % per year. Any population with the growth rate of – 1.4 % per year would decline to the half of its original size in 50 years.

The population prospects for Europe in the 21st century will probably be not very bright. According to the United Nations' medium term population projection for the European Union of 25 countries (EU without Bulgaria and Romania) in 2050 the projected population is expected to fall by about 20 million, from about 450 million to 431 million. The population decline is projected despite the favorable assumptions about the future population development in EU-25. The authors of the projections assume a considerable rise in both fertility and life expectancy and net immigration from outside of the EU-25 of about 33 million persons. The EU-25 population in 2050 would be very old with some 30 percent older than 65 years and half of the population older than 50 years.

The population of West Asia and North Africa, on the other side of the Mediterranean, will grow very fast. The demographic growth differentials between Europe and neighboring regions will probably even increase the existing income differences between both sides of the Mediterranean. Economic research shows that the process of elimination of the income differences between regions is slow even in the USA (Layard et al, 1992, 22). Therefore, we can not expect any improvement at all in our case. The differentials will imply the continuation of strong migratory pressure from West Asia and North Africa to Europe.

For the topic of this paper the most important question is whether the immigration is necessary for demographic reasons in modern demographic regime. In fact, the question is about the capacity of immigration to stop or at least considerably diminish population ageing and population decline in modern Europe. The question has long been debated by demographers and other experts and has recently taken place in policy debates (Niessen and Schiber, 2002, 13).

Formally, it is possible to see in the balancing equation that positive net immigration can compensate for negative natural increase of the population. Strong migratory pressure from the developing countries guarantees pool of potential immigrants which can fulfill all needs of the developed countries. On the other hand, many experts also think that immigration should be considered as an option for solving serious demographic problems of contemporary Europe and developed world as a whole (Niessen and Schiber, 2002, 1).

However, when we try to calculate the replacement migration which would compensate for bellow-replacement fertility or even for the lowest-low fertility we come quickly to very large numbers of necessary immigrants (United Nations, 2001). The numbers quickly surpass any realistic level of international immigration domestic native population would accept and would be able to integrate. My own calculations for Slovenia have shown that the number of necessary yearly immigrants would surpass the number of childbirths in the country per year in two to three decades from now. More or less similar are calculations for other European countries with the lowest-low level of fertility. Slightly better is the situation in European countries with total fertility rates between 1.5 and 2.0.

Additionally, immigration in Europe can not in any realistic way be able to stop population ageing. The reason is not only in the fact that immigrants also age but simply the fact that ageing of the population is basically caused by very low level of fertility. Therefore, the only long-run solution for the problem of population ageing is fertility increase to at least replacement level.

The social and political sustainability of large scale immigration is predominantly connected to the size and composition of the immigrant flows. The size is sensitive and controversial issue despite the fact that it is practically impossible to determine anything like appropriate size if not optimal or acceptable one. The size of the future immigrant intake in Europe and in the developed part of the world is very important for the capacity of integration of the receiving population and society as well as for the social cohesion relating to immigration.

However, the composition of the immigrants is even more important. Different characteristics of the migrant populations are the result of selectivity which is almost always part of the migration processes. There are some exceptions, too. Forced migrations, for example, are usually less selective despite the fact that there might be exceptions to this too.

With regard to composition, for the purpose of this paper the most important are demographic, economic and social characteristics of the immigrants. The question is what degree of selectivity of the immigrants is possible and desirable in developed countries and which criteria can or should be applied in the process of selection. In principle, the selection criteria should be as broad as possible. Therefore, the selection criteria which would be narrow or entirely dependent on demographic objectives would also be unsustainable in the long-run. However, at the same time one should always have in mind the question whether such a policy

of “fine-tuning” is possible to implement. Additionally, migration in general and international migration in particular is the most volatile of the components determining population size.

From the demographic point of view Europe and the developed countries would need young immigrants with gender balanced composition. It is hard to accept the idea of Niessen and Schiber that the desired immigrants would have been as young as possible because the developed countries are unable to import children. It would be social engineering par exellance and simply unreal (Niessen and Schiber, 2002, 14). On the other hand concern is unnecessary because immigrants are almost always young adults. Female immigrants are important too, at least for balancing gender structure. They may also improve slightly fertility in the immigrant societies despite the fact that immigrants relatively quickly accept low fertility norms of the developed world. But in the case of new spouse migration in Europe it may hinder integration of immigrants in host society. Some immigrants, notably Muslims and Hindus, tend to prefer arranged marriages with persons of the same religion, nationality, caste, etc. Many of them distrust western secularism and prefer imported brides free of liberal and disturbing western ideas and secularisms (Coleman, 2005, 28).

The developed countries need high quality immigrants. There is an increasing demand for highly skilled immigrant labor. Nevertheless, highly educated young persons from developing countries with needed skills such as IT for example are in short supply. Therefore, the increasing competition for educated and highly skilled immigrants can already be observed in the developed countries. Some countries try to attract students from developing countries and retain them after graduation. The problem with low skilled and uneducated immigrants which are in abundant supply is their long-run incompatibility with the economies of advanced European and other developed countries. Low skilled labor and capital are substitutes and uneducated immigrants are first to loose jobs due to technological developments in developed countries.

The ethnic and social composition of the population of many developed immigrant countries is threatened also by large numbers of ethnically and racially very different immigrants from far away countries and continents. In the case, the current size and ethnic composition of immigration flows to Europe would continue or even increase the racial and ethnic composition of many European countries will be radically and more or less permanently transformed.

Notwithstanding the desire for smooth and undisturbed demographic development in Europe we should also take into account the possibility that natural and migration components of population change will result in a demographic decline. It may be the result of individual and family fertility choices as well as the strong opposition to the large immigration of foreigners. Public opinion in most of Europe, and some political parties, already openly and increasingly opposes to large-scale immigration. In this case, as was stressed by P. Demeny, such societies should make necessary adjustments to a declining population size and should be able to exercise very strict control over

immigration (Demeny, 2005, 8). It will probably be a viable solution only in the case of slow demographic decline. Otherwise the population development would lead to large-scale population losses and towards the collapse of such population. Long-run survival would not be possible and large-scale foreign immigration would prevail sooner or later.

Conclusion

International migration of population is essential part of the growth equation of every open population. On the other hand, the present state of development of demographic theory does not allow all four components of demographic change to be included in one general theory of population development. A coherent theoretical framework which would be able to explain the complex nature of the modern demographic regime is, according to my view, still missing in modern demography. The classical theory of demographic transition was developed for transitional period and has never been intended to explain the modern demographic regime. The new theory which would be up to the task is not developed yet.

In modern demographic regime with low levels of fertility and mortality international migration will probably have important role. Even today European Union has reached an all-time peak of the net inflow of migrants. The figure, as estimated by Eurostat, is around one million per year.

The most important question analyzed in this paper is whether the immigration is necessary for demographic reasons in modern demographic regime. Can immigration stop or at least considerably diminish population ageing and population decline in modern Europe? The answer is far from simple. It can not stop the population ageing. The replacement migration, on the other hand, would demand very large numbers of necessary immigrants.

Europe and the developed countries need young immigrants with gender balanced composition and high quality immigrants. The continuation of current size and ethnic composition of immigration flows to Europe would cause permanent transformation of the racial and ethnic composition of many European countries.

In the case of demographic decline, European societies should make all necessary adjustments. However, it will probably be a viable solution only in the case of slow demographic decline.

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Philip Martin

Low- and Middle-Skill Guest Workers

Abstract

The world appears to be on the verge of a new era in guest worker programs, which aim to add workers temporarily to the labor force but not settlers to the population. This may seem surprising, since programs such as the Mexico-US Bracero and the German Gastarbeiter programs ended when receiving-country governments were persuaded that large numbers of guest workers adversely affected local workers and could allow migration to get "out of control"[1].

In a world of persisting demographic and economic inequalities and better communications and transportation links, especially young people want to cross national borders for higher wages and better opportunities. There is general agreement that the world is at the dawn of a new era in international labor migration, with more sources and destinations of migrant workers and migrants from all rungs of the job ladder.

Improved management of 21st century labor migration is likely to require guest worker programs that include economic incentives to encourage employers and migrants to abide by program rules. For example, employer-paid taxes on migrant earnings that finance the restructuring of migrant jobs can allow the programs to shrink over time, while refunding worker-paid taxes can encourage migrants to return as program rules require and provide funds to stimulate economic development to make emigration less necessary. Adding such economic mechanisms could help especially receiving countries to be convinced that guest worker programs would not turn into immigration programs, thus more labor channels for migrant workers.

This paper focuses on moving unskilled migrants from developing to industrial countries, such as Mexico to the US or Poland to Germany. There is also a significant flow of unskilled migrants into a wide range of middle-income developing countries that include Argentina, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand. These labor flows are similar to those into industrial countries in the industries and areas where migrants find jobs, including agriculture, construction, and a variety of services, but different in the sense that many of the migrants fill jobs that are vacant because of emigration or recent upward mobility, as when Poles migrate to the UK and Ukrainians fill in behind them.

Introduction

The world is divided into about 200 nation states. Their per capita incomes in 2004 ranged from less than $250 per person per year to more than $50,000 (World Bank Indicators 2006, 20–22), providing a significant incentive for especially young people to migrate from one country to another for higher wages and more opportunities[2]. The 30 high-income countries had one billion residents in 2004, a sixth of the world's population, and their gross national income was $32 trillion, 80 percent of the global $40 trillion[3]. The resulting average per

[1] It is generally agreed that Bracero program sowed the seeds for later illegal Mexico-US migration (Martin, 2004, Chapter 2), and that Germany faces major integration challenges with settled Turkish guest workers and their families (Martin, 2004, Chapter 6).

[2] Young people are most likely to move over borders because they have the least invested in jobs and careers at home and the most time to recoup their "investment in migration" abroad.

[3] At purchasing power parity, which takes into account national differences in the cost of living, the world's gross national income was $56 trillion, including 55 percent in high-income countries.

capita income of $32,000 in high-income countries was 21 times the average $1,500 in low and middle-income countries. This 21–1 ratio in per capita incomes between high-income and other countries has been stable over the past quarter century (Martin, Abella, Kuptsch, 2006).

Migration from place to place is an age-old response to differences in economic opportunity, security, and other factors, but international migration over regulated national borders is relatively recent — there were 43 generally recognized countries in 1900, versus almost 200 today.[1] The number of international migrants, 191 million in 2005 (UN, 2006), has doubled during the past two decades. There are four distinct flows. Some 62 million migrants have moved from south to north (from a developing to a developed country), 61 million moved from south to south, 53 million from north to north, and 14 million from north to south[2].

Table 1. Migrants in 2005 (mils)

Origin/Destination	Industrial	Developing
Industrial	53	14
Developing	62	61

Source: UN, 2006

Half of these migrants are in the labor force of the destination area, making the 60 million migrant workers in high-income countries an average 12 percent of the labor force (ILO, 2004). The 31 million migrant workers from developing countries in developed countries (half of 62 million) are different from the workers they join abroad and those left behind at home. Globally, 40 percent of the world's 3.2 billion workers are employed in agriculture, 20 percent in industry and construction, and 40 percent in services (World Bank, 2006), and developing country migrants are drawn from societies that have this 40–20–40 distribution of workers. The industrial countries to which migrants move have about three percent of their workers employed in agriculture, 25 percent in industry, and 72 percent in services (OECD, 2005).

Table 2. Migrants and Local Workers by Sector, Percent Distribution

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Industrial	3	25	72
Developing	40	20	40
Migrants	10	40	50

Source: See text
Industry includes construction

[1] There were 43 generally recognized nation-states in 1900, and 191 in 2000, when the CIA fact book listed 191 "independent states," one "other" (Taiwan), and six other entities, including Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Western Sahara. (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html,).

[2] These are stock estimates in 2005, meaning that migrants may have arrived recently or decades ago.

Migrant workers from developing countries in industrial countries have a labor force distribution unlike that in sending or receiving countries. About 10 percent of migrants are employed in agriculture, 40 percent in industry and construction, and 50 percent in services (OECD, 2006), reflecting a tendency of three types of industrial country employers to request migrant workers: those in sunset industries such as agriculture and light manufacturing such as producing garments, those in industries that are difficult to trade, such as construction, and those in services up and down the skill ladder, from IT and health care services to domestic helpers and janitorial services.

Migrant workers from developing countries who move to industrial countries also have personal characteristics that make them different from native-born adults. The best single determinant of individual earnings in industrial countries is years of education. In most developing countries, the distribution of adults by years of education has a pyramid shape, with a few well-educated persons on top and most workers grouped near the bottom, with less than a secondary-school certificate or high-school diploma.

Native-born adults in high-income countries have a diamond shape when arrayed by years of education. About 25 percent have a college degree, 60 percent have a secondary school certificate, and 15 percent have less than a secondary certificate or high-school diploma. Migrants from developing countries in industrial countries are different from adults at home and abroad, forming more of an hourglass or barbell shape when arrayed by years of education. Some 35 to 40 percent have a college degree, 25 percent a secondary school certificate, and 35 percent less than a high-school diploma. International migration from developing to industrial countries takes persons from the top and bottom of a pyramid distribution and adds them to the top and bottom of a diamond-shaped distribution.

The migrants drawn from the top of the education pyramid of developing countries are often professionals and students, and most are legal residents of industrial countries. Over the past two decades, almost all industrial countries have made it easier for foreign professionals to enter as students, guest workers, and settlers. However, most of the world's workers and most of the world's migrant workers are unskilled, and the major labor migration issue is whether and how to move more unskilled workers from developing to industrial nations.

Win-Win-Win Migration

Moving unskilled workers from lower- to higher-wage countries can be a win-win-win situation, with migrants benefiting from higher wages, receiving countries benefiting from more employment and a larger GDP, and migrant-sending countries benefiting from jobs for otherwise unemployed workers, remittances, and returns. The first two wins are well established, as migrants demonstrate a strong desire to go abroad by taking enormous risks to move to higher wage countries. Most studies in receiving countries conclude that the major beneficiaries of economically motivated migration are the migrants who have higher earnings, but the presence of migrants also slightly expands economic output by slightly depressing wages (Smith and Edmonston).

The third win, the effect of emigration on migrant countries of origin, has been in the spotlight because migrant numbers and remittances are rising rapidly. The Global Commission on International Migration (www.gcim.org), the World Trade Organization's GATS Mode 4 negotiations (www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm), and the UN's High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (www.unmigration.org) have recently lent support to the belief that more labor migration from developing to industrial countries can enhance win-win-win outcomes, citing remittances and the contributions of migrants who return and create new jobs at home and the Diaspora that maintains links to the country of origin.

Economists estimate that moving more workers over borders could increase global economic output significantly by moving workers to places where their productivity is higher. One of the first studies was conducted by Hamilton and Whalley (1984), who estimated that global GDP could double if there were enough additional migration to equalize the marginal productivity of labor (and wages) between seven world regions that included 179 countries.[1] Even if there was not enough migration to equalize wages, there could still be big increases in global GDP, since the first migrants face the largest gaps in marginal productivity or wages and thus gain the most by moving.

The World Bank (2005) estimated that moving an additional 14 million migrants from developing to high-income countries would generate a global income gain of over $350 billion, exceeding the $300 billion gain from completing the Doha round of trade negotiations.[2] The press release accompanying the report argued that more "managed migration programs, including temporary work visas for low-skilled migrants in industrial countries… would contribute to significant reductions in poverty in migrant sending countries, among the migrants themselves, their families and, as remittances increase, in the broader community."

If more labor migration produces win-win-win outcomes, how should it be organized? The answer seems to be carefully. The GCIM recommended (1.3) "carefully designed temporary migration programs as a means of addressing the economic needs of both countries of origin and destination." The need for

[1] In Hamilton and Whalley's simulation, massive migration to equalize wages would add $5 trillion to $16 trillion to global GDP in 1977, when it was $8 trillion. Their simulation relied on a number of assumptions, including full employment of the world's workers, who produced a single output with a CES production function. They estimated 1977 differences in the marginal productivity of labor across seven multi-country regions, and assumed that these differences were to be due to migration restrictions. Migration that equalized marginal productivity and wages (factor-price convergence via migration) would result in workers in receiving areas losing and capital owners in receiving areas gaining, and the opposite distributional effects in sending countries. (The full employment assumption is necessary to justify equating wages and marginal productivity; they assume the ratio of wages to profits is one in both rich and poor countries before migration barriers are lifted and that capital does not move even as labor migrates).

[2] Two thirds of this $300 billion gain would come from liberalizing farm trade.

careful design of guest worker programs is especially urgent in countries such as the US and Germany, where governments have little credibility keeping guest worker programs true to their design because past programs did not function as expected. Understanding why guest worker programs tend to get larger and to last longer than anticipated is a prerequisite to designing programs that can come closer to fulfilling the goal of adding workers temporarily to the labor force but not adding settlers to the population.

Distortion and Dependence

Guest worker programs tend to get larger and to last longer than anticipated because of distortion and dependence. Most employers in host countries do not hire guest workers. Distortion means that the minority who do have a different labor market than employers who hire only local workers—those hiring guest workers face limited supplies of unskilled workers at home and unlimited abroad.

The employers hiring guest workers often assume that migrants will continue to be available and make investment decisions that reflect this assumption. Thus, farmers who depend on migrants may plant fruit trees in areas with few people, assert that they will go out of business without migrants to pick their crops, and resist efforts to reduce the number of guest workers because doing so would reduce the value of their orchard investment. This is economic distortion in the sense that some employers face different labor supply constraints than others. The employers who rely on migrants do not have to raise wages as local workers exit or they expand production because they can recruit migrant workers.

Dependence reflects the fact that some migrants and their families as well as their regions and countries of origin may assume that foreign jobs, earnings, and remittances will continue to be available. If the opportunity to work abroad legally is curbed, and the 3 R's of recruitment, remittances, and returns have not set in motion economic development that makes migration self stopping, migrants may continue to migrate to avoid reductions in their incomes. Most researchers conclude that the US-Mexico Bracero programs sowed the seeds of subsequent unauthorized Mexico-US migration, via distortion in rural America (the expansion of labor-intensive agriculture) and dependence in rural Mexico (population and labor force growth without economic development) (Martin, 2003, Chapter 2).

The realities of distortion and dependence should encourage governments considering new guest worker programs to proceed cautiously, and to include economic mechanisms to minimize distortion and dependence. These mechanisms include taxes to encourage employers to look for alternatives to migrants and subsidies to encourage guest workers to return to their countries of origin as their contracts require.

Dealing with distortion requires recognition that employers always have choices when they make investments and fill jobs. By the time government is involved in a request for guest workers, the employer has usually found the migrants desired, so that a supervised period of recruitment usually fails to find

local workers. Government employment services are ill-suited to second-guess employers in such situations, which is one reason labor certification processes can become very contentious, especially if unemployment rates in the areas where migrants will be employed are high.

Once the employers who turn to guest workers learn how to have their "need" for migrants certified, most assume they will be able to continue to hire foreign workers. As a result, investments in alternatives to migrants can wither, and distortions may increase as migrant-dependent sectors become isolated from national labor markets. For example, migrant-dependent agriculture may not offer workers health insurance because the young male migrants who dominate the seasonal work force prefer cash wages to costly benefits, but this also makes farm work less attractive to local workers looking for benefits. Networks linking migrants and work places soon bridge borders, as current migrants refer friends and relatives to fill vacant jobs. One result is that labor market information may flow far more freely from a migrant workplace to migrant countries of origin than to pockets of unemployment nearby.

International norms and local laws call for migrant workers to be treated equally, offered the same wages and benefits as local workers. One way to minimize distortion is to realize that payroll taxes for social security and unemployment and other insurance add 20 to 40 percent to wages. These taxes should be collected on migrant wages to level the playing field between migrant and local workers, but in most cases migrants are not eligible for the benefits financed by the taxes.

If the employer share of payroll taxes were used to combat distortion by supporting the restructuring of migrant jobs, such as promoting labor-saving mechanization, employers would have an interest in alternatives to migrants. For example, in an industry such as agriculture, it is often hard for one farmer to finance or implement mechanization, since peach packers and processors want hand or mechanically picked fruit, but not both (Martin, 2003, Chapter 8). Thus, a mechanization program funded by payroll taxes could help shape alternatives to migrants.[1]

It should be emphasized that mechanization is not the only alternative to migrants. In some cases, local workers may be attracted to "migrant jobs" after they are restructured, as with garbage collection in the US, whose labor force has been "re-nationalized" by switching to large containers lifted by a truck operator. In other cases, levies on migrants may accelerate market segmentation, as when some elderly have in-home migrant caregivers and others use technology such as cameras linked to computers to live alone but under video monitoring that can summon help quickly. The universal truism is that wages held down by the presence of migrants will lead to more labor-intensive ways to get work done,

[1] To recognize that each sector is different, boards representing employers, workers, and government could decide how to spend the accumulated funds to reduce dependence on guest workers over time.

and wages bid up by the absence of migrants will encourage the development of alternatives to high-wage workers.

The other half of the equation involves giving migrants incentives to abide by the terms of their contracts, which usually require departure when jobs or a one- to two-year work contract ends. To encourage returns, guest workers can be given unique tax-reporting numbers, and the worker's share of payroll taxes can be refunded when the migrant surrenders his/her work visa in the country of origin. Given the global interest in using remittances to hasten development, governments and development institutions could match payroll tax refunds to support projects that create jobs in the migrants' home area.

Minimizing distortion and dependence with taxes and subsidies will not have the desired effects on employers and migrants if unauthorized workers are readily available and labor laws are not enforced. Some employers hire unauthorized workers to save payroll taxes, and some migrants established abroad will resist departing when their work visas expire despite refund offers if they believe they can continue to work abroad in an irregular status and they have few options to earn income at hoem. Thus, enforcement of immigration and labor laws is a prerequisite to the development of guest worker programs that minimize distortion and dependence.

21st Century Guest Worker Programs

During the US Bracero and German guest worker eras, there was one major program for admitting migrant workers. Today, the US, Germany, and most other high-income countries have multiple programs to admit foreign workers via front, side, and back doors. The leitmotiv of the new guest worker programs is straightforward: welcome skilled workers and allow them to settle but rotate unskilled migrants in and out of the country.

The front doors for foreigners invited to settle admit highly skilled or economic migrants. Australia, Canada and the UK select economic migrants on a supply-side basis that puts most weight on personal characteristics such as age and education, while Germany and the US select economic migrants on a demand-side basis of the foreigner having a job offer. There has been some convergence between points-based or supply-side selection systems and employer-based or demand-side selection systems, as Canada awards points to foreigners with job offers and the US makes it easiest to get immigrant visas for college-educated foreigners while Germany requires payment of a threshold salary.

Side-door migrants are admitted for a specific time and purpose that ranges from a few days for tourism to several years for work or study. Side doors were traditionally not linked explicitly to front-door settlement channels, as reflected in rules requiring foreign students to return to their country of origin upon graduation. This has changed, and most industrial countries now allow foreign student graduates to work after graduation and then settle, just as foreign professionals can enter as guest workers and later settle as immigrants, making these guest workers in effect probationary immigrants. Back-door migrants refer

to foreigners who enter a country illegally as well as those who entered legally and violated the terms of their entry, as when a tourist goes to work. In the US and southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, many of the foreigners who eventually wind up as immigrants arrive in illegal or quasi-legal status.

The major change between past and current guest worker programs is in their scope and purpose. Mid-20th century guest worker programs were macro in the sense that there was one major program per country, and the overall unemployment and job vacancy rate played determinative roles in decisions on the need for guest workers. Today's multiple programs are micro, aiming to fill job vacancies for nurses, IT specialists, or farm workers; overall unemployment and job vacancy rates play little role in discussions about whether these particular types of workers are needed. Government employment services agencies, which have shrunk, have less authority to deny employer requests for migrants, and less credibility in finding local workers to fill job vacancies.[1]

With contemporary guest worker programs admitting migrants at the top and bottom of the job ladder, and admissions procedures giving employers more authority to determine whether foreign workers are needed, employers have gained an important voice in admissions policy. In most industrial countries, if an employer decides that a college-educated foreigner is the best person to fill a vacant job, the hiring and admission procedure is relatively straightforward. For example, available H-1B visas in the US are generally gone early well before the end of the year in part because the admission process is easy--most employers can simply "attest" that they are paying at least the prevailing wage to a college-educated foreigner who is to fill a job normally requiring a college education.

Numbers versus Rights

The new guest worker programs are raising a difficult discussion, the trade off between the competing goods of migrant numbers and migrant rights. The demand for migrant workers depends in part on their cost, which in turn depends in part on their rights. If migrants have the "full rights" laid out in ILO and UN conventions, including the right to work-related benefits and family unification, their cost is typically higher and fewer are demanded by employers (Hasenau, 1991).[2] On the other hand, fewer rights and lower costs can expand migrant numbers, but lead to a layered labor force and society (Ruhs and Martin, 2006).

Most international discussions call for more numbers and more rights, that is, more channels for legal guest workers to enter rich countries as well as full ILO and UN rights for migrants admitted. In fact, most countries receiving

[1] In the US, there are two major ways of determining whether an employer "needs" migrants. Under certification, the US Department of Labor controls the border gate, not allowing migrants to enter until the employer conducts recruitment activities supervised by DOL. Under the alternative attestation process, the employer controls the border gate, opening it by attesting that she is paying the prevailing wage, and DOL responds to complaints of violations.

[2] Michael Hasenau, *ILO Standards on Migrant Workers: The Fundamentals of the UN Convention and Their Genesis*, 25 Int'l Migration 687, 688 (1991).

migrants have not ratified the ILO[1] and UN migrant conventions, so this call for "more" migrant numbers and rights provides little guidance to deal with the trade off in practice. For example, should UN agencies encourage labor to Gulf oil exporters that sharply restrict the rights of migrants? Migrants earn more in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait than they would at home, but there is no immediate prospect for equality between migrants and natives.

The presence of migrants in countries that restrict migrant rights demonstrates that many workers are willing to accept the trade off of higher wages and fewer rights. The fact that many people pay up to 25 percent of what they will earn to obtain a two-year contract to work in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait suggests that the international community may want to consider core migrant rights as well as more comprehensive migrant rights conventions.

The fundamental dilemma is that inequality motivates migration, but migrant conventions and norms call for equality after arrival. This dilemma lies at the core of the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations, which aim to liberalize the movement of "service providers."[2] If achieved, there could be "hundreds of millions" of additional migrants crossing borders to provide services[3].

In 2000, about one percent of global trade in services involved Mode 4, the "movement of natural persons" over borders. Many developing countries would like to see more Mode 4 movements, with some having the goal of a "GATS visa" that would allow access to any WTO member country for one to three years (Chandra, 2001, 648), so that refusal to allow entry and employment would be a reason to file a complaint with the WTO.

The numbers versus rights trade off becomes clear when dealing with wage standards for GATS service providers. ILO Conventions 97 and 143 call for wage parity for migrant and local workers. However, Chaudhuri et al (2004) assert that equal wages would limit numbers: "Wage-parity… is intended to provide a nondiscriminatory environment, [but] tends to erode the cost advantage of hiring foreigners and works like a de facto quota." Chanda goes further, asserting that wage parity "negates the very basis of cross-country labor flows, which stem from endowment-based cost differentials between countries." (2001, 635). In

[1] Cholewinski (1997, 91) notes that the ILO is reluctant to accept ratifications of its conventions with national reservations.

[2] Services move over borders in four major ways or modes. Mode 1 cross-border supply occurs when the service rather than the supplier or consumer crosses national borders, as with call centers. Mode 2 consumption abroad occurs when the consumer travels to the supplier, as when a tourist visits another country or a patient travels abroad for medical services. Mode 3 commercial presence reflects the movement of capital, as when a bank or insurance company establishes a subsidiary in another country, and Mode 4 "movement of natural persons" involves the supplier traveling to the consumer of a service.

[3] In answer to the question, "Are we looking at tens of millions of people moving around in the future [under Mode 4]," Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh, director of trade in services at the WTO, said "Ah, yes - it could be hundreds [of millions] if we liberalize." John Zarocostas, Migration helps export services, Washington Times, January 3, 2005, pA10.

other words, if GATS opened new channels for migrants, would they be paid local minimum or prevailing wages, which may limit their numbers, or could they work for lower wages, which would presumably increase numbers?

Numbers versus rights raise other questions as well. Ruhs (2005, 209) emphasizes that it is a human right to leave one's country, but there is no corresponding right to enter another country. As a result, the balance of power in determining whether numbers or rights gets higher priority lies mostly in the richer migrant-receiving countries, which have to answer questions such as whether to enforce the return of skilled migrants to avoid brain drain from sending countries or welcome skilled migrants to generate the maximum benefits for natives from immigration. Sending countries largely react to these policies, making decisions about whether to facilitate labor emigration or attempt to ban migration to particular countries.

Conclusions

Guest worker programs move workers from one country to another. Economic theory suggests that the workers who move from lower to higher wage countries are the major beneficiaries of such programs, and that such labor migration increases global economic efficiency. There are many types of guest worker programs, ranging from those that admit temporary workers to fill temporary jobs, those that admit temporary workers to fill permanent or year-round jobs, and those that admit probationary immigrants. The focus of this paper is on programs that admit temporary workers to fill permanent or year-round jobs.

Governments with large numbers of unauthorized foreign workers often see guest worker programs as the best compromise between the extremes of no borders and no migrants. The arguments for having legal guest workers rather than unauthorized foreigners seem compelling. Employers argue they cannot find local workers to fill vacant jobs at prevailing wages and working conditions, and many migrants want to work abroad for higher wages. To avoid fears of un-integrated second- and third-generation foreigners, governments are often attracted to the concept of simply "borrowing" workers from lower wage countries.

Earlier guest worker programs ended under a cloud, as they lasted longer and got larger than anticipated, and resulted in significant settlement and family unification. To avoid the same fate with 21st century guest worker programs, it is important to include economic incentives to reinforce program rules and help ensure that guest workers do not become permanent features of the landscape in sending and receiving countries. Doing so can encourage industrial countries to open more gates for guest workers.

Well-managed guest worker programs benefit migrants and receiving countries, but it is less clear that sending countries will benefit from recruitment, remittances and returns. The ILO (2004, 30) reviewed the migration and development literature and concluded that "migration can, in some cases, contribute positively to development where a country is already poised to develop; it cannot, however, create such conditions." The World Bank's 2006

GEP similarly asserts that "migration should not be viewed as a substitute for economic development in the origin country as ultimately, development depends on sound domestic economic policies."

Potential conflicts of interest between receivers and senders highlight the need for dialogue and cooperation. Receiving countries prefer the best and brightest workers, such as IT and health care professionals. The professionals earn more and can remit more, but may also find it easier to settle abroad, which likely reduces remittances. It is not yet clear whether the advice being given to developing countries — don't worry if your best and brightest leave because you will get remittances — will eventually be as dis-credited as the advice of a half-century ago to speed up development by creating and protecting behind high tariff walls basic steel and other industries.

Governments and international institutions advocating more 21st century guest worker programs have not yet dealt with the fundamental dilemma that inequality motivates people to move, but most norms call for equal treatment after arrival. Countries in which the equality norm receives least attention have the most migrants, as in the Middle East, while countries which adhere to the equality norm have fewer, as in Scandinavia. There are no easy or universal answer as to whether numbers or rights should get higher priority, but one way forward is to think in terms of core rights that all migrants should enjoy.

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Douglas S. Massey

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

This paper reviews theoretical ideas accounting for the supply of international migrants, the demand for their services, the motivations of movers, the infrastructure that connects sources of migrant supply and demand, and the intent and efficacy of state policies to regulate cross-border movements of people. These ideas offer a guide for the construction of improved forecasting models. The supply of international migrants is likely to be determined by transitions to the market now occurring throughout the developing world, and destinations will reflect links of trade, transportation, politics, and communication between developing and developed nations. The demand for immigrants in the latter is connected to the segmentation of labor markets and those persons who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants will be motivated by diverse goals, including the desire to overcome failures in capital, credit, and insurance markets as well as disequilibria in labor markets. In modeling migration it is imperative to estimate the influence of migrant networks and to capture the feedback effects of networks over time. The parameterization of such feedbacks according to a logistic function would enable forecasting models to do a better job of capturing the dynamic effects of migrant networks in promoting future immigration based on past experience.

Forecasting the size and composition of a nation's population is challenging because it requires one to make guesses about the future course of fertility, mortality, and migration. Even if one makes reasonably accurate assumptions about future demographic behavior under static conditions, exogenous shocks can always occur to change those conditions in unpredictable ways. Natural disasters, pandemics, wars, depressions, and technological breakthroughs can radically alter the decision-making environment to affect demographic outcomes, both directly and indirectly. Owing to unexpected exogenous changes in the past, demographers in the United States and other developed nations largely failed to anticipate two of the most important population trends of the postwar period: the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960 and the abrupt increase in life expectancy of the 1970s and 1980s.

Despite past failures, fertility and mortality in developed countries now stand at low levels and can reasonably be expected to change relatively slowly in the normal course of events, with mortality drifting downward and fertility fluctuating within narrow limits in response to short term perturbations. Barring some massive catastrophe, future changes in mortality should not be abrupt; and although fertility has more potential for shifts over time, a return to the swelling birth cohorts of the baby boom is unlikely. The potential for natural increase in developed populations is thus quite small and some countries have already begun a process of natural decline.

As fertility and mortality have fallen and their temporal fluctuations have diminished, international migration has emerged as the most dynamic source of population change. During the 1990s, for example, immigration accounted for a

third of U.S. population growth and by the end of the decade the share had reached 40%. Unfortunately for population forecasters, migration is also the hardest demographic factor to predict. Whereas people are born and die once and only once, they may move repeatedly or not at all during the time they spend in-between these two vital events. Moreover, whereas birth and death rates follow a characteristic age pattern whose contours shift in predictable ways as levels change, the age schedule of migration is malleable and not tied so closely to the overall level of population mobility.

Owing to their common grounding in human biology, mortality and fertility patterns are well represented by model schedules. Simply by picking a life expectancy and a total fertility rate, one can apply model fertility and mortality schedules to project the population forward with considerable accuracy. As long as guesses about trends in overall birth and death rates are reasonably accurate, the forecasts will be quite good. Projecting migration is trickier, however, as both the level and age pattern of mobility are sensitive to short-term fluctuations in social, economic, and policy variables. Moreover, the effect of migration occurs through the interplay of two very different kinds of behaviors — entering and exiting — which may be influenced by entirely different factors in entirely different places.

As a result of these empirical peculiarities, not only did demographers in the United States and other developed nations fail to anticipate the upsurge in immigration after the 1960s, unlike the case with fertility and mortality projections, demographers did not get much better in forecasting international migration in the ensuing 40 years (Massey and Zenteno 1999). The experience of the United States offers a case study in the failure of projections to reflect ongoing realities. In 1964, for example, the U.S. Census Bureau projected the U.S. population forward assuming a net annual immigration of 300,000 persons distributed according to a fixed age and sex structure. This assumption predicted that a total of 9.3 million immigrants would arrive by 1995; but gross legal immigration over the period turned out to be 19.2 million, nearly 50% higher. Although this figure does not take into account emigration, which averaged about a third of the inflow, even discounting by 33% yields a value of 12.9 million, which is roughly 40% higher than originally projected. Moreover, official statistics only capture the legal portion of the inflow. If we very conservatively assume that net undocumented migration ran at 100,000 persons per year, then total net immigration through 1995 rises back up to 15.9 million, a 65% understatement compared with the Census Bureau's projections.

Although demographers did not realize it at the time, the assumption of 300,000 annual immigrants was already out of date when the U.S. Census Bureau established it in 1964. To be sure, the figure seemed reasonable at the time, given the history of immigration to the United States that had prevailed up to that point. Legal immigration had only exceeded 300,000 thrice over the past several decades (in 1956, 1957, and 1963), so the assumption of a net increment of 300,000 migrants seemed safe, even conservative. Unfortunately, after 1965 gross annual

immigration never again fell below 325,000 and by 1967 was running at 362,000 per year. After 1965 undocumented migration also accelerated.

Demographers eventually realized that the assumed level of net immigration was too small, so in 1967 they increased it to 400,000 per year. Within ten years, however, legal immigration had surpassed even this figure, never to return again. Despite this fact, the U.S. Census Bureau clung to an assumption of 400,000 net immigrants well into the 1980s, by which time legal immigration alone was running at around 600,000 per year. In 1984 demographers raised the assumed level to 450,000 and by 1989 to 500,000. Unfortunately, by 1989 gross legal immigration was running in excess of one million per year and net undocumented migration was estimated at around 200,000 per year.

By the early 1990s, U.S. Census Bureau demographers finally came around and raised the assumption to 880,000 net immigrants. Yet even this figure was unrealistically low: during the 1990s legal immigrants arrived at an average rate of one million per year, with another 300,000 coming in through undocumented channels. Since 2000 legal immigration has dipped to a gross average of around 950,000 per year (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004) while net undocumented migration has surged to over 600,000 per year Passel (2005). The best estimate currently is that total net immigration to the United States easily exceeds 1.3 million persons per year.

Clearly, constantly raising the assumed level of immigration to reflect past trends suffers as a projection strategy. During a period of rapidly rising immigration, demographers play a losing game of catch-up, yielding a series of adjustments are too little, too late. Under these circumstances, immigration and its contribution to population growth are consistently underestimated. The failures of past immigration projections may be evident, but can demographers do better? In this paper I argue that they can. Rather than making simple assumptions that set the volume and age-pattern of immigration at fixed levels, I hold that assumptions about future immigration must be dynamic and take into account the full array of forces that influence rates and age patterns of immigration. Forecasting international migration thus requires a sound understanding of the forces driving in- and out-migration from around the world. At a minimum, this understanding should be used to make theoretically grounded, empirically informed judgments about the future trends in international migration (as opposed to assuming fixed levels and age patterns). Ultimately, however, a comprehensive forecast requires the specification of a structural statistical model to capture the effect of different factors at different levels of analysis and how they operate to influence the ebb and flow of people across borders.

Elements of a comprehensive migration model

Although decisions about whether, where, and when to migrate are ultimately made by individuals, these actors are inevitably embedded within households and communities, which are themselves embedded within a social, economic, and cultural matrix that extends regionally and nationally; and nations themselves are

located within global networks of trade, politics, and investment. As a result, no simple model of international migration can suffice to explicate past trends or predict future directions, and recent work has sought to integrate explanatory models across levels and disciplines (see Brettell and Hollifield 2000).

In their comprehensive analysis of migration theories done for the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, for example, Massey et al. (1998:50) expressed considerable skepticism "both of atomistic theories that deny the importance of structural constraints on individual decisions, and of structural theories that deny agency to individuals and families. Rather than adopting the narrow argument of theoretical exclusivity, we adopt the broader position that causal processes relevant to international migration might operate on multiple levels simultaneously, and that sorting out which of the explanations are useful is an empirical and not only a logical task."

In this paper I summarize the leading theoretical models that have been advanced to account for international migration and consider evidence on their key propositions. Based on this review, I outline a more comprehensive approach to the modeling of international migration. I argue that any attempt to account fully for international migration must address six fundamental questions: What are the structural forces within migrant-sending societies that generate large numbers of people prone to move internationally? What are the structural forces in migrant-receiving societies that generate a persistent demand for immigrant workers? What are the motivations of the people who respond to these structural forces by moving internationally and how do these motivations determine behavior? What are the transnational social structures that arise in the course of globalization generally and international migration specifically to influence the likelihood of future movement? What determines how national governments act with respect to international migration? And finally, to what extent are governments able to realize the immigration policy goals they intend, and how do actual results differ from intended outcomes?

The Structural Sources of Immigrant Supply

There is widespread agreement that international out-migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself (Massey 1988; Massey and Taylor 2004; Williamson 2005). The poorest nations in the world do not send out the most emigrants, and within migrant-sending nations, the poorest regions and communities are not the ones producing the most migrants. Whether in Mexico or China, international migrants generally come from regions and communities that are in the throes of rapid economic development (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Liang and Morooka 2004). It is the structural transformation of societies brought about by the creation and expansion of markets that produces the bulk of the world's migrants, both at present and ind the past, a process that is theorized in sociology under world systems theory (Portes and Walton 1981; Sassen 1988) and in economics by institutional development theory (North 1990; Williamson 1996).

The transition from a command or subsistence economy to a market system entails a profound restructuring of social institutions and cultural practices. A legal system of enforceable contracts, property rights, land titles, and courts of law must be established; a social, cultural, and economic infrastructure sufficient to sustain market transactions must be created; and a physical infrastructure of transportation and communication must be built to enable and coordinate the movement of labor, capital, goods, and services between zones of supply and demand. In the course of these transformations, people are displaced in large numbers from traditional livelihoods in subsistence farming (as peasant agriculture gives way to commercialized farming) or state enterprises (as state enterprises are privatized in former command economies). The people so displaced constitute the leading source of international migrants, both now and in the past (Hatton and Williamson 1998; Massey et al. 1998).

The Structural Sources of Immigrant Demand

Despite pressure in sending societies, few migrants leave their countries of origin were there no demand for their services. Because undocumented migrants are typically ineligible for state transfer payments, they have no way of supporting themselves without working. As a result, they are even more unlikely than legal immigrants to remain in countries of destination without a job and the vast majority of migrants of working age go into the labor force upon arrival. Among male immigrants legally admitted to the United States in 1996, for example, 85% of those with prior undocumented experience got a job within twelve months of arrival and two-thirds of those without illegal experience did so (Jasso et al. 2000). During the late 1990s, labor demand in the United States was such that the head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service suspended work site inspections and announced the cessation of all internal enforcement (Billings 1999). Over the past three decades, the United States and other industrialized nations have evinced a remarkably strong and steady demand for immigrant workers irrespective of the business cycle.

This strong and persistent demand is rooted in the segmented nature of labor markets within advanced post-industrial economies. Dual labor market theory (Piore 1979) explains this persistent demand in terms of the hierarchical structure of socially-embedded labor markets, which creates motivational problems at the bottom of the bottom of the occupational pyramid (where people are unwilling to work hard or remain long in low status jobs) and structural inflation (because raising wages at the bottom generates upward pressures on wages throughout the job hierarchy). Market segmentation also stems from the basic duality of labor as a variable factor and capital as a fixed factor of production, which yields a capital-intensive sector to satisfy constant demand and a labor-intensive sector to handle secular fluctuations. Enclave theory (Portes and Bach 1985) elaborates on segmented labor markets by pointing out that ethnic communities also generate their own demand for immigrants and may, under appropriate circumstances, become vertically integrated in ways that generate a long-term demand for immigrant workers.

The structural segmentation of labor markets has been demonstrated empirically (Dickens and Lang 1985; Bulow and Summers 1986; Heckman and Hotz 1986). This segmentation yields an ongoing demand for unskilled workers willing to work hard at unpleasant, demeaning jobs with few prospects for economic mobility, people who see the work as a short-term means of raising cash rather than as a career or an identity-determining occupational status. In the past this demand was met by teenagers, women working as supplemental earners before and after childbearing, and rural-urban migrants, but the demography of advanced societies has eliminated these sources, causing employers to turn increasingly to immigrants (Massey et al. 1998). If immigrants are not already entering the country in sufficient numbers, employers jump-start new streams through deliberate labor recruitment, either privately or through government agents acting on their behalf (Piore 1979).

The Motivations for Migration

The social organization of today's global economy is thus characterized by the expansion of markets into former command and subsistence economies and the ongoing segmentation of labor markets in advanced industrial economies, yielding a large supply of potential migrants in the former and rising demand for their services in the latter. Those who move in response to these powerful macro-level forces are not passive actors, however, but active agents seeking to achieve specific goals through transnational movement. Any comprehensive model of international migration must theorize the aspirations of those who respond to macro-level transformations by moving internationally. If one seeks to shape the behavior of migrants through policy interventions, it is critical to understand the reasons why people migrate.

The best-known model of migrant decision-making, neoclassical economics, argues that people move to maximize lifetime earnings (Todaro and Maruszko 1986). Individuals consider the money they can expect to earn locally and compare it to what they anticipate earning at various destinations, both domestic and international. Then they project future income streams at different locations over the remainder of their working lives subject to some time-sensitive discount factor and then subtract out the expected costs of migration to different destinations, yielding a mental estimate of net lifetime earnings.

In theory, people go to the location offers the highest lifetime returns for their labor, so that in the aggregate labor flows from low- to high-wage areas. The departure of workers from the former constricts the supply of labor to raise wages at home while the arrival of workers in the latter increases the supply of labor to lower wages abroad. The flow continues until, at equilibrium, wage differentials disappear except for a residual reflecting the costs of movement, both financial and psychological (Todaro 1976). According to neoclassical theory, immigrants therefore aspire to permanent settlement and will continue arriving until wage differentials effectively disappear.

The maximization of lifetime earnings is not the only potential motivation for international migration, however, and an alternative theoretical model—known as the new economics of labor migration—has been derived to explain transnational movement. NELM argues that international migration offers a means by which people of modest means can overcome missing or failed markets for capital, credit, and insurance (Stark 1991), conditions that are common in societies undergoing economic development (Massey et al 1998). In contrast to permanent settlement abroad, NELM predicts circular movement and the repatriation of earnings in the form of remittances or savings. Rather than moving abroad permanently to maximize lifetime earnings, people move abroad temporarily to diversify household incomes or accumulate cash, seeking to solve specific economic problems at home in preparation for an eventual return.

In the developing world, labor markets are volatile and characterized by oscillations that render them periodically unable to absorb fully the streams of workers constantly being displaced from pre-market and non-market sectors. Lacking unemployment insurance, as is typical in the developing world, households self-insure by sending members to geographically distinct labor markets. In this way, the household diversifies its labor portfolio to reduce risks to income in the same way that investors diversify stock portfolios to reduce risks to wealth. For example, if a rural Mexican household sends an older son to work in Mexico City and a father to work in Los Angeles, then if crops fail or agricultural wages plunge at home, the family can rely on income originating in other locations unaffected by local conditions.

Another failure common to developing countries is missing or incomplete markets for capital and consumer credit. Families seeking to engage in new forms of agriculture or looking to establish new business enterprises need money to purchase inputs and begin production, and the shift to a market economy creates new consumer demands for costly items such as housing, automobiles, and appliances. Financing such production and consumption requires cash, but weak and poorly developed banking systems typically cannot meet new demands for capital and credit, giving households in developing nations yet another motivation for international labor migration. By sending a family member temporarily abroad for wage labor, a household can accumulate savings to self-finance investments in production and the acquisition of large-ticket consumer items.

The Emergence of Transnational Structures

A global economy wherein goods, capital, service, information, commodities, and raw materials flow relatively freely across international borders relies on an underlying infrastructure of transportation, communication, and governance to connect trading nations with one another and maintain international security (Massey et al. 1998). As trade between two countries expands, so do the various infrastructures that facilitate it, thereby reducing transaction costs along specific international pathways. However, reducing the costs of moving goods, services, and products also reduces costs for the migration of people. As a result, nations

that engage in trade also tend to exchange people. Those people who possess human capital flow into developing nations while those bearing labor go to developed countries (Massey and Taylor 2004).

Once migration begins, however, a new social infrastructure arises that is under the control of the migrants themselves, and this development builds a powerful momentum into migration that yields a self-perpetuating process known as cumulative causation (Myrdal 1957; Massey 1990). The first migrants who leave for a new destination have no social ties to draw upon, and for them migration is costly, especially if it involves entering another country without documents. For this reason, the first international migrants usually are not from the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy, but from the middle ranges (Portes, 1979; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). After the first migrants have left, however, the costs of migration are substantially lower for their friends and relatives who still live in the community of origin. Because of the nature of kinship and friendship structures, each new migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination area. Migrants are inevitably linked to non-migrants through networks of reciprocal obligations based on shared understandings of kinship and friendship. Non-migrants draw upon these obligations to gain access to employment, housing, and other forms of assistance at the point of destination, substantially reducing their costs.

Once the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because migration itself creates the social structure necessary to sustain it. Every new migrant reduces the cost of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives, and with the lowered costs, some of these people are induced to migrate, which further expands the set of people with ties abroad, and, in turn, reduces costs for a new set of people, causing some of them to migrate, and so on. Recent empirical studies strongly support this scenario, showing that access to network connections substantially raises the likelihood of international migration (Massey and García España, 1987; Palloni et al. 2001; Munshi 2003; Massey and Aysa 2005).

Eventually, of course, communities reach a point of network saturation, where virtually all households have a close connection to someone with migrant experience. When networks reach this level of development, the costs of migration stop falling with each new entrant and the process of migration loses its dynamism (Massey and Zenteno 1999). At the same time, the rate of out-movement ultimately reaches a stage where labor shortages begin to occur and local wages rise (Gregory, 1986). These developments act to dampen the pressures for additional migration, and cause the rate of entry into the migrant workforce to decelerate and then fall off (Massey et al. 1994).

The Behavior of States

In the absence of governmental actions, the size and composition of international migratory flows would be determined solely by the foregoing factors—structural factors at origin and destination, the strategic behavior of

migrants acting on particular motivations, and the emergence of transnational structures to mediate the flows — but in the present day all nations seek to influence the number and characteristics of foreign arrivals. State policies thus act as a filter affecting how the various macro-level forces and micro-level motivations are expressed in practice to yield concrete populations of immigrants with specific characteristics. A full statistical treatment of international migration thus needs to model the behavior of states as they evolve in response to domestic and international conditions.

State policies affecting immigration are the outcome of a political process in which competing interests interact within bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, and public arenas to develop and implement policies that influence flow and characteristics of immigrants. Recent theoretical and empirical research yield several conclusions about the determinants of immigration policy in migrant-receiving societies (Massey 1999). First, even though doubt remains about precisely which economic conditions are most relevant, it is clear that a country's macroeconomic health plays a key role in shaping immigration policy. Periods of economic distress are associated with moves toward restriction, whereas economic booms are associated with expansive policies (Lowell et al. 1986; Shughart et al. 1986; Foreman-Peck 1992; Goldin 1994; Timmer and Williamson 1998).

In addition, immigration policy is sensitive to the volume of international migration itself, with large inflows generally leading to more restrictive policies (Timmer and Williamson 1998; Meyers 2004). Immigration policy is also associated with broader ideological currents in society, tending toward restriction during periods of social conformity and conservatism and toward expansion during periods of principled support for open trade as well as geopolitical conflict along ideological lines (Meyers 2004). During the Cold War, policy makers in capitalist nations accepted large numbers of refugees from communist societies on generous terms, and advocates of free trade push for the opening of borders with respect to workers as well as capital, commodities, and goods. On the whole, these conclusions suggest that developed countries will move toward more restrictionist policies, even as they act to lower barriers to movement among themselves.

Meyers (2004) divides receiving-country immigration policies into three basic categories: those affecting labor migrants, those affecting refugees, and those affecting permanent settlers (who may include former labor migrants and refugees). Labor migration policies are generally determined bureaucratically by economic interest groups (employers and workers) who interact with public officials outside the public eye, yielding a "client politics of policy formulation" (Calavita 1992; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998). Refugee policy is also formulated bureaucratically outside the public arena, yielding a slightly different client politics of negotiation between the executive branch and various social groups having political or humanitarian interests (Meyers 2004). Policies on permanent immigration occur in public arenas where the interests of politicians, legislators, and ordinary citizens weigh more heavily against those of bureaucrats and special interests.

Citizens, albeit to varying degrees, tend to be xenophobic and hostile to immigration. Small but significant minorities also oppose immigration on ideological grounds, as part of a commitment to zero population growth or reducing strains on the environment. Most citizens, however, are poorly organized and politically apathetic, leaving immigration policies to be determined quietly by well-financed and better-organized special interests operating through bureaucratic channels. During periods of high immigration, stagnating wages, and rising inequality, however, the public becomes aroused, and politicians draw upon this arousal to mobilize voters, thus politicizing the process of immigration policy formulation and moving it from client politics to public politics. This scenario clearly occurred in the United States during the period 1986-1996 as successive pieces of immigration legislation made it more difficult for Latin Americans to qualify for legal residence and dramatically increased resources for border enforcement.

The Efficacy of Restriction

In general, the likely thrust of government policies toward immigration is fairly clear—in the absence of compelling ideological reasons to accept large numbers of immigrants, democratic governments move toward restriction during periods of high immigration, high inequality, and rising economic uncertainty. These conditions prevail now and in the foreseeable future in the United States. While the intended goals of sate policies may be clear, however, a central question concerns the ability of states to achieve the goals they intend. Although states may attempt to regulate immigration, it is by no means assured that this goal will be achieved in practice. Desired outcomes may be partially accomplished or achieved not at all, and it is even possible that state interventions produce results precisely opposite those intended by policy makers.

Evidence of the gap between policy intentions and actual results is the fact that in recent years virtually all developed countries have come to accept a large (although varying) number of "unwanted" immigrants (Joppke 1998). Even though most countries have enacted formal policies to prevent the entry and settlement of immigrants, liberal democratic states have found their enforcement of restrictions constrained by several important factors (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994). First is the global economy itself, which lies beyond the reach of individual national governments but which generates unleashes powerful social and economic forces that promote large-scale international population movements (Sassen 1996, 1998). Second is the internal constitutional order of liberal democracies, reinforced by the emergence of a universal human rights regime that protects the rights of immigrants and makes it difficult for political actors to assuage the restrictionist preferences of citizens (Hollifield 1992; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Freeman 1992, 1995; Jacobson 1997). A third constraint is the existence of an independent judiciary that is shielded from the political pressures to which elected politicians must respond, thus allowing

immigrants in liberal democracies to turn to courts to combat restrictive policies implemented by the legislative and executive branches (Joppke1998)..

The efficacy of restrictive immigration policies thus varies substantially depending on five basic factors: the relative power and autonomy of the state bureaucracy; the relative number of people seeking to immigrate; the degree to which political rights of citizens and non-citizens are constitutionally guaranteed; the relative independence of the judiciary; and the existence and strength of an indigenous tradition of immigration. The interplay of these five factors produces a continuum of state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies, as illustrated in Table 1 (adapted from Massey 1999).

At one extreme are centralized authoritarian governments that lack an independent judiciary and a well-established regime of constitutional protections, and which have no tradition of immigration, such as the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, are homogenous Islamic societies led by hereditary monarchs who preside over centralized, authoritarian states. Officials in the Gulf states are thus in a strong position to enforce restrictive immigration policies, and laws and regulations governing migration within the region are much harsher than those prevailing in Europe or North America (Halliday 1984; Dib 1988; Sell 1988; Abella 1992).

Next on the continuum of state capacity to restrict immigration are democratic states in Western Europe and East Asia with strong, centralized bureaucracies, but with moderate demand for entry and little native tradition of immigration. Political elites in these countries can expect to meet with some success in restricting immigration, but, as described above, immigrants have important resources---moral, political, and legal---to forestall state actions and evade legal restrictions on entry and settlement. Next on the scale of state capacity are the nations of Southern Europe and South Asia, which likewise lack strong traditions of immigration but which also lack strong centralized bureaucracies capable of efficiently imposing their will throughout society. Immigrants to Spain, Italy, Greece, Thailand, or Malaysia thus have considerably more leeway to overcome barriers, and the states have less capacity to enforce restrictive immigration policies and bureaucratic procedures.

Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Gulf states are countries that lack a highly centralized state and that have strong traditions of individual liberty and long-standing cultures of immigration. Such countries as Canada and Australia have well-developed social and political infrastructures to support immigrants, protect their rights, and advance their interests. The most extreme case in this category is the United States, which faces an intense demand for entry and has a deeply ingrained commitment to individual rights, a long-standing history of resistance to central authority, a strong written constitution protecting individual rights, and an independent and powerful judiciary. In the United States immigration is not simply a historical fact, it is part of the national myth of peoplehood (Smith 2003).

Table 1. Conceptual classification of factors affecting state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies.

	Strength of Bureaucracy	Demand for Entry	Strength of Constitutional Protections	Independence of Judiciary	Tradition of Immigration	Continuum of State Capacity
Relationship to State Capacity	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative
Kuwait	High	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	High
Singapore	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	–
Britain	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Low	–
Switzerland	High	Moderate	High	High	Low	–
Germany	High	Moderate	High	High	Low	–
France	High	Moderate	High	High	Moderate	
Argentina	Low	High	Moderate	Moderate	High	–
Spain	Low	Moderate	High	High	Low	–
Canada	High	High	High	High	High	–
United States	Middle	High	High	High	High	Low

SOURCE: Massey (1999)

Lessons for forecasting

The foregoing discussion reveals international migration to stem from a complex array of factors and forces acting at different levels, often with complicated cross-level, longitudinal feedbacks. It is not surprising, therefore, that international migration has proved to be far more dynamic than demographers have thus far realized in forecasting models, and that static predictions based on constant assumptions and fixed projections have badly failed to predict the course of immigration in most nations during the last quarter of the 20th century. What does the foregoing review teach us about the nature of international migration and our ability to forecast its future course?

Respect the Salience of Market

A principle lesson is the critical role played by markets in promoting and sustaining international migration throughout the world. Within developing nations, migration — both internal and international — is a byproduct of the structural transformation of society that occurs as markets progressively expand and penetrate into more areas of social and economic life. The growth and expansion of markets within countries is, in turn, linked to the insertion of nations within the global networks of trade, investment, and coordination that undergird the global market. As countries such as China and India join the global trading regime and shift from peasant agriculture and state-led production toward market mechanisms they can be expected to produce more, not fewer people seeking to adapt to the new realities of life in a rapidly changing market society through international wage labor. Demographers seeking to predict future levels of immigration for use in population projections would do well to pay close attention to developments within these and other developing nations as they embrace capitalism and undergo transition to the market in coming decades.

At the same time, demographers need to broaden their view to consider not just labor markets, but also those for capital, credit, and insurance. Building a well-functioning market society is not a simple task, and along the way nations are likely to experience periodic market failures and prolonged periods when large segments of the population are exposed to missing, incomplete, or inefficient markets. In the past, demographers have focused largely on international wage differentials as the driving force behind international migration, and while large international population flows generally do not occur in the absence of significant wage differentials, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for immigration to occur (Massey et al 1998). Whereas neoclassical economics focuses on geographic disequilibria across national labor markets as the fundamental cause of migration, the new economics of labor migration pays greater attention to failures in credit, capital, and insurance markets as leading drivers.

Although some people clearly migrate in order to maximize lifetime earnings, many others move in order to overcome market failures at home. Throughout the world, the most important single target for migrant remittances

and savings is the construction or acquisition of a home, suggesting that migrants may be moving as much to overcome missing mortgage and lending markets as to maximize lifetime earnings (Massey et al. 1998). In head-to-head comparisons between hypotheses derived from neoclassical economics and NELM, the latter usually have greater explanatory power (Stark and Taylor 1989, 1991). Massey and Espinosa (1997) found, for example, that temporal variations real interest rates generally out-performed fluctuations in the expected earnings differential in predicting the likelihood of Mexico-U.S. migration. Ironically, those most likely to move in response to earnings differentials are those with human capital, and people with skills and education are generally welcomed as immigrants throughout the global economy (Massey and Taylor 2004). In building structural forecasting models or judging the level of immigration to assume in static models, therefore, it is important consider the extent and rapidity of market expansion in different nations around the world, to consider not just labor markets but those for capital, credit, and insurance, and to differentiate between the movement of people selling their labor and those moving to maximize returns on their human capital.

Recognize the Circularity of Migration

Even though demographers recognize that immigrants naturally come and go across international boundaries, they nonetheless tend to under-appreciate the size and importance of emigration in assessing the relative contribution of international migration to population growth. In the United States, this fixation is pronounced because it follows American myth, which glorifies immigration as a one-way passage to paradise. This emphasis on settlement is reinforced by neoclassical economics, which views migration as a permanent move undertaken to maximize lifetime earnings rather than as a short-term strategy to accumulate savings or manage risk.

It is hardly surprising therefore, that past projection models have assumed a fixed number of net international migrants distributed according to a constant age-sex schedule, as if net migration itself were a discrete quantity affected by a coherent set of determinants. In reality, net immigration constitutes a small residual from much larger gross flows of people in and out of a country; and entries and exits typically respond to entirely different factors operating at different geographic locations. With the exception of the Irish and Jewish immigrants from the Russian Pale, international migration during the classic era of immigration the United States between 1880 and 1920 was heavily circular and determined by fluctuating conditions in sending and receiving nations (Thomas 1973; Wyman 1993; Hatton and Williamson 1998).

Migration flows in the late 20th century were likewise heavily circular, with out-migration generally averaging about a third of in-migration in the United States (Jasso and Rozenzweig 1982; Warren and Kraly 1985). Indeed, two thirds of those entering the United States as "new" permanent immigrants have been in the country before in one status or another (Massey and Malone 2003; Redstone

and Massey 2004). Rather than assuming a single value for net international migration, therefore, demographers would be on safer ground if they were to make separate assumptions about levels and patterns of in- and out-migration for purposes of population projection. Likewise, in specifying forecasting equations they would do well to model the two flows separately as a functions of distinct sets of determinants.

The case of the United States is particular instructive here. Projections during the 1990s failed not so much because the level of in-migration had changed, but because the rate of out-migration fell precipitously to record low levels, something that Census Bureau demographers failed to notice because they were not looking in the right place (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Massey 2005). Not only is the separate consideration of in- and -out-migration mandated empirically, it is warranted theoretically under the New Economics of Labor Migration which explicitly posits return migration (Massey et al. 1998).

Although net international migration may be dominated by the entry and exit of foreigners, the crossing of international borders is not limited to immigrants, and in today's global market natives also contribute to net gains and losses of population through international movement. Some 4.2 million U.S. citizens lived abroad at the time of the last census (U.S. Department of State 2002) and although this constitutes a small number compared with the 31.1 million foreigners in the United States, changes in the propensity of Americans to live abroad may influence projections more significantly in years to come as both retirement and business emigration expand.

Appreciate the Power of Feedbacks

Another reason that Census Bureau projections failed so badly in predicting the volume of immigration during the 1980s and 1990s is that they did not take account of the powerful endogeneity built into immigration processes by social networks. Known variously as the "auspices" of migration (Tilly and Brown 1967), the "family and friends effect" (Levy and Wadyckia 1973), "chain migration" (MacDonald and MacDonald 1974), and "migration capital" (Taylor 1986), network ties lend migration a strong internal momentum. When someone without prior migration experience has a social tie to someone with current or past experience as an international migrant, his or her odds of moving internationally are dramatically higher compared with those who lack such ties (Massey et al. 1998). This basic empirical fact creates a powerful feedback loop between the past migratory behavior of people within a social network and the future migratory behavior of non-migrants who share the same network, yielding a feedback process known as cumulative causation (Massey 1990).

The principal lesson for demographers is that the more immigrants from a particular origin there are in a receiving country at present, the more can be expected to come in the future, up to asymptotic limits set by the logistic curve. Massey and Zenteno (1999) showed that building feedbacks through migrant networks into models projecting Mexican immigration to the United States

increased the expected number of immigrants over static projections by 85% in the course of five decades, yielding a far more accurate forecast of future population size. Hatton and Williamson (1994, 1998) found that network effects dominated in statistical models predicting emigration from Europe during the classic era, especially during the phase of rapid expansion shortly after the initiation of mass movement.

Don't Be Surprised at Unintended Consequences

Although governmental policies may influence fertility and mortality at the margins, the effects are diffuse, indirect, gradual, and quite modest overall. Vigorous pronatalist policies to encourage childbearing in some European countries have met with limited success (Morgan 2003) and heavy investments in biomedical research and health care have yielded gradual rather than quantum increases in life expectancy in recent (Wachter and Finch 1997). In contrast, changes in immigration policy since 1965 have produced a series of sharp discontinuities in the volume and composition of immigration to the United States, usually in unexpected and often in unintended directions (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

As already mentioned, immigration policies are generally developed in response to domestic politics and are grounded more in ideology or expediency than in any realistic appreciation of international migration as a social and economic process. As a result, state interventions to placate domestic political interests or satisfy specific constituents have frequently produced unanticipated effects that have worked as much to expand as to limit the flow of immigrants into countries of destination.

Again the United States offers and excellent example. The contemporary era of international migration is commonly dated from the passage of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which established a new "preference" system for allocating visas to prospective immigrants on the basis of kinship to U.S. residents and to a lesser extent, on the basis of domestic employment needs. By far the largest number of immigrant visas were reserved for direct relatives of U.S. citizens and resident aliens, which a much smaller share set aside for needed workers. In 2004, for example, two thirds of all resident visas went to the relatives of people already present in the United States, compared with 16% granted on the basis of employment (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2005).

The preference system was created to eradicate discrimination on the basis of national origin and was thought at the time to have few implications for the long-term expansion of immigration. But the allocation of visas to the relatives of citizens and resident aliens—most of them former immigrants themselves—inadvertently ended up reinforcing if not institutionalizing the process of network migration to build a strong momentum into U.S. immigration (Massey and Phillips 1999). Each time an immigrant receives a green card, it creates new entitlements for entry by that person's relatives, and if the new immigrant eventually goes on to

become a citizen, the set of people eligible for entry expands even further (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1988; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

Thus because legislators in 1965 did not understand the role played by migrant networks in dynamizing international migration, a provision that was intended to rectify past discrimination ended up reinforcing one of the principal feedback loops by which immigration perpetuates itself over time. Likewise, in 1986 the members of congress sought to prevent undocumented migration by increasing the resources and personnel allocated to border enforcement, launching what would prove to be a two-decade long militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border. Since 1986, the number of Border Patrol Officers has tripled and the agency's budget has grown tenfold (Durand and Massey 2003).

This enforcement strategy assumed that immigration was a one-way street and that few immigrants left the country once they secured entry. Congressional representatives were unfamiliar with the new economics of labor migration, which argued that labor migration is motivated by a desire to solve economic problems at home and return. Mexican migration historically had been highly circular, especially among those without documents (Reichert and Massey 1979). Massey and Singer (1995) estimate that between 1965 and 1985, 85% of undocumented entries were offset by departures, and even many "permanent" legal residents come and go seasonally across the border without settling (Durand and Massey 1992).

Legislators were also unfamiliar with the experience of European nations, which after 1973 ended foreign labor recruitment and attempted to close their borders. Although the number of guestworkers fell, their place was taken by a growing number of spouses and dependents and what had been circular flow of male labor became a settled population of families, as male workers dug in their heels and refused to leave for fear of not being able to reenter later (Martin and Miller 1980). In the end, the rate of growth of the foreign born population accelerated in response to European attempts at border closure.

Much the same thing happened during 1986-2006 in the United States. The launching of Operation Blockade in El Paso in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in 1994 tripled both the costs of border smuggling and the risk of death (Massey 2005). In response, undocumented migrants quite rationally took steps to minimize border crossing—not by ceasing to migrate in the first place, but by staying longer and not returning once entry had been achieved (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Trip durations lengthened (Reyes 2004) and return rates plummeted (Riosmena 2004) while volume of in-migration remained fairly constant and the probability of apprehension actually fell. As a result, the net flow of undocumented migrants into the country accelerated rapidly. The number of undocumented migrants in the United States consequently grew at an unprecedented rate, causing Hispanics to overtake blacks as the nation's largest minority a decade before census demographers had predicted.

Although both of the above outcomes were unintended and unexpected by legislators, they could nonetheless have been anticipated by anyone familiar with

recent theory and research on international migration. Indeed, the effect of recent immigration laws in reinforcing network migration and social capital accumulation had been predicted publicly in an op-ed piece based on social capital theory (Massey 1988). Likewise, the likely effect of border enforcement in reducing rates of return migration was anticipated as early as 1982 by Reichert and Massey (1982) and its effect in lowering apprehension probabilities was clearly documented in 1998 by Singer and Massey (1998). Legislators unencumbered by a scientific understanding of immigration nonetheless chose to escalate border enforcement, dramatically increasing the contribution of immigration to U.S. population growth over the past decade.

Conclusion. Building a better model

The foregoing discussion offers guidance to demographers in deciding which levels of immigration to assume in future projections, offering a foundation for better guesses about future trends in emigration and immigration. Ultimately, however, a proper job of forecasting migration trends requires the construction of a full-blown econometric model that connects entries to and exits from the United States to key determinants identified from theory and prior research, one that allows for feedbacks across time and between levels. Although building such a model is a formidable challenge, and beyond the scope of this paper, we are nonetheless in a position to specify which variables are relevant from a theoretical and substantive viewpoint.

The aggregate supply of international migrants from different nations around the world is likely to be determined by their location on a continuum of market development, pointing to economic measures of industrialization, service sector dominance, and privatization as key indicators of migratory potential. The existence of political alliances and the emergence of trade, transportation, and communication links, in turn, predict likely destinations for these potential migrants. The most important "political" variables to include in any model predicting international migration are troop deployments and military bases by developed nations (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Countries to which soldiers are sent for geopolitical reasons are very likely to become sources of international migrants because dependent relationships inevitably form and marriages are contracted between soldiers and local women.

Demand for immigrants is also connected to the ongoing segmentation of labor markets within advanced industrial societies and by the relative supply of workers from domestic sources who are in a position to fulfill the demand for workers in the secondary sector. Sociologists have developed several classification schemes that potentially can be applied to occupational distributions to measure the degree of segmentation on a year-to-year basis (Tolbert, Horan, and Beck 1980). The potential supply of workers can be measured as the relative number of women aged 25–65 who are not already in the labor force and the relative number of youths aged 15–20 who are neither in school nor at work.

The people who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants are likely to be motivated by diverse goals. Those seeking to maximize lifetime earnings pay attention to relative wages in the United States and other destination areas, suggesting the necessary inclusion of wage differentials in models of international migration. Those seeking to overcome failures in the capital, credit, and insurance markets, however, are more affected by the relative number of banks, prevailing interest rates, and insurance coverage. Recent theory and research suggest it is essential to include measures of more economic variables than simple wage rates or differentials.

Finally, it is imperative not only to model the influence of migrant networks but to capture their feedback effects over time. The ideal measure for such purposes would be the relative number of people of a given national origin who have migratory experience within the country of origin, but data on the distribution of foreign experience within specific national populations generally does not exist, and the most common proxy has been the relative number of migrants from a country who have already settled at the place of destination (Dunlevy and Gemery 1977; Walker and Hannan 1989). Thus a strong predictor of the rate of entry from a particular country is the relative number of migrants from that source who were present in the destination country at some point in the past, say five years ago. The parameterization of such lagged relationships according to a logistic function would enable forecasting models to do a better job of capturing the dynamic effects of migrant networks in promoting future immigration based on past experience (Massey and Zenteno 1999).

At this point, the principal obstacle to the construction of a valid and accurate model of international migration is not theoretical or technical. As social scientists, we know which variables are important and how they operate to determine international population movements. We also have the statistical tools necessary to estimate complex effects and interrelationships that are dynamic over time and across analytic levels. What we lack at this point is a body of data that is adequate to the task. In most countries, information on immigrants is limited to that contained on visa applications (Levine, Hill, and Singer1985). The first order of business in building better models of international migration is therefore to improve governmental capacities for data gathering and tabulation. At this point it is hard enough just to model past inflows to most countries, much less project them into the future.

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Irina Pribytkova

MIGRATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE

Introduction

The first estimate of Ukraine's population is attributed to the noted historian A. Rigelman in the mid-17th century. Using methods of population arithmetic, in 1785–1786 he counted the number of inhabitants within the bounds of the territory ruled by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi at the time of Ukraine and Russia's reunion. A. Rigelman estimated this population at four million inhabitants in 1654.

The population of the Ukraine increased rapidly in the 19th century, especially in the latter half after the abolition of serfdom. While in 1835 the population of Ukraine amounted to 8.7 million inhabitants, in 1880 it totaled 15.7 million, and by 1897 it had grown to 21.2 million. By the eve of the First World War, the population of Ukraine had risen to 28.9 million.

In the 20th century, the people of Ukraine went through a number of demographic crisis. The first was brought about by civil war and the policy of war communism in 1917–1921, accompanied by repression and economic ruin. The second, lasting from 1929–1934, was caused by the collectivization of agriculture and with it the complete ravaging of the entire tenor of rural life, the deportation of a vast majority of families and the terrible famine of 1932–1933. The third crisis came hand in hand with the second World War, from 1941–1945. All of these political, military, social and economic crises of the first half of the 20th century were accompanied not only by a sizeable increase in mortality, but also by a considerable diminution of fertility owing to forced or conscious refusal of a restrictions on child-bearing. Women in the thirties did not hesitate to choose the family-internal code of reproductive behavior. The abolition of abortions in 1936 did not practically change the situation. The second World War only strengthened the tendency to regulate child-bearing within the family. A new type of reproductive behaviour had begun to prevail.

The fourth demographic crisis arose in Ukraine in the second half of the 1980th. At that time, a swift reduction in fertility and the increasing mortality rate spread on a large scale. After the disintegration of the USSR, the demographic situation was essentially aggravated. The drop in standards of living, unemployment and worries about the future forced many people to reconsider marriage and reproductive plans.

Changes in the regime of population reproduction, potential of demographic growth and life potential of population in Ukraine in the course of demographic transition

At the end of 19th century the fertility in Ukraine reached a very high level: in 1896–1897 crude rate of birth constituted 48.8‰ and total fertility rate ran to 7.5. At the same time the level of infant mortality was measured with crude death

rate equal to 19.9‰. Therefore, a family with four children at the age of five years and over was widespread in Ukraine. Only three-four from seven-eight children born at the end of 19th century lived till thirty years old. Even under such high mortality a number of population increased rapidly in Ukraine at that time.

At the beginning of 20th century fertility began to shorten gradually, however its level kept, as before, sufficiently high values. A considerable diminution of fertility in the years of the First World War (30.7‰) gave place to compensating rise in fertility after its completion. By 1926 crude birth rate reached its peak (42.1‰). Afterwards the level of fertility began to reduce at a rapid pace. But the fact is that the systematic reduction in intensity of child-bearing has begun before 1917: it is enough to give a glance at total fertility rates for those times. However, mortality was reduced even more rapidly, and so indexes of children loading remained at the pre-revolutionary level.

Just at the beginning of 20th century the demographic transition to modern type of population reproduction came into it opening phase. It was completed finally in the middle of 1970-ties. The Ukraine shifted to two-children family model. The contingent of elderly and old people has grown rapidly. The scope and the pace of population aging both "from below" and "from above" in Ukraine in 1970-ties were determined by long changes in the type of demographic regime. Ukraine has crossed the threshold of demographic old age.

The reformation of the demographic regime in Ukraine in 1970-ties finds reflection in its generalized characteristics: gross- and net-reproduction rates (Table 1). It should be noted that the latter one does not depend on the peculiarities of sex and age structures of population and shows in what ratio does generation of parents is replaced by generation of their children. Under fertility and mortality conditions of 1969–1970-ties 994 girls were born per 1000 women and only 962 of them had a chance to reach the age of their mothers. In 2004–2005 1000 Ukrainian women have given birth to 587 girls. There were only 575 out of them who will live till age of their mothers.

Since the age structure is an independent factor of demographic development, let us investigate its contribution to the future increase (decrease) of population in Ukraine. The widespread method to estimate this contribution is calculating of demographic growth potential, based on the models of stable or stationary population. The potential of demographic growth gives an opportunity to answer the question: how a number of population will change owing to the initial age structure if the parameters of its reproduction (fertility and mortality) will become stable.

The estimate of demographic growth potential in Ukraine (Pirozhkov, 1985) shows that at early stage of demographic transition – since the close of 19th century (1896-1897) and up to 1926–1927, this index has increased, having reached the values 1.338 and 1.447 accordingly. At the subsequent stages – in 1958-1959 and 1969-1970, its values are getting less and less: 1.189 and 1.089 respectively. The latter index of demographic growth potential indicates: on condition that the functions of the demographic regime will preserve invariable

value, the number of population will be increased during the stabilization period by 8.9% owing to initial age structure.

Table 1. Gross and net reproduction rates in Ukraine, 1925–2005[1]

Year	Gross reproduction rates	Net reproduction rates	Ratios of net reproduction rates to its initial level, %
1925–1926	2.560	1.685	100.0
1938–1939	1.900	1.391	82.6
1958–1959	1.125	1.049	62.2
1969–1970	0.994	0.962	57.1
1978–1979	0.955	0.923	54.8
1995–1996	0.653	0.636	37.7
1998–1999	0.557	0.544	32.3
2003–2004	0.578	0.566	33.6
2004–2005	0.587	0.575	34.1

Investigating the contribution of age structure into growth of population by decomposition of natural increase rate into its two components: on account of the impact of the demographic regime intensity and on account of age structure contribution, S. Pirozhkov came to the next conclusions (Pirozhkov, 1992).

The largest absolute value of the demographic growth potential was reached in Ukraine at the end of 1950-ties, when the age structure determined the forming of natural increase rate, exceeding the negative consequences of reproduction regime impact. Since 1970-ties the contribution of structure factor into the increase of population in Ukraine became to reduce rapidly. It means that the potential of demographic growth accumulated in the age structure was lost.

The analysis of life potential of population in Ukraine in a long space of time — from 1897 to 1989, carried out by methods of potential demography for major age groups by data of censuses of the population, witnesses that against the background of marked increasing of absolute dimensions of life potential in each of age groups, the rates of life potential growth for the central age group (demographically and economically productive: 15–59 years old) are reduced after 1939, and its growth in the 0–14 age group was practically stopped since then. The life potential of population in the elderly age (60 and over) continued to increase since that time and up to now. Moreover, there were observed the more high rates of life potential growth for women. It could be explained not only by ageing of population but also by different life expectancy at certain ages for male and female population.

The portion of life potential for younger age group (up to 15 years old) reduced steadily in 1897-1989 (from 51.6% to 36.1%), and in the elder age groups, on the contrary, rose (from 2.1% to 7.2%). These radical changes in the structure of life potential of population were caused by ageing processes in Ukraine.

The dynamics of total fertility rate in Ukraine as well as the types of age structure by Sundbarg reflect the crisis phenomena in the sphere of population reproduction in Ukraine which continually gained in scope from the beginning of

[1] Calculated by data of State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine.

1990-ties. Only in 2000 the demographic situation began to improve, and a total fertility rate becomes stable at the level 1.1. In 2002 this index increased to 1.2, preserving this level till now. Net reproduction rate exhibits recently a tendency to a rise: from 0.544 in 1998-1999 to 0.575 in 2004–2005 (Table 1).

Changes of population size and proportions of its forming sources

The population of Ukraine has increased from 42468.6 thousand in 1960 to 52244.1 thousand in 1993. Later on its diminution led to sizable demographic losses: as of the 1-st January, 2006 the population number in Ukraine amounted to 46929.5 thousand inhabitants. The country has returned to the dimensions of population in 1969-1970 when the demographic transition in Ukraine came to an end. The natural increase of population preserved invariably the positive values, though its number was reduced from 593.0 thousand in 1960 to 26.6 thousand in 1990.

The immigration into Ukraine supported its demographical development. The net migration was, as a rule, positive with the exception of a short space of time: in 1961, 1976–1978 and 1982–1984. The total migratory losses constituted in all 182.1 thousands persons at that time. Meanwhile due to a positive migratory gains the population of Ukraine has increased by 1128.6 thousands inhabitants in 1960-1990. At the same time the contribution of natural increase in the growth of population numbered 8530.2 thousand inhabitants. Thus, the portion of migratory inflow in the growth of population in 1960–1990 made up 10.0%, and the portion of natural increase — accordingly 90.0%.

It should be noted as well that both natural increase and migration inflow of urban population had invariably the positive value during all this time. In the countryside of Ukraine the natural decrease was marked for the first time in 1979. Just then the depopulation of Ukrainian village made its destructive start.. The migratory decrease of rural inhabitants was fixed before the 1960-ties. Its destroying influence upon the reproduction of rural population has continued right up to 1992, when a shock therapeutics, inflation and unemployment forced the urban inhabitants to look for earnings in the countryside. From 1960 to 1978 inclusive the rural population of Ukraine has grown due to natural increase by 2422.9 thousand inhabitants, and migratory losses have reduced the rural population number by 4608.0 thousand during that time, having exceeded the natural increase almost twice (1.9 times). Owing to administrative-territorial remaking, the rural population has decreased still more: these losses constituted 1162.8 thousand peasants. As a whole the Ukrainian countryside has lost from 1960 to 1978 3379.4 thousand inhabitants.

Types of rural population changes in Ukraine in 1970–1978

At a moment, when the demographic transition was over, the depopulation and migratory losses brought about the irreparable consequences for rural population practically in all regions of Ukraine. Let us address the results of analysis, fulfilled after J. W. Webb's model, with a view to investigate the types of population changes in the countryside of Ukraine in 1970-1978. This method

gives a possibility to mark out eight basic types of dynamics that reflect not only the direction of population change (growth or diminution) but also the correlation of its forming sources (natural and migration movements) and the character of its dynamics (Figure 1).

The grouping of rural administrative regions of Ukraine by J. W. Webb's model (Webb J. W., 1963) shows that the tendencies and structure of rural population changes keep within the next types of dynamics in 1970–1973: I, II, III and VIII (growth of population); IV and V (decrease of population); and intermediate type of stationary population. The overwhelming majority of rural administrative regions in Ukraine (400 out of 476) belong to IV and V types; 270 regions, where the migration outflow exceeds a natural increase, belong to IV type; and 130 regions belong to V type (migration outflow exceeds natural decrease). The stationary population (natural increase and migration outflow are equal in size) is observed only in two rural administrative regions (Figure 2).

The growth of population took place only in 76 regions. 12 out of them belong to I type. Those ones are mainly the suburban regions of large administrative, industrial and cultural centres of Ukraine — Kiev, Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, Lugansk, Poltava, Kryvoi Rog. Here the population has grown under exceeding of migration inflow above the natural increase. The population increase by II type was observed in other 10 rural administrative regions. Here a natural increase exceeded the migration inflow. Those were mainly the regions of Black Sea coast.

The positive dynamics was present also in 52 other rural regions: here the natural increase exceeded the migration outflow (III type). Those were, as a rule, the suburban regions of province centres of Ukraine. And, at last, the growth of population took place in two suburban regions of Dniepropetrovsk, where the migration inflow exceeded a natural decrease (VIII type).

Analysis of rural population changes over more long period of time — from 1970 to 1978 — leads to conclusion on extremely high rate of its worsening towards the end of demographic transition. There were only 60 rural regions by 1979 where the growth of population was observed. At the same time the number of regions with negative dynamics of rural population has grown to 417. All four types of rural population increase (I, II, III and VIII) are represented within the Ukraine. The decrease of rural population proceeds by IV, V and VI types. And VII type of dynamics (natural decrease exceeds migration inflow) was absent in Ukraine in 1970–1978 (Figure 3).

The number of regions, where diminution of rural population proceeds by V type (migration outflow exceeds natural decrease), has noticeably grown and ran to 170. Its portion constituted 35.6% of whole number of rural administrative regions in Ukraine. The upgrowth of their number took place at the expense of those regions which have belonged before to IV type (migration outflow exceeds natural increase).

In central regions of Ukraine and its north a vast zone has shaped where the decrease of population proceeded in 1970-ties on a large scale and with

heightened speed. It led to irreversible demographic losses within the bounds of these territories and to spreading of sparsely populated areas inside of a countryside of Ukraine.

Migratory component of demographic development of Ukraine

If depopulation in the countryside has begun in 1979, its destructive effect on urban population became evident for the first time by 1992. Since then the depopulation processes acquired a common national scope. True, migratory inflow of immigrants to Ukraine from abroad compensated partly natural decrease of population, having provided its common growth in 1991-1993 by 488.3 thousand inhabitants.

In 1993 the dimensions of immigration into Ukraine were shortened up to 49.6 thousand, and appreciable outflow of population from Ukraine was registered for the first time in 1994: migratory losses amounted to 143.2 thousand inhabitants. All the next years the Ukraine invariably losses its population in the migration exchange with the other countries: 94.5 thousand in 1995, 131.1 thousand in 1996, 82.1 thousand in 1997, 93.6 thousand in 1998. And then the migration situation in Ukraine somewhat improves, migratory losses reduce almost twice: 44.8 thousand in 1999, 46.6 thousand in 2000. On the threshold of millennium the migration accumulations, made in the early nineties, are exhausted. However, the tendency to reduction of migratory losses is preserved: their dimensions made up 33.8 thousand in 2002, then 24.2 thousand in 2003 (twice less in comparison with 2000).

Afterwards the migration situation in Ukraine continued to improve. The Ukraine became a receiving state in migration exchange with CIS countries already in 2004, and with other countries – in 2006. Even if the net migration increase for two last years is not big (accordingly 4583 persons in 2005 and 14245 in 2006), it nevertheless indicated a turning point in the development of migration dynamics in Ukraine, the status of which has been shifting from a country of origin to a country of destination. The geography of international migration flows in Ukraine gains gradually the features of existing here at the beginning of 1990-ties space structure of migration movement, in country.

Conclusion

In 1970-ties the reformation of the demographic regime in Ukraine is over. Accumulated in the age structure potential of demographic growth due to high fertility in recent times, now is very near the exhaustion. In consequence of its loss the natural increase of population reduces steadily and its transition into natural decrease becomes inevitable. It has happened in Ukraine in 1991 and coincides by time with the beginning of unpopular market reforms. Though these reforms are regarded as a main cause of losses in natural increase of population, in reality the connection of fertility tendencies with politics and political situation at the beginning of 1990-ties is relatively weak.



Figure 1. Types of population changes (after J. W. Webb's model)



Figure 2. Types of rural population changes in Ukraine in 1970-1973 (by J. W. Webb)

1 – I type; 2 – II type; 3 – III type; 4 – IV type; 5 – V type;

6 – intermediate type of stationary population (natural increase and migration outflow are equal in size); 7 – VII type



Figure 3. Types of rural population changes in Ukraine in 1970-1978 (by J. W. Webb)
1 – I type; 2 – II type; 3 – III type; 4 – IV type; 5 – V type; 6 – VI type; 7 – VIII type

In the present case more deep evolutionary conditionality of population reproduction processes takes place. The transition to regime of narrowed reproduction has started long before the reforms. A crisis of posttransitional fertility has arisen in Ukraine still before the USSR dissolution. Already from the early 1960-ties the net reproduction rates went down below mark "one": the population of Ukraine stopped to reproduce itself.

The migratory accumulations of Ukraine have increased its population in 1960-1990-ties by 1128.6 thousand inhabitants. The portion of migration inflow in the total growth of population made up during this time 10.0%. In 1991-1993 the inflow of immigrants into Ukraine from abroad has compensated partly the natural decrease of population , having provided it with 488.3 thousand of new inhabitants. At the close of 20th century the Ukraine losses the migration accumulations made in the early 1990-ties.

By 2000 the migratory situation in Ukraine is gradually improved, this tendency becomes stronger in a recent times. Already in 2004 the Ukraine became a receiving part in the migratory exchange with CIS countries and with other countries – since 2006. It is a turning point in the migration dynamics in Ukraine.

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Leonid Rybakovsky

MECHANISMS OF FORMATION OF MIGRATION FLOWS

By the beginning of the 1960s, in Russia, or to be more exact, in the research institutes of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the viewpoint on geographical differences in vital activities as the root causes of population movements has become dominating (Labour Resources… 1961, p. 161). In the further years these differences were used to explain irrational migration movements, in particular, the out-flow of population from labour-deficit areas of Siberia and Far East to the central regions of Russia.

In the 1990s and the first decade of the current century, another viewpoint on understanding the mechanism of contemporary migration has become dominating. The push-pull theory has become a core theoretical instrument (New Diasporas… 2002, p. 233). Unfortunately, it is hardly possible to agree that the new theory has developed an old one and raised it to a higher level. On the contrary: the confusion of ideas took place. The matter is that there are different types of migration. Depending of the mechanism of formation of migration flows, they can be voluntary or forced.

Forced migrations – flows of refugees and displaced migrants – are usually urgent and massive, often with ethnic component. These are the flows from countries of regions involved in conflicts when people face life threats, threat to lose their belongings, social status etc. and rush away in search for safety. In this context, the situation in the origin areas can be characterized as pull factors. People or certain ethnic group try to escape from these factors. The root cause of forced migration is not related to differentials in living conditions between countries and regions but because of impossibility to stay in a country/region of origin (in the post Soviet area these are the cases of Armenians running away from Azerbaijan, Russians from Tajikistan, etc.). Moreover, forced migrations are normally one-way flows. Return migration is much less typical, and even if it happens it is much less numerous. In such type of migrations the parallel flows principle (in and out) does not work.

Pushed from their places of origin, forced migrants chose the places of destination where they can be admitted. In the post-Soviet territory, Russia was the pull country as it was more stable in its economic and social situation in comparison to other ex-USSR states, not to mention Afghanistan, which was a source of refugees. By the beginning of 2006, there were 168,700 forced migrants in the Russian Federation registered since 1992. Among them, there were less than 500 refugees (Population size…2006, p. 181). About 31,000 forced migrants have settled in the Central Federal District, around 55,000 – in the Southern Federal District, etc. Thus, push factors were typical for “problem” areas of the post Soviet space where ethnic-based or even armed conflicts happened and violation of human rights was unbearable. Meanwhile, the whole territory f the Russian Federation was a pull area where compatriots (not only Russians) were

welcomed together with other ethnicities including titular nations of the newly independent states, e.g. Armenians from Azerbaijan.

Forced migrations are temporary by nature and their scale is much less that that of voluntary migrations. In 2005 only, the number of migrants who have entered Russia was about 2.1 million. Totally, between 1993 and 2005 their number exceeds 30 million. This is a mass constant phenomenon that follows different principles than forced migration. The scale and direction of voluntary migrations are regulated by different mechanisms. Here, migration is an exchange of population between two territories, not the whole of population but only its smaller part. In the basis of this exchange there are differences in living standards between territories.

To understand the mechanism of population movements, it is reasonable to address to the theory of migration factors (Rybakovsky, 1987, p. 132–162). Usually, factors are understood as driving forces of a phenomenon or a process. Factor as a driving force of a process is seen in two essences: as a factor of level (static) and a factor of development (dynamic). Such separation is important when we consider historical (in time) profile and geographical (space) profile. Therefore, factors can be defined as determinants of level or development of any phenomenon. This only advantage of this definition it its shortness. To approach the essence of population movements, we would rather shift to a broader and comprehensive definition of a factor, which needs methodologically correct approach. The core item is that definition of a factor can't be formulated in isolation from the system of interconnected terms. For the theory of migration factors two arguments are fundamental: (1) factor as an objective reality exists not by itself but in connection with the phenomenon, which it influences; (2) factor is a component of the conditions for which it is an integral part.

Conditions are represented by all the components of the environment. If we speak about migration processes, human environment can be presented as natural and social. Human environment is flexible, its components can emerge, disappear, shift, etc. Among them, there are conditions which affect certain processes. They are the factors of this process, i.e. the components of objective conditions, their part, not the whole. The kit of these components is determined by the nature of the phenomenon. In this sense, factors are derivative. Whether this or that component of human environment will be a factor, fully depends on the nature of concrete phenomena and processes. Conditions are the total set while factors are sub-set. Any combination of the set elements can be a sub-set. Sub-sets can change in number of elements and their composition, or both. Same components can be incorporated in different sub-sets.

To determine interrelations between a factor and a reason is a much more complicated task than between conditions and factors. Objective and subjective issues play here important but often contradictory roles. In philosophy reason is understood as a phenomenon, which realizes in another phenomenon; the first produces, determines, changes, and results in the latter; the latter is called a consequence. A reason stands in front of a consequence. However, a factor stands

in front of a reason. To answer a question whether a factor and a reason are the same, we are to turn to the principal idea of the theory of factors, which classifies phenomena and processes in dependence of their nature and their interconnections with factors.

There are two major types of interconnections between factors and phenomena. The first type is related to all natural processes; biological, physical, technological, etc. Here interconnection between a factor and a phenomenon is direct, lacking any intermediate chains. For such kind of processes a factor and a reason are synonyms. The second type is related to social processes including migration. The principle difference between the first and the second types is that the object of influence in the second case is human psychic setup, individual mentality. Factors influence the phenomenon not directly but mediately, through consciousness, though psychic setup of an individual. In these processes, a factor and a reason are separated and they reflect difference processes. Here the trinomial scheme: factors — reasons — phenomenon is appropriate. Here a reason is intermediate stage between a factor and an action.

These differences act as contradictions between two parts of two states of the same environment, which is external for a migrant and so, objective. However, there is also contradiction between an object and a subject, i.e. between an environment and an individuality of a migrant. The subjective perception of existing differences in living standards of population in different regions and communities gives them different value and outlines the second contradiction, which is closely related to understanding of a reason of migration. It is rooted in the attitude of a subject towards an object, reaction of an individual towards his environment, and interconnection between an individual's demands and objective factors to realize them.

Whatever definition of a demand we use, it is an evidence of full or partial absence of something at a person needs. Every person has a system of material, spiritual and intellectual needs, which is structured. Situational shifts in environment also can result in changes in the hierarchy of needs.

Factors are a totality of living conditions produced by the nature of a phenomenon; their composition and — most important — hierarchy depend on structure of needs. That's why, our opinion is that existing diversity of factors and their division by significance is explained exclusively by differences in hierarchy of needs of different groups of people or individuals. So, differences between territories and settlements are to be defined via differences in living conditions — as they are interpreted by people and structure of their needs.

The migration reasons concept is based on understanding of interrelations between objective and subjective factors.

There always exits differences between needs of an individual in certain things and comforts and possibilities to satisfy them. This contradiction can go sharp; it's a sort of "the moment of truth". Relations between totalities of factors, i.e. possibilities to satisfy the needs of people and these needs can exist not only as a contradiction but as a harmony when needs are basically satisfied. However,

when contradictions are strong people intend to out-migrate. Contradiction emerges either when basic needs are growing due to further socialization, e.g. getting education in a settlement with a higher status, or when living conditions decline, e.g. as a result of natural disasters. However, it is possible to eliminate a contradiction without migration, in the frames of the origin community. That's how the majority of population do. There is a segment of population who have no opportunities to satisfy their needs locally but they do not migrate though, because migration behaviour assumes extraordinary activities, and people can be not ready for that. Moving is an extreme action while migration is only one of options to satisfy the needs.

Reason is a specific from of relations between objective factors and subjective characteristics, including needs. In the context of behaviour, factors are an objective issue while reasons are subjective. As far as a reason is subjective-objective by nature, it can be followed by an action or not, despite the sharpness of contradictions between factors and needs.

Thus, effect of a society on migration can be managed by the following regulators of migration behaviour. First, the most flexible regulator is the shift in territorial differences in objective components of living conditions that satisfy different, primarily basic, human needs. Such shift can be an object of State management. Differences in living standards affect migration as objective factors but they also gradually influence needs and values, i.e. they are long running.

Another way of management of behaviour is impact on the needs and values of potential migrants. In this context, there are three levels of impact on migration behaviour. On the individual level, psychological and other characteristics of subjects are to be taken into consideration. On the group level, major regulators are social norms, particularly those focused on neutralization of traditions, which obstacle migration behaviour needed by the society. Finally, on the mass level, i.e. in relation to the total of population, there should be measures aimed at formation of nation-wide values like duty for Motherland.

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Elena Y. Sadovskaya

International Labor Migration, Remittances and Development in Central Asia: towards regionalization or globalization?

Annotation

The paper analyses international labor migration, remittances and development in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan throughout the 2000s. Up to 25–30% of the economically active population are labor migrants in such countries as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the remittances to these countries are equivalent of about 25% of GDP. The study of the emergence of a regional migration subsystem as well as globalization trends in Central Asia is based on a wide range of applied sociological research implemented by the author in the 2000s.

Introduction: Research Goals and Methodology

The present paper offers the analysis of the latest trends in international labour migration in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan in the 2000s.

(1) The author argues that Central Asia is emerging as *a regional migration subsystem*, a part of a larger post–Soviet (CIS) migration system, wherein *Kazakhstan* is a country receiving labor migrants, and other countries of the region — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan — are "sending" countries.

(2) Alongside with the process of *regionalization,* contemporary labor migrations in Central Asia increasingly become affected by the *globalization* trends. Internationally, labor migration becomes more diversified, it expands from CIS to developed Western countries, joins the world labor markets, and acquires other universal characteristics.

(3) Remittances flows increased steadily for the last five years. The author argues that *labor migration and remittances have become one of social strategies for survival of migrants' households* in Central Asia in the 2000s. However, it remains a challenge to adapt the migration management systems both in the countries of origin and destination in order to make full use of labor migration and remittances for community and national development.

Research methodology

The paper is based on the findings of a range of applied sociological research implemented by the author or under her supervision, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 2000–2007. Using the data of these and other surveys, the author has studied the emergence of new trends of labor migration and identified the globalization trends in international migration in Kazakhstan and throughout Central Asia.

Some of the analysis has been pioneering for the region, such as on the emerging regional migration subsystem, characteristics of the contemporary labor migration in Kazakhstan, amounts of remittances, methods of money transfers, and their role in migrants' households. Below is the a brief summary of the findings with regard to the regionalization and globalization trends in

international migration, remittances and development in Central Asia, both in terms of methodology and context.

The analysis of international migration in Central Asia will draw on a number of theories of international migration and will employ research tools from various disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science, and international relations.

The analysis of contemporary international migration in Central Asia reveals the applicability of nearly all contemporary Theories of International Migration. According to D. Massey "…a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis or one conceptual mode. …their complex multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions." (Massey Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor (1998: 17). This kind of pluralistic paradigm is relevant to the analysis of international labor migration in the Central Asian republics.

World migration system theory, the Macro- and Micro-Theories of neoclassical economics, New economics of migration theory, Social capital, Social and Migrant networks theories, Cumulative causation, other theories and concepts are mutually complementary in understanding causes of international migration (Massey et el., 1998: 17–18).

World migration system theory is applied to the analysis of post-Soviet migration system. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional structure, which emerged after the break-up of the USSR; and, in terms of migration processes, represents a common migration system. The former Soviet republics are still connected by common infrastructure, transportation and communication systems, economic, financial and sociocultural relations as well as human ties. (IOM 2005, Sadovskaya 2006f, Zayonchkovskaya, Zh. ed., 2006).

Former Soviet Union countries had a single economic system, unified working standards in production and service industries, and standardized quality controls. The USSR had a single system of secondary, higher, and professional education, with a Russian language as obligatory one. Modern economic and trade relations and visa–free regime between newly independent states are stimulating the exchange of workers and specialists where the demand for them is growing. Russian language ("Russophonism") is undoubtedly a factor of creating "common grounds" for moving, finding a job, working, living, easily adapting to a new, or actually similar, sociocultural environment in different countries within CIS.

The nature of migration movements changed dramatically over the last 15 years: internal migration within a single state (USSR) became international migration between sovereign states. Forced migration of the population of the 1990s gave way to labor force flows in the 2000s. Due to favorable economic conditions and relatively dynamic economic reforms, the socioeconomic situation in Russian Federation and Republic of Kazakhstan has been changing and they have become major receiving countries for labor migrants.

Russia is the center of post–Soviet migration system. The most socially and economically advanced country, Russia's labor market attracts migrants from all CIS states. The migration flows to Russia come mainly from Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, the Transcaucasian states, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. While Slavic groups formed the bulk of the forced migration flow, mainly into Russia in the 1990s, the native population of Central Asian countries prevails in contemporary labor emigration flows. Russia and Kazakhstan are also — but in a less degree — transit countries and migrant-sending countries. (IOM 2005, Sadovskaya 2005, Sadovskaya 2005a, Zayonchkovskaya, Zh. ed. 2006)

D. Massey is critical about "Push-Pull" concept (D.Massey et.el., 1998: 12), however the author argues that it may still be used as heuristic device for analysis of international labor migration in the countries like Tajikistan, which had experienced a civil war in 1991-1997. There is a number of "push" macroeconomic factors such as destruction of the infrastructure during the civil war, fall of production, high level of unemployment, poverty, that are currently stimulating labor emigration from the country.

Macro-level factors are decisive for migration according to the World migration system theory as well as to the *Segmented labor market theory.* Piore (1979) explained labor immigration by pull factors in receiving countries, i.d., a chronic labor demand of modern industrial societies (D. Massey et el., 1998: 28). However, Central Asian republics are *transition countries,* and their societies don't have advanced industrial economies characteristics, thus the challenges of the segmented labor market are only emerging.

The Macro- and Micro-Theories of neoclassical economics add more perspective in analyzing international migration in Central Asia and Russia. The Macro–theory (Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 1976; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987; quoted from D. Massey et el., 1998: 18–19) explains labor migration by geographic differences in the supply of and the demand for labor in sending and receiving countries as well as differences in wages.

Labor migration in Central Asia is caused by both the demand for labor force in Kazakhstan, and the supply of excessive labor resources in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The demand for labor force in Kazakhstan is a consequence of large-scale emigration and "brain drain" of the 1990s, with net migration comprising more than 2.0 mln persons. Thus, when Kazakhstan's economy started picking up in the 2000s, the country suffered from lack of qualified specialists and workers. The difference in wages is also decisive in stimulating workers from labor excessive and low wage countries like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to migrate to a labor scarce and higher wage country such as Kazakhstan and Russia. (Sadovskaya 2005, 2006f)

The *Micro-Theory of neoclassical economics* is instrumental for studying at what level–individual or household, the decision to migrate is made. (Todaro 1969, 1976, 1989; Borjas 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). According to this theory, the decision is modeled as an individual choice to move where skilled

migrant be more productive and expect higher remuneration. At the same time "the costs–benefits" migration formula is associated with certain investments such as costs of traveling and lodging, learning a new language and culture, adapting to a new labor market, etc.

Supporters of *New economics of labor migration theory* point out the importance of considering of a decision making level regarding migration — not only by an isolated individual (migrant), but by larger unit of related people — migrant household or a group of households, or sometimes communities — in which people act collectively to maximize profit (benefit) from migration and minimize risks and losses. (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark 1984a, Katz and Stark, 1986; Taylor 1986, 1987; quoted from D. Massey et el., 1998: 19, 21–22).

Massey points out, that the *New economics of migration theory* considers conditions in a variety of markets, including labor market. "It views migration as a household decision taken to minimize risk and to overcome constraints on family production or consumption attributable to failures in insurance, capital, or consumer credit markets". (Massey et el*.,* 1998: 17-18)

Other conceptual frameworks such as *Social capital, Social and Migrant networks theories, Cumulative causation, Enclave labor markets concept,* etc., are applicable for analysis of international labor migration, its development and "perpetuation", and increasing impact of remittances on households and communities.

Scholars argue that both sending and receiving countries benefit from migration. In these terms. remittances and their role for migrant households and communities have increasingly become the focus of research worldwide (Adams, 2003a, Adams and Page, 2003, Newland, 2004, etc.). Recent global reports and regional studies by ILO, IOM, World Bank and other international bodies include sections on migrant remittances and their increasing impact on the national economies (Adams, 2003b, IOM 2003a, 2005d Ratha 2003, Ratha and Riedberg, 2004, Roberts and Banaian, 2004, World Bank 2006, etc).

According to the World Bank study, and remittances reduce poverty and inequality. Migrant remittances defined as a percentage (share) in Gross National Product (GNP) in developing countries play a statistically significant role in poverty reduction. On average, a 10% increase in the percentage of international migrants' remittances in the GNP leads a to 1,6% reduction in the size of the local population living in poverty. According to scholars' conclusion, a 10% increase in a number of international migrants, defined as a share of the country's population living abroad, leads to a 1,9% reduction in the number of persons living in poverty in their home country. (Adams and Page 2003).

As far as remittances is a relatively new phenomenon in Central Asia/CIS, and is one of the focuses of this paper, we'll make a brief research overview. The international migration has been widely studied in CIS countries (Iontsev, 1999, Ivakhnyuk, 2005, Krasinets, 1997, Ushkalov and Malakha, 1999, etc.). The role of labor migration and migrants' earnings has also attracted scholars' attention in various CIS countries in the 2000s. Several applied research projects have been

implemented, and monographs as well as collections of articles were published under the auspices of the Independent Research Council on the CIS and Baltic States Migration Studies of Institute for Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. (Arutyunyan 2003, Maksakova 2003, Moshnyaga 2001, Sadovskaya 2001a; Zayonchkovskaya 2001, Zayonchkovskaya, ed., 2003). Recently more attention has been given to studying remittances in Central Asia and Russia (Olimova and Bosc, 2003b; Sadovskaya and Olimova, 2005a; Tourukanova 2005); several research and publications were focused on migrants' remittances *per se,* primarily in Kazakhstan and Central Asia (Sadovskaya 2006, Sadovskaya 2006a, Sadovskaya 2006b, Sadovskaya 2006d).

However, representative comparative studies on remittances and their impact on households, communities, and national economies have not been carried out in the Central Asian Republics so far. This kind of studies is very important for working out remittances and development programs in Central Asia.

(1) International Migration in Central Asia: Emerging Subregional Migration System

Factor analysis of Subregional Migration System Emergence

From around 2000 onwards, Kazakhstan emerged as a receiving country, becoming a center of the subregional migration system in Central Asia, with sending countries being Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (IOM 2005; Sadovskaya 2005, 2006, 2006e). This section offers a factor analysis of the formation of the subregional migration system in Kazakhstan/Central Asia, estimates of the number of labor migrants in each country, highlights some general and specific characteristics of labor migration in the region.

Formation of migration subsystem is caused by disparities of economic development in the republics of Central Asia, disbalance on a regional labor market (excess of the labor resources in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and lack of a labor force in Kazakhstan and Russia), difference of demographic potentials of countries of the region (26 mln persons – in Uzbekistan, 15,2 mln – Kazakhstan, 5,1 mln and 6,7 mln, respectively in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), liberalization of migration regulations, geographical closeness, and influence of other factors.

The GNP in the *Republic of Kazakhstan* has been increasing annually by 9–10%, and the average monthly salaries increased steadily in 2000–2006. Kazakhstan had the highest living standard and relatively high average salary among the Central Asia countries — 34,066 KZTenge, or around $270 in 2005. Political liberalization and migration legislation adopted in Kazakhstan in 1990s were also conducive to migration growth.

Demographic consequences of large-scale emigration of the 1990s had a negative impact on the contemporary labor market in Kazakhstan. More than 3.1 mln persons emigrated from Kazakhstan since 1992 (out of its total population of

16.5 mln); net migration comprised 2.0 mln persons while 63–65% of emigrants were able-bodied people, and around 45% (older than 15) were people with higher (university) and special (professional) secondary education. Consequently, Kazakhstan now suffers from the lack of a labor force, especially highly qualified specialists and skilled workers. (Sadovskaya 2001a, 2005, 2006f).

Central Asian republics have similar problems to post-Soviet transit countries: a crash of the "socialist economy" and social protection system, lack of a market economy infrastructure; authoritarian regimes which slow down economic and political reforms; corruption; social stratification and in many societies, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, social polarization; unemployment and low standard of living. Country specifics, such as economic stagnation in Kyrgyzstan in the 2000s, hardships of post-conflict reconstruction in Tajikistan, overpopulation and economic deprivation in Uzbekistan are "pushing" factors in republics of Central Asia, which intensify out-migration from these countries. and makes Kazakhstan a regional center of destination for labor migrants. (Sadovskaya, 2005: 211–212)

One of the reasons for formation of migration subsystem is the fact that a poor rural population, which cannot afford to pay for an expensive air–trip to Russia or to foreign countries, is involved in migration in the region. Labor migrations are mainly of a temporary and recurrent nature, seasonal migrations are prevailing. This allows families having many children (which prevail in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) send the head of the family or a household to work for several months, and to join him (or her) for a certain period in summer or autumn in order to increase the profit from migration. If necessary, the head of the family may visit the country/region of residence for a short period of time.

Transportation and communication infrastructure in the country / region of destination, relative cheapness of the trip and communication are factors that households take into consideration when choosing a country for migration. Moreover, climatic conditions and ethno-cultural environment, including language and religion, are favorable as well. In all five countries of the region, the majority of the population confesses Sunni Islam and speaks different versions of Turkic language (except Tajikistan). Russian language is still the language of inter–national and interstate communication in the region. Ethnocultural similarities (even nationally diversified), and common linguistic space is an important factor of gradual formation of a largely unregulated and spontaneous regional "common migration space".

This is also confirmed by responses of labor immigrants from republics of Central Asia residing in Kazakhstan. According to the sociological survey data, the most important factor for respondents is remuneration of their labor[*]. 40% of

[*] Sociological survey among labor migrants in the South Region of Kazakhstan in April-May 2005. 255 persons interviewed using personal standardized questionnaire. Respondents were selected through snow-ball sampling. The sampling is targeted, homogenous. The geography of research: the cities of Alma-Ata and Chilik, localities in Chilik district of Almaty oblast, the

labor migrants noted higher remuneration in Kazakhstan than in a previous country. The reason of both economic and psychological nature is on the second place: migrants noted that it was easier for them to get home (to visit relatives) from the current destination area (25.2%); besides, the traveling home is cheaper (23.8%). Respondents noted several factors of psychological nature: good attitudes of local residents (14%), and local authorities (5.6%), presence of friends and acquaintances (4.2%).

A correlation of answers on a question regarding causes of migration and country of origin is quite illustrative. Thus, higher remuneration is the main reason for immigrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 57.0% of respondents from Kyrgyzstan and 41.2% — from Tajikistan answered this way. For Uzbek immigrants, cheap travel is on the first place (49.2%); the fact that Kazakhstan is close to migrants' homes and they have an opportunity to visit their family is on the second place (44.4%). This is the way migrants' households control risks and try to maximize expected income (Sadovskaya 2006f)

Scale of labor migration: estimate of the size of migration flows

Based on official statistics analysis and experts' interviews, the author's estimate of average annual irregular immigrants' number is from 500,000 –700,000 up to 1,000,000 persons in 2004-2006, or equivalent to 6% up to 12% of the economically active population of Kazakhstan. (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006a)

According to the estimates by the Ministry of Interior of Kyrgyzstan, the overall number of labor emigrants from Kyrgyzstan was 500,000: 350,000 of them worked in Russia and 120,000 in Kazakhstan in 2004. (www.irinnews.org). The widely spread assessment of labor migration by experts and state authorities vary from 400–700,000 persons. (IOM 2005) The number of those involved in labor migration from Tajikistan is 632.000 persons (IOM 2003) This translates to at least 25–35% of the economically active population in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan being engaged in international labor migration (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006).

The official assessment of external labor migration depends on seasonal fluctuations of around 100-500,000 persons, excluding frontier migrations, as they are rampant and difficult to assess. (Uzbekistan…, 2004: 27) The authors' estimation of labor migrants from Uzbekistan is more than 1,000,000 persons, or around 10% of the economically active population of the republic. (Sadovskaya, 2006f). The number of international labor migrants in Uzbekistan has also grown rapidly over the last several years.

According to the author's preliminary assessments, the number of labor emigrants from Turkmenistan ranges between 50,000 and 150,000. Commercial, shuttle trade (*chelnok*) migration is the major type of labor emigration in Turkmenistan. (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006f).

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city of Chymkent and the localities in Dzhetysai district of Southern Kazakhstan oblast. Project funded by J. and K. McArthur Foundation, Award No 04-81339-000-GSS.

General characteristics and specifics of international labor migration flows in Central Asia

International labor migration in Central Asian/CIS countries acquired some general characteristics in the recent years and still has some specifics. Firstly, it is represented by legal (authorized), irregular (unregulated, or undocumented), and illegal (unauthorized) immigration. The specificity of labor migration in the Central Asia / CIS is a large portion of commercial migrants, or "shuttle" traders. Internationally, labor migration becomes more diversified, it is currently directed to developed countries (Western Europe and North America) as well.

Labor migration in Central Asian countries is mostly irregular (*nereguliryemaya migratsia*). Irregular migrants are persons legally staying in a receiving country, breaking some of its rules and regulations of admission, stay and economic activities on the territory of this state. (Bilsborrow, Hugo, Oberai, Zlotnik, 1999: 37). For example, Tajikistan had 16,800 legal migrant workers in Russia in 2002, while, according to survey, the actual number of irregular labor migrants was 632,000. (IOM 2003: 21). Irregular labor migration is a common trend not only for Central Asia and CIS, but also globally.

The specifics of migration in Central Asia and CIS are that the latter has "*common visa-free space"*. Almost all of the CIS countries enjoy a visa-free regime among each other. The only exception is Turkmenistan, which has a visa regime with all countries, and Uzbekistan, which has a visa regime with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thus, migrants enter other CIS countries legally, but then find a job without signing a formal employment contract, often just by oral agreement, which makes him or her illegally employed.

ϕThe specifics of labor migration in the CIS are that a large portion of labor migrants are engaged in *commercial migrations,* or "shuttle" trade *("chelnoks"*). Commercial migrants are engaged in trade; they purchase goods in foreign countries and carry them back to the country of origin to resell at a higher price. Commercial migrants are typical for the "informal" nature of their activities. They are frequently engaged in trade business without proper registration with state authorities, avoid paying taxes, and these semi-latent activities led to violation of law and corruption, and increase a segment of "shadow" economy which threats the national security. (Sadovskaya 2001a: 57; Zayonchkovskaya, Zh, ed. 2003).

Commercial migrations had been widely spread internally and internationally in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular. According to the representative sociological survey conducted by the author in 2005, 15.8% of urban population of Kazakhstan has been involved into labor migrations in 1992–2005, one third (32,6%) of them have been involved into commercial migrations, or shuttle trade[*] (Sadovskaya 2007).

[*] Sociological survey on labor migration among urban citizens of Kazakhstan, used the Omnibus method, for the representative republican sampling of 2000 respondents. The survey covered 27 Kazakhstan cities with population over 50 thou people. The sampling structure

Contemporary migration becomes "younger", because a new generation in the countries of origin joins the labor market for the first time, but a failure to find a job in their city or village, force them to move abroad. Migrants have neither professional education and skills, nor job experience. According to the survey on labor immigration in South Kazakhstan, conducted in 2005, *for more than 40% respondents from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan it was their first arrival* in general and in Kazakhstan in particular.

56% of respondents are labor migrants "with previous experience". Among those who migrated to work more than once, 40.6% are involved in this type activity for 2 to 3 years 25.9% have been working for 4–5 years, 32.2% — for more than 5 years. Migrants from Tajikistan have the longest experience: 70.6% of respondents have been working outside the country for more than 5 years.

Among those labor immigrants who have been migrating repeatedly, 41.4% from Kyrgyzstan and 49.2% from Uzbekistan have been doing so during the last 2–3 years. 25–30% migrated to work during the last 4–5 years, and around 25% — over 5 years. *"Migration Wave" from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan and Russia is rising and expected to be the most massive in the coming years.*

Labor immigration to South Kazakhstan is mostly *temporary, and predominantly seasonal.* The main flow of labor migrants arrives to Kazakhstan for a period from 3 to 9 months — 56.9%, among them: 27.1% — from 3 to 6 months, 29.8% — from 6 to 9 months. Taking into account those who work in the republic less than 3 months, their number comes to 64.4%, i.e., almost two thirds of labor immigrants. These are, as a rule, people arriving for seasonal agricultural works (since March till November), or for construction and service sphere during summer period. 31.4% of migrants live in a place of temporary employment more than a year, or permanently.

The *native population of sending countries* (Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks), *predominates in the labor migration flows*. They don't know Russian language properly and have low legal awareness. The adaptation to the local communities in the countries of destination is difficult and violation of migrants' rights is rampant. There are no migrants' rights protection NGOs, and legal assistance programs initiated by International organizations are launched only recently.

(2) Globalization Trends in Central Asia

This section offers a brief analysis of the latest globalization trends that can be currently observed in Central Asia.

Globalization of economic production, growing foreign investment and arrival ("penetration") of transnational corporations stimulate the mobility of

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included multi-stage stratification using random selection of respondents at the final stages; the selection was representative in terms of gender, age, place of residence, size and type of locality. The survey was based on personal telephone interviews with respondents aged 16 or older, with the error variance of 5,0%. Conducted by GfK Kazakhstan in February 2005. Project funded by J. and K. McArthur Foundation, Award No 04-81339-000-GSS.

capital, services and goods in Central Asia, which become strategically important due to its huge oil and gas reserves. The scope of labor emigration from the Central Asian republics has been *increasing in response to capital flows and emergence of new technologies, providing transportation and communication services,* including electronic Money Transfer System into the remotest parts of the region (Sadovskaya 2006: 112–113, 121)

These two–directed movements manifest emerging *"common migration space"* between Central Asia and the rest of the world. Even if it is only an initial stage of globalizing of migration movements within the region and far from a "common migration space", it needs to build on the ancient traditions of travel and trade in this part of Asia in order to become a modern *Silk Way,* or to be regionally specific, combining globalization and localization, or *"glocalization"* trends. (Robertson 1990; Sadovskaya 2006: 121–122)

More countries of the region are sending migrants abroad. The mobility of the labour force is increasing, both in terms of destination countries number, and in terms of migrants number. In terms of migrants number, labor immigrants comprise annually 3.0–5.0% of the population of a receiving Kazakhstan. Between 25% and 35% of economically active population are currently involved in international labor emigration in sending countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Dozens of countries not only in the CIS, but also in Eastern and Western Europe as well as worldwide are destination countries for migrants from Central Asia nowadays. According to State Committee on Migration of Kyrgyzstan, around 30,000 Kyrgyzstanis have been abroad in 2005, according to mass media around 10,000 were illegally employed in the United Kingdom alone. (www.iwpr.org)

While the poorest countries of Central Asia "push" their unskilled labor force to geographically close countries, highly qualified specialists move to more prosperous countries; the relevant strategies for these two groups are, respectively, to *minimize the cost of migration and to maximize investment into "human capital"*.

Another global trend observed in Central Asia is a rising role of "*migrants networks*". "Migrants networks" are informal relations within migrant communities in receiving and sending countries. Emerging of informal networks between migrants/communities/regions in countries of origin and destination is not merely "common information space", it's a "social capital," which makes further migration of Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens to Kazakhstan easier and maximize their profits. This phenomenon is common to many countries of the world, and the trends emerging in Kazakhstan are typical for globalization process.

To put it short, we'll illustrate the process of migrants' networking by the following diagram 1 and a table 1.



Diagram 1. Labor immigrants ways of finding job in Kazakhstan in 2005

According to the survey, many labor migrants find a job through informal channels. The majority 31% — finds jobs via friends and acquaintances, 22% — via relatives, 20% — on their own (see diagram). Illegal employment becomes possible through middlemen, spontaneous labor markets, "black" exchanges. Institutional mechanisms of legally finding a job for migrants are weak: only 5—7% of migrants find jobs via recruiting agencies (Sadovskaya 2006e, 2006f).

Since a Kyrgyz migrant may lease land in Kazakhstan, the subsequent "waves" of migration included relatives and countrymen; together they grew tobacco and cultivated land leased by a head of a family or a countryman earlier. Some Kyrgyz migrants got married, became admitted to citizenship, migration developed and included a greater number of relatives or countrymen from Kyrgyzstan. These are the routine "mechanisms" common to many receiving countries.

According to the survey, migrants noted acquaintances, countrymen (fellow-villagers in the countries of origin), relatives and employers, to a less degree — recruiting agencies, as people who are helpful in reaching the workplace. Responding to a question on those who assist in keeping in touch with their families, migrants mentioned friends, acquaintances, relatives and, rarely employers. These are the same people who help migrants to pass earned money home.

A significant role of informal ties among migrants is seen in responses to a question regarding those who assist migrants on departure: relatives are on the first place – 43.1% of respondents. Migrants at the destination community were mentioned by 34.9% of the respondents, countrymen –by 32.5%. Employers were mentioned only by 10.2% respondents; local residents by 9.8%. Participation of the recruiting agencies in solving migrants' problems was mentioned by 0.4% respondents only.

"Migrant networks" are especially important in "traditional" societies, where relations are being built along the family or kin lines. For example, in the situation of conflict or post–conflict reconstruction as in the Tajikistani case.

During and after civil war in the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Tajik nationals fled from the country and have formed compact settlements and spheres of employment outside the country (mainly in Russia). Many Tajik citizens stay in other CIS countries until now. *Avlod*–traditional kinship based community–plays a vital role in Tajiks' life and forms migrants' networks ready to help new Tajik migrants in finding jobs, apartments, support and protection in case of being detained or put into prison for illegal employment (IOM 2003: 51).

Table 1. Who supports labor immigrants at the destination area (The South Kazakhstan, 2005)

Who supports you upon departure?	Abs	%
Relatives	110	43,1
Other immigrants on a current place of residence	89	34,9
Countrymen from the same aul, kishlak [village] of the origin country	83	32,5
Employer	26	10,2
Local residents	25	9,8
Friends, acquaintances	6	2,4
Recruiting agency's staff	1	0,4
Nobody	23	9
No answer	5	2
Sample	**255**	**100**

Note: respondents could choose several response categories, thus, the sum of answers is more than 100%.

Not only "migrants' networks", but also national diasporas are conducive to increase and "perpetuation" of migration. For example, Kazakhstan has a large Uzbek diaspora. This is the third largest ethnic minority of Kazakhstan, 90% of it resides in the southern oblasts of Kazakhstan, neighboring Uzbekistan. Economic deterioration in Uzbekistan and kinship relations stimulate migration from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan. Migrant communities in receiving country and networking with the countrymen in sending country help maximize the profit for the households in Uzbekistan.

The informal ties are actually helpful to not only finding jobs or appartments to migrants, they are also conducive to emerging of the ethnic enclaves and the secondary and tertiary labor markets where immigrants are often illegally employed *en masse.* They are also exploited and discriminated against there, spreading informal relations and corruption, and other distortions which accompany the functioning of "shadow" economy sector.

International Migration, Globalization and Security Issues

The data of the author's research proves the great role of informal ties in migration in Central Asia, which is in fact, is one of the modest evidences of *the regional as well as global migration mismanagement problems and raising threats to national and regional security.*

There is a number of other issues which increase the relevance of the security issues in Central Asia. Partly because Central Asian / CIS countries have become involved in global migration movements. In particular, Central Asian

countries have become transit countries for migrants from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian countries. Prevailing of irregular labor migration among migration flows, increasing illegal migration into/via/from regional countries, including trafficking in persons and drug trafficking, other criminal processes, such as using international money transfer systems for illegal money laundering and financing of terrorism, are *threatening national and regional security.*

A growing geopolitical role of China became a new factor of regional security. As a result of the economic and political modernization, which started in China in 1978, China's economy is rapidly growing. As a member of WTO, China is very active in trade, economic cooperation, and population movement globally and in Central Asia specifically.

Chinese involvement in Kazakhstan is accompanied by a number of contradictory trends: China has control of up to 25–40% of Kazakhstan oil asset, however commercial negotiations are not transparent and are accompanied by corruption according to media. China is one of the major international trade partners of Kazakhstan, but it is characterized by unbalanced trade structure: predominantly natural resources in export and every day consumer goods in import structure.

Chinese labor immigration is rapidly growing, however on the background of a relatively high unemployment rate in Kazakhstan (at around 8.1% in 2005), it stirs public resentment, alarmism and Sinophobia. The number of publications on the threat of '*China-isation'* of Kazakhstan in the mainstream media is increasing. These contradictory trends should be carefully studied to prevent national and intergovernmental tensions — and, consequently, national and regional security issues. (Sadovskaya 2007b)

So far, neither national, nor regional security system in Central Asia has been created. Even highly needed agreements on labor force mobility, visa regime, citizenship, etc., among the regional states are either not signed, or not ratified, or not implemented. Only two regional states — Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined the UN Convention on Protection of Migrants' Rights, a few joined the international conventions for prevention of transnational crime. Kazakhstan, the main labor migrants' destination country nowadays, has no adequate legislation and institutional basis, the main direction of its migration policy is repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs, just as it was 15 ten years ago.

Apart from the threats associated with criminal types of migrations and/or migration mismanagement issues, we would like to point out "*soft security issues"* in Central Asia. To mention only one, but very important for the region: mid– and long–term consequences of the BRAIN DRAIN of the 1990s. They have never been studied in–depth, but its damaging effect on the Human development in Central Asia will be evident soon.

One of the global tendencies emerging in the region is *the increase in remittances by labor migrants* to their home countries. The following section will

focus on increasing size of remittances and their role in the improvement of living standards of migrants' households. It supports the conclusion that international labor migration and remittances are playing an increasing role in development.

(3) The Remittances In Central Asia: Types, Size, And Dynamics Of Transfers

The size of remittances has considerably increased in the 2000s. There are two basic types of remittances by labor migrants: *official* and "*unofficial"*. Various international and national money transfer systems are used as official ways of sending money home. However, many migrants still bring money home themselves or send earned money 'unofficially' via friends, relatives or an informal money transfer systems, for example *hawala* (The hawala alternative remittance system…, 2000).

There are different types of Electronic Money Transfer Systems operating in Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics: specialized international systems (Western Union, MoneyGram, Travelex Worldwide Money Ltd, etc.), Russian banking systems (Contact, Migom, Bystraya Pochta, etc.), and national systems. International systems are operating jointly with national banks, e.g., Western Union has hundreds of offices in the national Central Asian banks. According to mass media, there had been 870 Western Union bureaus operating in Kazakhstan in 2005.

Rosbiznesbank (Russia) opened 740 service bureaus in Russia, 166 in Kazakhstan, 121 in Kyrgyzstan, and 75 in Tajikistan, and transfer money via two systems: Contact and Migom. Alfabank, jointly with Western Union and Anelik, also has a network of service bureaus: 65 in Kazakhstan, 123 in Kyrgyzstan, 125 in Tajikistan, as well as in other CIS countries.

In Kazakhstan, approximately 30 "secondary level" banks offer money transfer services. They include ATFbank, Caspian Bank, the Bank of China in Kazakhstan, Eurasian Bank, KazCommerzbank, National Savings Bank of Kazakhstan, HSBC Bank of Kazakhstan, and others. As in other Central Asian republics, they transfer money via their own systems, or via Russian banking, or International ones.

According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the remittances by residents and non-residents from Kazakhstan since 2000 have been growing by 1.5–2 times annually over the subsequent five years. In 2004 remittances sent by official ways reached US$805.8 mln. (http://www.nationalbank.kz)

According to the author's sociological survey, 41.2% of labor immigrants in Kazakhstan carry money they have earned on their own; 23.9% send money via friends, and 14.9% — via relatives. Only 17.6% or less than one fifth of the total number regularly transfers money by post. This testifies to a great potential of the money transfer system from/to Kazakhstan (Table 2)



Diag. 1. Dynamics of remittances of residents and non-residents to / from the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2000-2006 (in mln USD)

Note: The indices in the Graph (vertically) are shown in quarterly values of $50 mln, annual values (horizontally) amount to $150 mln.

Table 2. How do you transfer money to your family?

	Abs	%
I carry it on my own	105	41.2
I send it with friends	61	23.9
I send it with relatives	38	14.9
Western Union money transfer	24	9.4
Postal remittance	21	8.2
I don't send it	12	4.7
I use it to buy goods and carry them on my own	4	1.6
I have not sent it yet, since it's my first visit	4	1.6
I send it with a special person	3	1.2
I don't know / no answer	37	14.5
Sampling	255	100

Note: respondents could choose more than one version, therefore the total percentage is more than 100%.

Taking into account all above mentioned parameters, an amount of remittances sent by labor migrants from Kazakhstan in 2004-2005 may be preliminarily estimated at US$ 0.5 up to $1 bln annually. (Sadovskaya, 2006a: 117).

Kyrgyzstan. Using the data on official transfers and evaluating the amount of money sent via unofficial channels, a preliminary evaluation can be made that in 2005 about US$500 mln was sent by migrants to Kyrgyzstan from Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries. For comparison: GDP of Kyrgyzstan comprised around US $2,0 bln in 2004-2005. Remittances are equivalent to 25% (and higher) of GDP, and surpass annual Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance to Kyrgyzstan (Graph 2)



Diag. 3. The Dynamics of GDP, Foreign Direct Investment, and Remittances to Kyrgyzstan in 1999–2005 (in percent to the previous year)

According to the National Bank of *Tajikistan*, the remittances to this country reached $ 256 mln in 2003, which comprised 23,2 % of Tajik GNI. $260 mln were transferred in 2004. The amount of remittances sent to these two countries - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is equivalent to more than 25% of GNP (Sadovskaya, 2006b). However, more transferts were sent via relatives and friends and other "unofficial" channels, brought by labor migrants as expensive goods or clothes, etc.

According to the Central Bank of the *Republic of Uzbekistan*, the remittances to the country reached more than $ 1 bln in 2006, the amount of remittances sent via Unistream Money Transfer System multiplied 6 times - from $24 до $146 mln в 2006. Uzbekistan is one of the leader in the CIS in terms of dynamics and amount of remittances sent to the country. Bearing in mind, that according to the UN assessment, more than 40% of remittances are sent by "unofficial channels, the total amount of remittances is much higher and is equivalent to a significant portion of GDP of Uzbekistan.

Labour Migrants' Remittances: A Strategy For Survival For Migrants Households

Migrants' remittances and their impact on increasing living standards is the first and most important outcome of international labour migration. The survey on spending remittances in the households of migrants from Central Asian Republics demonstrated that 'migradollars' are spent mainly on food (55.7%) and clothing (47.2%). 30.3% of respondents reported that the earned money provided them only with the living essentials. 22.5% of respondents paid for medicines and medical treatment and 25.5% of respondents financially supported their parents and children.

The spending of migrants' remittances differs from country to country. Lower-income migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan spend the money for daily living needs. Migrants from Tajikistan who have been working in Kazakhstan for many years (71.0% of the Tajik respondents have been international migrants for more than 5 years), provide material assistance to relatives (47,1 %), pay for medical services (35.3 %), and purchase more expensive goods. The share of respondents who invest into the education of their kids, especially girls, is relatively small. (see diagram 3)



Diag. 3. Spending of Kazakhstan labor immigrants' remittances, by country, in 2005

Research has demonstrated that remittances are predominantly used for purchasing consumer goods in migrant households, and in a lesser degree for paying for the health services and education. The positive impact of labor migration includes accumulation of initial capital for starting up a new business by some of migrants, and improvement of migrants' qualifications which consequently increases the quality of the labor force in the countries of origin.

International labor migration of the 2000s has played a positive stabilizing role preventing social and political tensions and conflicts in both receiving and sending countries. To give only one example, today money earned by Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan helps hundreds of thousands of households to survive in poor agrarian regions of the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. Emigration of the excessive labor force mitigates the situation in the local labor markets, preventing social tension and unrest.

Change of gender roles in the process of involving women in labor migrations is typical for countries of the region, particularly, for Uzbekistan. According to the research data, in 1999, less than 2% of female labor migrants in the Republic of Uzbekistan considered themselves heads of their families, while in 2004, 57.6% of women said that they are "feeding their relatives" and therefore are heads in the families. (IOM 2005b: 50)

However, labor migration, especially irregular one, has a negative impact as well. The "economic benefit" received by employers by illegal employment of migrant workers is that cheap workforce is used which does not require any social protection/expenses. Migrant workers, thousands getting a relatively small amount of money, do not pay taxes, and there is economic damage to the state resulting from non-payment of taxes to the national budget (the overall amount of taxes evaded is high given the entire number of migrant workers); capital and workforce flow into the "shadow" economy.

Since labor migration into/via/from Central Asian countries has recently acquired international status, violation of the migrants' rights is widely spread. Unregistered migrant workers suffer from exploitation, low wages and lack of proper working conditions and social protection.

Sending countries witness negative demographic consequences of long-term labor migrations since males, who are the heads of households, are usually the main migrants. "Brain drain" has a negative impact on national economies in the mid– and long-term perspective.

A criminal component in labor migration remains: according to expert appraisal, approximately 10% of income from emigration/job activity in Tajikistan goes to drug trafficking. (IOM, 2003: 97). Counteraction mechanisms in republics of Central Asian region and Russia are being created in order to prevent usage of transfer system for laundering illegal incomes and financing terrorist activity. (http://www.euroasiangroup.org) However, it is necessary to distinguish criminal component from a legal transfer of money from a receiving country to migrants' origin country, where transfers play a growing role in national economies and need special regulation.

Remittances for Community and National Economies Development: A Goal for the Future

Research demonstrated that international labor migration and remittances become a strategy for survival for migrants' households in the republics of Central Asia, but not yet a strategy for community and national economy development. The remittances are used for purchasing consumer goods and improving living standards of migrants' households, and this is the most obvious positive effect of labor migration.

Remittances serve as an important contribution to reducing poverty in the sending countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with poverty rates at 44,4% and 60% respectively at the beginning of 2000s, according to UNDP. They play a positive sociopolitical role, contributing stability in the communities in the countries of origin and destination and in the region as a whole.

The amount of the remittances is equivalent to *a considerable part of GDP* in some republics of Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The contribution is about 25% in Kyrgyzstan, and between 23% (through official channels) and up to 45% (including 'unofficial' channels) in Tajikistan. In 2004-2005 *the amount of remittances exceeded the annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI*) in the Central Asian countries. The migrants' households in these countries, and increasingly in Uzbekistan as well, not only survive, but also develop due to the migrants' remittances.

As migrants' remittances constitute a considerable share of the GDP, the governments of the sending countries should develop a system of efficient use of remittances for the development of local communities and national economy as a whole.

The development of a legal framework and practical mechanisms that would encourage the migrants to use the remittances for development is a new and important direction of activities for the executive bodies in the Central Asian countries. One of measures of stimulating investments for development might be facilitating bank transfers of remittances (as opposed to handing over the cash), or encouraging the migrants to cover medical insurance, to invest in education, mortgage, and local communities projects. Additional measures should also include encouragement to invest in local small and medium business and production, and giving out credits, and set lower interest rates for social and economic projects in local communities (re/construction or other local social and economic needs).

Labor migration flows in Central Asia tend to increase and so do the remittances, therefore using them for community development rather than for individual or household consumption should become a new and important direction of activities for the Central Asian governments. In order to work out development programs in sending and receiving countries, further research is needed into the amount of remittances, the money transfers, and the role the remittances play in migrant households and communities.

Paradoxically enough, the response to the challenges of *international ("external") migration* depends on addressing the *internal problems* of Central Asian republics. The sending countries need to focus on creating jobs and national economy development. The receiving country – Kazakhstan, should find out a comprehensive solution to a range of socio-economic problems such as unemployment and self-employment, small and medium business development, education and advanced professional education and other issues.

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Uma A. Segal

UNITED STATES' IMMIGRATION[1]

Overview of Immigration to the United States

Although individuals may be interested in emigrating from their homelands, the move is highly contingent on the receptiveness of the potential host nation to immigrants in general, and immigrants from specific countries in particular, and many governments now have strict immigration laws. United States (U.S.) immigration history, since the mid-18th century, has been significantly impacted by legislation that has substantially colored the face of immigration in the last two and a half centuries, yet individuals and families from around the globe continue to enter in a continuous stream. The backlog of visa applications and waiting lists to enter the U.S. stretches to several years. Undocumented immigrants, both those who enter without legal papers and those who overstay their visits, abound. Refugees and asylees continue to enter in record numbers from countries in political turmoil. Disproportionately large numbers of entrants into the U.S. in recent years have been people of color from Asia, Africa, and Central and South America, and despite encountering a series of barriers, an overwhelming majority remains, making this nation its permanent residence.

Recent Legislative History and Its Impact

Immigration legislation to the U.S. moved from open entry in the mid-19th Century to strict controls in the early part of the 20th Century. In 1965, under President Lyndon Johnson, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act removed several barriers to entry and marked the beginning of the liberalization period in U.S. immigration history. Below are brief sketches of immigration-related legislation or action[2] that, since the beginning of the liberalization period, have affected diverse populations in a variety of ways, from entry into the U.S. itself to access to fundamental rights.

1965: *The Immigration and Nationality Act* finally liberalized immigration and repealed legal discrimination because of race, gender, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. It rescinded the national origins system, replacing it with annual quotas of the Eastern (170,000) and Western (120,000) Hemispheres, with up to 20,000 individuals being permitted entry from any one nation. This quota did not include spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens.

1978: Separate ceilings for the two hemispheres were abolished and a world-wide annual ceiling of 290,000 was established.

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[1] A variation of this paper will be published by in the *Encyclopedia of Social Work,* 20th Edition, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008.

[2] These and additional laws relevant to immigration and immigrants are available through the Web site of the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Retrieved May 30, 2006, from (http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/legishist/index.htm)

1980: *The Refugee Act* removed refugees as a preference category. The President, in conjunction with Congress, and based on the political climate of the world, determines the annual ceiling and the distribution of that ceiling among identified countries for that year (ceilings have ranged from 50,000–90,000).

1986: *The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)* was a comprehensive reform effort that legalized undocumented immigrants who had been in the country since January 1, 1982, but made it unlawful to hire undocumented workers.

1990: *The Immigration Act of 1990* increased the annual ceiling for immigrants to 700,000 and established an annual limit for certain categories of immigrants to attract skilled workers. It also established the Immigrant Investor Program, offering up to 10,000 permanent resident visas to those willing to invest at least $1 million in U.S. urban areas or $500,000 in U.S. rural areas.

1996: *Welfare Reform* ended many cash and medical assistance programs for most legal immigrants (and other low-income individuals),

1996: *The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)* expanded enforcement operations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, particularly at the border and reorganized the procedures for removal of inadmissible entrants.

2001: *The USA Patriot Act* was passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington, DC. It gives federal officials greater power to track and intercept national and international communications and to prevent the entry of foreign terrorists and detain and remove those who may be within the U.S.

2006 *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006* that attempts to curtail and address the presence of undocumented immigrants.

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act had a major and permanent impact on U.S. immigration, dramatically altering the traditional origins and numbers of immigrants to the U.S. Prior to 1965 and the amendments of October 3rd to the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which resulted in the liberalization of immigration laws, the majority of entrants into the U.S. were from European countries. When the 1965 amendments: (i) abolished the national origins quota system; (ii) established a preference system for relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents; (iii) exempt immediate relatives of citizens and some special groups (certain ministers of religion, former employees of U.S. government abroad, etc.); and (iv) expanded the limits of world coverage to a 20,000 per-country limit, the influx of new immigrants from non-European countries was unprecedented and continues into the present. While minor modifications are frequently made to the Immigration Act of October 1, 1965, it remains the primary directing force of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Table 1. U.S. Population by Sex, Age, and Generation: 2004, (Numbers in thousands.)

Population Age	Total		GENERATION [1]					
			FIRST		SECOND		THIRD-AND-HIGHER	
	Number	Percent	**Number**	**Percent**	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	288,280	100.0	**34,244**	**100.0**	30,430	100.0	223,606	100.0
Under 16 years	64,859	22.5	**2,421**	**7.1**	12,515	41.1	49,923	22.3
16 - 65 years	188,762	65.5	**27,116**	**82.1**	12,798	42.1	147,838	66.1
65 years and over	34,659	12.0	**3,697**	**10.8**	5,117	16.8	25,845	11.6
MEDIAN AGE (years)	35.9	(X)	**38.4**	**(X)**	21.4	(X)	36.6	(X)

(X) = Not Applicable
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. (2004). *Current population survey, annual social and economic supplement*., Retrieved May 30, 2006, from http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/asec/2004/sdata.htm.

Table 2: Immigrants, by Country of Birth: 1981 to 2004, Numbers in thousands

Region and country of birth	**1981- 1990 total**	**1991-2000 total**	**2001-2003 total**	**2004**
All countries	**7,338.1**	**9,095.4**	**2,833.9**	**946.1**
Europe	705.6	1,311.4	450.3	127.7
Asia	2,817.4	2,892.2	936.6	330.0
Africa	192.3	383.0	163.0	66.3
Oceania	(NA)	48.0	16.0	6.0
North America	3,125.0	3,917.4	1,063.1	341.2
Canada	119.2	137.6	52.9	15.6
Mexico	1,653.3	2,251.4	541.7	175.4
Caribbean	892.7	996.1	268.9	88.9
Central America	458.7	531.8	199.5	61.3
South America	455.9	539.9	198.6	71.8

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. (2006).

2004 yearbook of immigration statistics.

See also <http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm>.

Table 3: Immigrants Admitted as Permanent Residents Under Refugee Acts, by Country of Birth: 1991 to 2004

Region and country of birth	1991 to 2000, total	2001 to 2002, total	2003	2004
Total	**1,021,266**	**234,590**	**44,927**	**71,230**
Europe	426,565	118,736	17,290	24,854
Asia	351,347	41,406	9,885	14,335
Africa	51,649	20,360	7,723	12,443
Oceania	291	52	18	28
North America	185,333	51,503	8,454	18,323
Cuba	144,612	47,580	7,047	16,678
Haiti	9,364	1,504	472	536
El Salvador	4,073	382	194	263
Guatemala	2,033	809	294	387
Nicaragua	22,486	631	169	137
South America	5,857	2,158	1,518	1,150

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. (2006). *2004 yearbook of immigration statistics.*

See also <http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm>.

The numbers of immigrants admitted legally are: (a) fixed by law; (b) limited only by demands for those considered eligible; and (c) restricted by processing constraints (Gordon, 2005). Fiscal year limits are found on the website of the U.S. Department of state and fall in the three categories of family sponsored immigrants (480,000), employment based immigrants (140,000), and diversity immigrants (55,000):[1] In addition, a substantial number of legal immigrants include those not subject to these numerical limits—relatives of U.S. citizens and children born abroad to permanent residents. In 2004, this number was approximately 407,000 (U.S. Census, 2004a). An interesting addition to the immigration quotas is the "investor program" that issues approximately 10,000 visas annually to those who are willing to invest one million dollars in urban areas or $500,000 in rural areas of the U.S.

Demographic Trends

Newcomers to the U.S. enter under a variety of conditions. Early migrants of the 19th and early 20th centuries came as volunteer immigrants, indentured laborers, or as slaves. Most however, were considered "legal immigrants," particularly in the absence of any legislation. Present-day immigrants may be categorized as voluntary immigrants (illegal or undocumented) or as refugees (and asylees). Several legal immigrants, after a minimum length of residence in the country, choose to apply for U.S. citizenship.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census indicates that in 2004, of the approximately 288 million residents of the country, 34 million (12%) were foreign born and another 30 million (10%) were children of those who had migrated from other countries (Table 1). On October 17, 2006, the population of the U.S. reached the 300 million mark, and this increase is a result, not only of birth, but of immigration. Of the foreign born, five million are from Europe, eight million from Asia, 18 million from Latin America, and three million from other regions, including Africa.

Tables 2 and 3 present immigrants (1981–2004) and refugees (1991–2003) respectively, by region of birth (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). During these years, the largest number from any one country was from Mexico. However, it is clear from the distribution of sending countries, that although the largest number of immigrants to the U.S. Between 1981 and 2004 has been Mexican (4,621,800), this is still less than a quarter of the total entrants during that period (22.86%); the percentage is even less if the 1.4 million refugees are included. Hence, it is essential that, while recognizing the strong Mexican presence in the U.S., one remain cognizant of the diversity of immigrants.

Among those who voluntarily migrate to the U.S. are immigrants without the requisite papers, the undocumented population. While there is no valid method of counting undocumented immigrants, estimates suggest numbers as high 20 as

[1] U.S. Department of State. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_2924.html

million [See Scheme 1 (Knickerbocker, 2006)]. These are people who are in the U.S. without governmental approval and are sometimes described as economic refugees, but are not so recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Although undocumented immigrants lack the legal documentation to be residing in the U.S., they may have entered the country legally or illegally. Despite perceptions of undocumented immigrants being those who slip across borders without appropriate documentation, a large proportion (about 41%) of all undocumented immigrants, particularly from Asian countries, are "overstays" who fail to leave when the period of their visas expires (INS, 2000):



Scheme 1. Undocumented Immigrant Numbers[2]

Refugees and asylees, unlike immigrants, are usually involuntary migrants. The U.S. has always been a refuge for those fleeing from persecution with the largest number of the world's refugees (Mayadas & Segal, 2000). The U.S. President, in consultation with Congress, can establish annual numbers and allocations of refugees based on the current political climate of the world (Table 4). Asylees differ from refugees in that they usually enter the U.S. on their own volition without prior approval. Once within the U.S., they apply for asylum and are detained until a determination is made regarding legal admission as refugees or repatriation to their homelands.

Table 4: Refugee Admissions in FY 2005 and FY 2006; Proposed Admissions for FY 2007[3]

Region	FY 2005 Actual Arrivals	FY 2006 Ceiling	FY 2006 Projected Arrivals	Proposed FY 2007 Ceiling
Africa	20,749	20,000	17,200	**22,000**
East Asia	12,071	15,000	5,800	**11,000**
Europe and Central Asia	11,316	15,000	11,500	**6,500**
Latin America/Caribbean	6,700	5,000	3,000	**5,000**
Near East/South Asia	2,977	5,000	4,000	**5,500**
Regional Subtotal	53,813	60,000	41,500	**50,000**
Unallocated Reserve		10,000		**20,000**
Total	53,813	70,000	41,500	**70,000**

[2] Reproduced with permission from the May 16, 2006 issue of *The Christian Science Monitor*, (www.csmonitor.com)

[3] U.S. Department of State. Retrieved December 8, 2006 from http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/rpt/2006/73619.htm#proposed

In throwback fashion to earlier migration periods of the early 20th Century, the nation is beginning to see three additional groups of migrants—victims of human smuggling, victims of human trafficking, and mail-order brides. Those smuggled into the country pay a substantial price to enter the country clandestinely, and once in the U.S., find they are burdened with debt and few employment opportunities. Victims of human trafficking are exploited for illicit reasons and are practical slaves to those who bring them into the country (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Finally, the mail-order bride market is burgeoning, with over 590,000 Web sites catering to a growing clientele (Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, 2004). Usually from developing countries, mail-order brides register with a catalogue or Web site their intent to marry foreign men. Usually there is no period of courtship, and marriages take place in absentia, with the man having "shopped" for the wife who **fits his needs. These women, then, enter the country legally as the wives of U.S. citizens.**

Figures 2 and 3 reflect, respectively, the origins of legal and undocumented immigrants who arrived in the U.S. between 1991 and 2000 (Massey, 2005).

Figure 1: Origins of 9.1 Million Legal Immigrants Arriving in the United States 1991-2000



Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, *2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*.

Figure 2: Origins of 7 Million Undocumented Immigrants in the United States, 2000



Source: Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990-2000* , January 31, 2003.

Under continuing discussion is the Immigration Reform Bill, a guest worker program that will allow temporary workers to enter the country for a period of up to six years to assume jobs for which U.S. employers are unable to find native employees. While this may appear to be novel, it has long been a part of the cross-border movement for Mexican workers who have entered the U.S. for seasonal work and returned home at the end of the season. Known as circular migration, this pattern is evidenced regularly and increasingly both in the U.S. and internationally (Hugo, 2003; Zuniga, 2006). However, currently, a significant number of workers who used to enter the country illegally, but traditionally followed the pattern of circular migration, are now choosing to remain in the U.S., as moving across the U.S.–Mexico border is becoming dramatically more dangerous (Zuniga, 2006). Migration researchers, further, are seeing two new phenomena with immigrants choosing to either return permanently to their homelands (return migrants) several years, or decades, after leaving, or dividing their time equally between their countries of origin and the U.S. (transnationals).

Regardless of the process and reasons that immigrants enter the U.S., it is clear that for a large proportion, a primary impetus is economic opportunity. Furthermore, few completely sever ties with their homelands, and a significant number sends remittances to support family members, organizations, or communities in the country of origin.

Economic Impact of Immigration

Many deliberations in the U.S. surround the economic impact of migration. The ongoing immigration debate juggles arguments regarding assets newcomers bring to the country with those about drains they place on the infrastructure. The country is divided on the current net worth of immigration in the 21st century.

The Immigrant Workforce

The recent focus on immigration reform and the guest worker program has drawn overwhelming focus toward undocumented workers. One must bear in mind in all deliberations that of the 34 million documented immigrants in the U.S., over 27 million are between the ages of 16 and 65 years, and the majority is in the workforce (Table 4) and present across the occupational structure (Table 5). Significant proportions of the legitimate workforce, these immigrants have the appropriate documentation and are essential to the functioning of the country. While immigrants in 2004 constituted 11% of the population, they made up 14% of the labor force and 20% of the low-wage earners (Nightingale & Fix, 2004). Ironically, immigrant unemployment rates have fallen faster than those of natives, yet their wages have increased half as fast, therefore, while, in general, immigrants have a higher employment rate and are composed of two-parent families, they are more likely to live in poverty than are native born Americans (Nightingale & Fix, 2004).

Table 4: Employment Status of the Foreign-Born Civilian Population 16 Years and Over by Sex and World Region of Birth: 2004,
Numbers in thousands. [1] [2]

SEX AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS	FOREIGN BORN		WORLD REGION OF BIRTH							
			EUROPE		ASIA		LATIN AMERICA		OTHER AREAS	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total Civilian Labor Force	21,168	100.0	2,424	100.0	5,470	100.0	11,641	100.0	1,633	100.0
Employed	19,857	93.8	2,294	94.6	5,178	94.7	10,844	93.2	1,542	94.4
Unemployed	1,310	6.2	130	5.4	292	5.3	797	6.8	91	5.6
Total Male Civilian Labor Force	12,736	100.0	1,295	100.0	3,010	100.0	7,469	100.0	962	100.0
Employed	12,001	94.2	1,223	94.4	2,851	94.7	7,002	93.7	925	96.2
Unemployed	735	5.8	72	5.6	159	5.3	468	6.3	36	3.8
Total Female Civilian Labor Force	8,432	100.0	1,129	100.0	2,460	100.0	4,172	100.0	671	100.0
Employed	7,857	93.2	1,071	94.9	2,327	94.6	3,843	92.1	616	91.9
Unemployed	575	6.8	58	5.1	133	5.4	329	7.9	55	8.1

[1] The majority of those born in 'Latin America' are from Mexico. Those born in 'Other Areas' are from Africa, Oceania, and Northern America.

[2] Employment status refers to reference week of the survey.

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau,. Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2004.
Immigration Statistics Staff, Population Division,
Internet Release Date: February 22, 2005.

Table 5: Occupation of Employed Foreign-Born Civilian Workers 16 Years and Over by World Region of Birth: 2004, Numbers in thousands. [1] [2]

SEX AND OCCUPATION GROUP	FOREIGN BORN		WORLD REGION OF BIRTH							
			EUROPE		ASIA		LATIN AMERICA		OTHER AREAS	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	**19,857**	**100.0**	**2,294**	**100.0**	**5,178**	**100.0**	**10,844**	**100.0**	**1,542**	**100.0**
Management, Professional, and Related Occupations	5,225	26.3	953	41.6	2,332	45.0	1,340	12.4	601	39.0
Management, business, and financial	1,958	9.9	404	17.6	784	15.1	561	5.2	210	13.6
Professional and related	3,267	16.5	550	24.0	1,548	29.9	779	7.2	391	25.4
Service Occupations	4,631	23.3	315	13.7	830	16.0	3,175	29.3	311	20.2
Sales and Office Occupations	3,737	18.8	556	24.2	1,221	23.6	1,666	15.4	294	19.1
Sales and related	1,870	9.4	240	10.5	687	13.3	784	7.2	160	10.3
Office and administrative	1,867	9.4	316	13.8	535	10.3	882	8.1	135	8.7
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations	309	1.6	1	0.1	15	0.3	289	2.7	4	0.3
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Occupations	2,556	12.9	214	9.3	173	3.4	2,047	18.9	122	7.9
Construction and extraction	1,925	9.7	156	6.8	61	1.2	1,625	15.0	83	5.4
Installation, maintenance, and repair	632	3.2	58	2.5	112	2.2	423	3.9	38	2.5
Production, Transportation, and Material Moving	3,398	17.1	254	11.1	606	11.7	2,327	21.5	210	13.6
Production	2,108	10.6	149	6.5	474	9.2	1,388	12.8	96	6.2
Transportation and material moving	1,290	6.5	105	4.6	132	2.5	939	8.7	114	7.4

- Represents zero or rounds to zero.

[1] The majority of those born in 'Latin America' are from Mexico. Those born in 'Other Areas' are from Africa, Oceania, and Northern America.

[2] Status refers to reference week of the survey.

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2004, Immigration Statistics Staff, Population Division

Several big businesses, construction companies, agriculture, and employers in many service industries contend that the absence of immigrant workers would cause a major catastrophe in the U.S. economy. These groups, specifically, refer to the absence of the unauthorized workforce. In a survey of approximately 800 building contractors, half admitted to having some undocumented workers, and several indicated that hiring all native-born workers makes their companies less competitive (Caulfield, 2006). Others suggested that there are not enough legitimate workers available, and if the illegal immigrant workforce is reduced, their companies could not maintain production as current levels. There continues to be a strong, steady demand for migrant workers in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and hospitality (Kochhar, 2005). Undocumented workers are estimated to fill 25% of all agricultural, 17% of office and house cleaning, 14% of construction, and 12% of food preparation jobs.

Estimates suggest that about 850,000 unauthorized immigrants enter the U.S. annually, and have done so since 1990, for a total of close to 12 million (Passel, 2006). The majority (78%) is believed to be from Latin America, 56% from Mexico (about 7 million), and 22% from other countries of Central and South Americas. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that California and Texas have the largest numbers of unauthorized migrants at 2.7 million and 1.6 million respectively, while Florida and New York also have substantial numbers. While there is a pervasive tendency to believe that all undocumented immigrants cross the border illegally, the Office of Homeland Security revealed that approximately half the unauthorized immigrants are visa overstays (Grieco, 2005)who enter the U.S. with appropriate documentation, but remain in the country after their visas expire. Despite regulations, perhaps illegal immigration has not declined because this would harm the U.S. economy (Portes, 2006) and the U.S. has a revolving door that entices unauthorized migrants with labor opportunities and with U.S. immigration policies that make only half-hearted efforts at occasional repatriation.

Brain Gain Versus Brain Drain

Despite Emma Lazarus' wonderfully touching poem etched upon the Statue of Liberty,

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I life my lamp beside the golden door

it is important to be aware that individuals that undertake the challenge of migrating to an alien land and culture are rarely those without substantial human capital. While this capital may not be in the form of tangible assets, it often is found in psychological, intellectual, and physical capabilities. Most immigrants move to enhance their opportunities, bringing with them a variety of resources

that can benefit the U.S. A significant number comes to further its education and eventually adjusts visa status from student to immigrant. This process has long been known as the "brain drain" as educated individuals, often of a developing nation, leave their homelands in search of greater opportunities. What is more recently recognized is the "brain gain" to countries that draw such immigrants. As one reviews the list of Nobel Prize winners in recent years, a disproportionate number are originally from countries outside the U.S.

Highly-educated people who stay in developing countries are few, for this is a group that tends to migrate, particularly to the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe. One in ten adults with some university education and who was born in the developing world is now in developed countries (Sriskandarajah, 2005). In January, 2007, a highly telling article on the top ranked medical graduate in the Philippines explored his reasons for leaving his country to work as a nurse in the U.S., a frequent occurrence among physicians from that nation (Geller, 2007). Legal immigration to the U.S. of people without at least an elementary level of education is small. The largest group of immigrants is from other North American countries, and the majority has a high school education. The second largest group is from Asia, and its population is generally highly educated. Finally, immigration from South America and Africa is relatively small, however, African immigrants are also highly educated (Carrington, & Detragiache, 1999). Thus, the brain drain from developing countries results in a brain gain for countries such as the U.S., as the educated and talented make the U.S. their home.

The recent phenomenon of the "reverse brain drain" is causing some concern with the outsourcing of production and of services. Not only do companies seek to have their products and services made in other countries, increasing numbers of both native-born Americans and first-generation (immigrant) Americans are choosing to live outside the U.S., where they see better opportunities (Weber, 2004).

Conversely, the brain drain can benefit sending countries. The World Bank reports that most expatriates remit money to support family members, and the receiving country's economy benefits from the flow of these additional monies. Thus, the brain drain serves to provide income and help offset poverty for poorer or less-educated family members and, to some extent, counteracts the effects of the loss of educated individuals (Ozden & Schiff, 2006). Thus, although the brain drain may not directly benefit the sending country, indirect benefits may help build capacity in the country of origin (Asian Development Bank, 2005). These remittances, furthermore, can be quite substantial. In one community, expatriate Mexicans in the U.S. sent 16% of their income back home (Drake, 2006) with remittances in 1999 being as high as $6.8 billion.

Impact of Migration Policies

As immigrants enter the U.S. and adapt to life in their new homeland, they bring with them a diversity of cultures and norms. The U.S. prides itself at being

a multicultural nation, a nation of immigrants, and, clearly, as the U.S. influences these New Americans, the country is influenced by them. Immigrants influence the U.S. culture and society through their social norms, family patterns, art, music, dance, cuisine, and businesses. They expose native-born Americans to alternative modes of behavior and social relationships, differences in perceptions and interpretations, and variations in experiences and observations. They may challenge traditional American norms and require that Americans reassess or defend them.

With the opening of U.S. borders with the liberalized Immigration Act of 1965, came an unprecedented flow of immigrants from Asian, and to a somewhat smaller extent, South American countries. While in the early years, these immigrants came as skilled workers, the flow continues through the family reunification stream, and the numbers continue to grow exponentially. The impact of observable Asian factors is evident across the U.S. from the large metropolitan areas to smaller, less populated and somewhat rural communities. The effect of Mexican migration continues to expand as Mexican migrants move to non-traditional destinations (Donato, Stainback, & Bankston, 2005).

Readiness of the U.S. for Immigrants — Social Capital

Immigration policies, (the laws that determine who is eligible to enter the country) and immigrant policies (laws and programs that reflect how immigrants are received once they are in the country) should be differentiated. The former are federally regulated and apply across the nation, while the latter are highly dependent on state and local programs and local public perceptions and can show a great deal of variability. Several immigrant policies are instrumental in determining how well human capital is nurtured and developed.

The readiness of a receiving country to accept immigrants in general, or an immigrant group in particular is, itself, a complex matter. When immigration is viewed as inextricably bound to a nation's political, economic, and social well being as well as its future security interests, it is likely to be welcomed. Nevertheless, immigration policies of many countries are temporal, reflecting what is believed to be of benefit at a particular moment. Nations also fulfill international agreements in the resettlement or provision of asylum to large numbers of refugees, to facilitate government action and for humanitarian reasons. Policies that allow immigration are coupled with those that permit the expulsion or deportation of foreign nationals.

Social capital, "the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded" (Serageldin, 1999:i), is essential in ensuring that opportunities within a nation are strong and viable. It is a necessity in the creation of human capital (Coleman, 1988) and immigrants' adjustment is often linked to the social capital available to them. The nation's welfare policies should guarantee that all immigrants have admittance to appropriate public welfare services and subsidies and are connected to private welfare programs as necessary

Availability and accessibility to social capital is paramount in the successful settlement of immigrants in their country of adoption. The implementation of sustainable development projects can ensure that immigrants receive the social and economic tools to succeed in their new countries. In addition to providing new arrivals with economic subsidies, housing and health care, community-based educational programs and training can provide the components for new immigrants to move away from dependency on society's support programs (Lobo & Mayadas, 1997). Hence, knowledge about prevention of disease, ability to function through society's institutional structures, and earning capacity in the legitimate economy of the country will enhance the likelihood of self-sufficiency. Social and mental health services that recognize difficulties associated with the immigration experience can assist immigrants in their adjustment to the receiving country. Resistance, communication barriers, personal and family background, and ethnic community identity (Lum, 2004) are exacerbated by the experience of many immigrants and refugees, who closely guard information because of fear (perhaps unfounded) of exposure, past experience with oppression, and mistrust of authority. A number of immigrants and most refugees arrive from nations in turmoil in which they do not have the freedom of speech or of choice, and many continue to fear deportation from the U.S.

In addition to the several ethical issues that confront professionals on a regular basis, the major one they must resolve for themselves is where they stand on the debate on undocumented immigrants. It is expected that professionals uphold U.S. laws and support both immigration and immigrant policies. As such, they should deny services to undocumented immigrants, they must report them, and they ought to intervene when others allow them access to resources. On the other hand, many professionals are also bound by values that uphold the dignity of individuals, provide opportunities, and strive for social and economic justice. To what extent should this country, that invites, entices, or accepts newcomers adapt to them, and to what extent should the New Americans adapt? What should be valued and what should be replaced? These issues will consistently face policy makers and practitioners when they focus on immigration and immigrants.

The Role of Social Capital

It is safe to say that the flow of immigrants can strain the receiving country's support service systems. It behooves policy makers and service providers to be cognizant of the experience of immigrants so that they can appropriately meet their voiced, or unvoiced, needs and ensure that the nation's social capital is available to this group in enhancing its human capital. Receiving countries must recognize that migration across their borders will persist with improvements in transportation and with further emerging reasons for relocating. In admitting immigrants, the U.S. makes a commitment to them. Unless it is willing to help them through the transitional period of adjustment, their unmet economic, social,

health, and mental health needs can, in both the short and the long term, drain its resources. On the other hand, early attention to these very immigrants may accelerate their entry as contributors to the society. (Mayadas & Elliott, 2003) While some experiences are unique to a particular immigrant group and to a specific individual, much in the immigrant experience is shared—from emigration to immigration, including reactions to and by the receiving country.

The framework presented here (figure 1) can help develop an understanding of the immigration experience and may provide a foundation for the interpretation of the experience of particular groups within the context of the receiving country's readiness to accept them. As immigration accelerates, it will be imperative for policy makers and service providers to become more sensitive to the unique needs of new arrivals and assess the degree to which programs and services are inclusive and supportive or xenophobic and discriminatory. Such assessments may ensure that programs are modified to manage a mutually satisfactory adjustment between both the immigrant group and the host country.

Summary

Substantial changes in immigration and immigrant policies in the U.S. are slow to evolve, however, they do change over time. More importantly, changes in political and social attitudes affect the interpretation of these policies, at the national, state, local levels, and even at the client contact level. This article presents a very general overview of the assets immigrants and refugees bring to the U.S., the issues they face, and the implications for the United States. While the lives of these populations alter dramatically when they enter the country, they do not begin here. Much influenced their decisions to move to the U.S., and U.S. immigration policies affected the ease of process. All immigrants and refugees have in common the newcomer experience in this land of opportunity and the experience of loss of that which they have left, in their homelands. However, there the similarity ends. A close inspection of the Census data, available on the government Web site www.census.gov, makes it abundantly clear that there is no single profile of immigrants or refugees to the U.S. They range in age from infancy to well into old age. They may be single, married, divorced, or widowed; they may come with families, without families, or as part of an extended family. They may be white, black, brown, yellow, red, or any other color under which the human species is categorized. They may be living in the U.S. legally or illegally. They may be highly professional and skilled, or they may be unprofessional with skills that cannot be transferred to the U.S. economy. They may be extremely wealthy or very poor. They may be fluent in the English language and speak several other languages, or they may speak only their mother tongue, which may not be English, and they may be illiterate even in their own language. They may be from cultures that are highly hierarchical and autocratic, or they may be from cultures where there is greater equality.

Figure 1. Model / framework for the immigrant experience



From: Segal, U. A. (2002). *A framework for immigration: Asians in the United States*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 4.

Underlying difficulties for immigrants and refugees is a far reaching xenophobia — both of the immigrants and by them. Should the host or the self-invited newcomer be responsible for reaching out to the other? This host country has policies to allow 290,000 immigrants annually and, often, almost a third as many refugees and twice as many "exempt" family members for a total yearly entry rate of over one million. Therefore, should the country not attempt to accommodate them? Immigrants (and even refugees who come to the U.S. as a third nation of resettlement) must make application to enter the U.S. Hence, they are here voluntarily. Should they not make attempts to adjust? With whom does the responsibility lie?

For immigrants, as for all people, much is dependent on their personal resources. More significant, however, is the readiness of the receiving country to accept immigrants and their American-born descendents. Immigration policies and programs may reflect the interests of the nation in allowing entry to certain groups of people, however, it is the opportunities and obstacles that immigrants and their offspring encounter on a daily basis that affect the ease of adjustment and mutual acceptance. Immigrants and the host nation must make a conscious level to adapt to each other — it is neither the exclusive responsibility of the host nation nor of the immigrant.

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Ronald Skeldon

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF MIGRATION: DISCUSSIONS OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

The discussion of the social and economic dimensions of migration is plagued with contradictions and incertitude. Whether migrants make positive economic contributions to destination societies or consume welfare benefits or whether migrants easily assimilate into the economic and social fabric of destinations or remain marginalized minorities remain highly contested issues that often have political repercussions. The contradictory findings from many studies are well summarized in work such as that by Lucas (2005). Generalization remains elusive but it seems likely that contradictory findings need to be considered within a space-time framework. What may be the case in one place at one point in time may be entirely different at another point in time. For example, early migrants to a destination from any particular source are likely to be highly educated and to be absorbed productively into an economy. However, as the migration system evolves and greater numbers of dependants move from the specific origin, education levels may decline and new arrivals become more difficult to absorb into both the economic and the social fabric of the destination country. When the whole range of countries of origin of migration is considered for any specific destination, each at a different stage in the evolution of its migration, clear and often contradictory differences in impact can be observed. When different destinations of migration, each with their own particular migration fields, the picture becomes yet more complex. Hence, any assessment of the social and economic impact of migration, more generally, migration and development, must place the migration flows within a spatial and temporal framework.

An additional difficulty when considering migration and development is that both of these terms are essentially “black boxes”. We know instinctively what both “migration” and “development” mean but when we come to try to define precisely their dimensions, that meaning begins to slip away. Does migration include short-term or circular movements? How long does one have to be away from one's usual place of residence in order to be called a migrant? Over how great a distance must one have moved in order to be classified as a migrant? These essentially definitional and methodological issues are central to the volume of migration that is measured by our chosen instruments, censuses and surveys, and make comparison across time and space problematic. With regard to development, it must surely be more than just economic growth, although that growth is a fundamental part of the process. It must also incorporate social and political development. However, how should these be defined?

As will be seen from the argument, I am hesitant to conceptualize migration and development as two separate categories: migration cannot be separated from development. Ideally, we cannot conceive of development without some associated shifts in human populations. Similarly, it is difficult to envisage large-scale migrations without some changes to the level of prosperity, either upwards or downwards, of the people involved. Development is generally seen to be something desirable: a legitimate and essential aim for national and international action. Migration, on the other hand, was until quite recently seen to be undesirable and in some way to be negative for development. These attitudes are reflected in the results of the most recent United Nations enquiry into internal migration in which 90 out of 123 governments in the developing world reported that action to reduce migration to cities in their country was needed (United Nations 2006b). A recent poster of the United Nations Development Programme headlines that "Migration is often the only way to survive. Provide sustainable alternatives to migration". The agenda being that migration is something negative and if only development can be provided in situ, people will not need to move. The idea that perhaps development stimulate migration seems not to be accepted even though the most developed economies in the world also have amongst the highest levels of mobility: a mobility facilitated by their very affluence.

However, more recent thinking about migration, and particularly international migration, has shifted to a consideration of the positive aspects that the movement of people can bring to development[*]. The report of the Global Commission on International Migration reviews the results of much recent research and argues that we have not accepted the potential that migration can have for development (GCIM 2005; see also Tamas and Palme 2006). Similarly, a high-level report from the British government sets out the case for migration working towards the reduction rather than the creation of poverty (IDC 2004).

The new viewpoint on migration and development is certainly to be welcomed. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the movement of people is seen to be positive or negative for development, a fundamental danger exists. Migration is seen almost as an independent variable, making migration work for poor people as if migration was in some way a "thing" out there separate from the people themselves. That is, the danger of reification exists. The meaning and the sentiments may be worthy, but the door to analytic confusion is likely to be opened. Shifting to the vocabulary of demography, a danger exists in the current discussions of migration of confusing proximate causes with root causes, and individual behaviour with structural constraint.

I would like at the start to go back considerably in time to look at the work of two people who have been influential in thinking about migration and development. The first figure is, I think, obvious: Ernst Georg Ravenstein,

[*] Most of the ideas in this paper were first presented at the International Conference, *1985-2005: 20 Years of Research on International Migration*, Migrinter, University of Poitiers, 5-7 July 2006.

arguably the father of modern migration studies (Ravenstein 1885; 1889; also Grigg 1977). Ravenstein's last three "laws" of migration, laws 9 through 11, all relate to migration and development:

- Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce develop and transport improves. That is, Ravenstein saw migration as positively related to development. Following on from this "law" we have:
- The major direction of migration is from agricultural areas to the centres of industry and commerce, and
- The major causes of migration are economic. Perhaps we could even have said "economic development".

Thus, an explicit linkage to development was made right at the start of modern studies of population migration.

The second figure to whom reference should be made at the outset of this presentation is perhaps not so familiar to students of migration: Frederick Jackson Turner whose seminal essay on the Significance of the Frontier in American History appeared in 1893 and quite independent from Ravenstein's essays that were published in the previous decade (Turner 1961). The core of Turner's thesis was that "the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development": the explanation of American development lay in the process of westward migration across the area that became the United States. The fact that Turner was off-target in many parts of his thesis is largely unimportant. What is important is the idea that, to a large extent, migration creates the nation or the state. I would argue that this iconic image of migration as being important to political development has not figured as prominently as it might have done in our work on migration and development over the last 20 years. Let me give one or two other examples. Could we understand modern China without the iconography of the Long March, or the history of South Africa without the Great Trek, the "epic dimension" in the foundation of Afrikaner nationalism? We could also go on to consider the role of circuits of pilgrimage in forging common identities by taking people out of their communities and giving them a shared experience (see Turner and Turner 1978, for example).

What we might call the "iconography" of migration and the development of nations and states has been much less studied than the more economic aspects that have evolved from Ravenstein's approaches. The principal reason for this, I would argue, is that over the last 20 years we have been preoccupied with international migration and its links to development and to a much less extent with internal migration and its relations with development. "Migration" has largely come to mean international migration and yet the number of people who cross international borders represents only about 3 per cent of the world's population, or some 191 million in 2005, according to the United Nations (United Nations 2006a). The vast majority of those who move do so within the borders of their own country, some 100–200 million people in China alone, depending upon

how we define a "migrant" and perhaps a similar number in that other demographic giant, India. It cannot make sense to be concerned only with the minority of migrants who move from one country to another. Nevertheless, a minority of migrants can and do make a difference to countries of origin and countries of destination and the remainder of this paper will focus only on the minority of international movers.

Migration has often been regarded as a failure of development: people flee because of poverty and they want to achieve a better life. Over the last 20 years the results of research have shown that the situation is much more complex and several comprehensive reviews of the evidence have already been published (Lucas 2005; Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Tamas and Palme 2006). Given limitations of time and space, this presentation will be much more restrictive and focus critically on what appear to have emerged as the three principal, although interconnected, research themes on migration and development over the last 20 years:

1. Remittances
2. Diasporas
3. Skilled migrations and brain drain

Remittances

The magnitude of the volume of remittances sent back by migrants to their home countries has only relatively recently become widely recognized as a major policy issue by international institutions, despite the early work of scholars such as Russell that was published at the start of our period in 1986 (Russell 1986). Today, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, various specialized international organizations such as the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration and OECD, as well as national development agencies such as the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom, have all become concerned about remittances and their implications for development. The reason is not hard to fathom. Recent estimates place the volume of remittances to developing countries alone in 2006 at $199 billion, up from $188 billion in 2005 and over double the amount in 2000 (Mohapatra et al 2006). Remittances now are much larger than the total volume of official aid flows (Maimbo and Ratha 2005).

The above estimates of the volume of remittances refer only to the amount flowing through formal banking channels. If the amounts flowing through informal channels, too, were to be included, the total volume would increase significantly. Studies in Bangladesh, for example, suggest that only about 46 per cent of remittances sent back to villages flowed through formal channels (cited in Siddiqui 2005: 84–85). In the Philippines, where official attempts to facilitate the transfer of remittances appear to have met with success, the proportion that flows through official channels appears to be similar, suggesting that about half of all remittances to the Philippines flowed through the official system. However,

perhaps more significantly, the proportion of remittances flowing through the formal channel appeared to have increased from 65 to 76 per cent between 1995 and 2002. A shift towards an increasing proportion of remittances flowing through formal channels was also observed for both Bangladesh and Pakistan. This trend may reflect increased international scrutiny of international financial flows in the post-9/11 world.

Another trend in the flows of remittances is the increasing proportion originating in the developed world, and particularly in the United States. However, this trend may be more apparent than real. Taking the Philippines as an example, the volume of remittances sent back from the United States grew by virtually 20 per cent from 2003 to 2004. At US$2.66 billion in 2004, these were by far the most significant of the remittance flows back to the Philippines, accounting for 52 per cent of all remittances from land-based migrants (Go 2006). However, that flow need not necessarily have originated in the United States. Workers in Hong Kong, Singapore or the Gulf States may increasingly be using American banks to transfer their monies and this appears as a US-to-Philippines transaction rather than a location-of-worker-to-Philippines transaction. Similar patterns in the origins of remittances have been observed for other countries. For example, in the case of Pakistan, from accounting for less than one tenth of all remittances in 1999–2000, the United States accounted for over one third in 2001–2002 (see Skeldon 2005b). Thus, great care needs to be taken with origin-destination flows of remittances and they may not accurately reflect the real origin of the monies being transferred.

Other important policy issues implicit in this debate on remittances exist, not the least of which is just how remittances are measured. For example, where is the dividing line between remittances and foreign direct investment? Remittances sent back to China at some US$8 billion between 1991 and 1998 are seen to be small compared with a figure seven times larger sent from a smaller overseas Indian population back to India. However, foreign direct investment to China in 2002 was estimated at US$48 billion, of which half came from the Chinese overseas (data cited in Newland and Patrick 2004: 4–5). A broader approach to financial flows brought about by current and previous migrations is required.

Some questions about the precise amounts of money sent back by migrants as remittances and about the channels used clearly exist. Although there can be little debate about their importance for the relief of poverty among specific families and individuals in areas of origin of the international migrants, their broader developmental implications are much less clear. The current debate on remittances tends to ignore certain fundamental aspects of the process.

1. Governments may seek to manage or make more productive use of remittances in developing countries.
2. It is generally assumed that remittances are simply country-to-country transactions, but this assumption is misleading.
3. The volume of remittances may influence the future direction of official development assistance.

Much of the debate on remittances has focused on whether they are used primarily for consumption or for investment and whether governments can in some way better manage these significant resources for the wellbeing of their populations. However, there are dangers inherent in this debate. First, any distinction between uses for investment and consumption is largely sterile as expenditure on consumption for house construction, for example, can have important local multiplier effects in terms of creation of local employment and a stimulus for local activities. Certainly, where expenditure is mainly for imported goods, negative externalities can result, but expenditure that appears to be directed primarily at consumption can have important positive implications for local development. Even lavish expenditure on a wedding can have positive aspects as it is an investment in the demographic future of a community. Thus, any clear distinction between consumption and investment is likely to be spurious at best, and the consensus of micro-level studies of remittance use is that "the average migrant worker spends his money prudently" (Gunatilleke 1986: 15). Second, current discussions on managing remittances by governments and international agencies miss a critical aspect of the financial flows. Remittances are essentially a person-to-person or family-to-family transaction: money is put directly into the pockets of individuals and families being supported by the migrants. Any attempt by governments to influence the use of these monies is likely to prove counterproductive and migrants are likely either to resort more to informal channels or to cease to remit altogether if they see that their monies are going to general government-sponsored development objectives. Thus, attempts to regulate or otherwise manage financial flows along more developmental paths may achieve precisely the opposite result to that intended. Great care will be needed in the design of any policy with this objective in mind.

The second area that does not seem to attract much attention in the discussions on remittances relates to the origins of the migrants. The assumption is that the remittances flow back to the countries of origin as a whole. While true at a very general level, this assumption does not recognize the highly localized nature of migration. Migration is not a random event with communities of origin distributed evenly throughout a country. Similarly, migrants are not spread evenly across destination countries but tend to be concentrated in the largest, often the "global", cities in the developed world and in centres of commercial agriculture or resource exploitation in the developing world. From the point of view of remittances, however, the areas of origin of migrants are arguably more important than the destinations. Some 95 per cent of migrants from Bangladesh to the United Kingdom up to the late 1980s, for example, came from a single district in Bangladesh, that of Sylhet (Gardner 1995: 2), and the majority of the Pakistani migrants, also to the United Kingdom, came from the district of Mirpur in the north of that country (Ballard 1987: 24). Much of the migration from India to the Middle East has been from the southern state of Kerala (Zachariah, Kannan and Rajan 2002) and migration from China has been dominated by three southern

coastal provinces, Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, and from very specific parts of these provinces. Thus, the huge volumes of remittances flow back to a very small number of villages and districts in countries of origin. While this concentration of wealth is likely to have an impact on migrations internal to the respective countries, the immediate effect is to increase inequalities. Thus, unlike aid, or official development assistance, which can be targeted at particular groups and specifically towards the eradication of poverty, remittances are flows of an entirely different nature. They are focused on the specific areas of origin of emigration that might involve neither the poorest areas nor the poorest people within those areas.

The concentration of remittances in specific areas leads directly to the third cautionary point made in this note: that donor countries are looking at the volume of remittances flowing back to some countries and comparing it with their aid. It is possible, though somewhat speculative at this stage, that countries will be tempted to reallocate their official development assistance on the basis of the observed flows. As emphasized above, remittances make up a very different type of financial flow compared with aid and it would be a dangerous move to influence the allocation of aid on the basis of remittance flows. Some areas and particularly vulnerable groups that do not participate in migration may be deprived of assistance in countries that are the recipient of substantial remittances if official flows of aid are in any way to be channelled away from countries that receive remittances.

Diasporas

Diaspora has become one of the most prominent terms in the vocabulary of international migration in the early 21st century. In the past, the word diaspora referred to very specific expulsions of people in which the majority of the inhabitants were expelled from their homeland, and migrants lived with the idea of going home. The Jewish diaspora was the classic example, but other examples such as the Armenians appeared to fit this model. Today, we have the Chinese diaspora (Ma and Cartier 2003; Wang and Wang 1998), the Indian diaspora (Jayaram, 2004; see also Wong 2004), the African diaspora (Hamilton 2007) and even the Scottish diaspora (Kay 2006) among others. The word "diaspora" has come to encompass all population movements, voluntary and forced, irrespective of the number of migrants relative to the population of origin. Arguably, in fact, diaspora has come to replace "international migration" itself and we now talk of "diasporas" as readily as we would the international migration from any country of origin. In this debate, French social scientists have played an important role (see, for example, Chaliand and Rageau 1991; Ma Mung 2000; Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper 2006).

It is not difficult to see why diaspora has risen to such prominence. The word "migration" gives the impression of a definitive move: a movement to a destination where the migrant will stay and eventually become a citizen of another country. Diaspora, on the other hand, draws attention to looking back, to the importance of

linkages between origins and destinations and to the fact that the migrants may return or at least continue their involvement with their countries of origin. Diaspora becomes closely associated with another term that has come to prominence in the migration literature, the "transnational community": migrants maintain close links with their origins and may even operate or live and work in two or more states. Diaspora also brings together, under a single umbrella, migrants and co-ethnics who may have been born in the destination society.

It is but a small jump to the idea that development can be associated with the diaspora. In any migration system, the most innovative and educated individuals tend to leave first. Hence, in the diaspora are to be found many of the best and brightest that a country has to offer. If an origin country can take advantage of its overseas population, then these people should be able to contribute to "development" in the country of origin.

The role of the diaspora has been significant in the development of East Asia. The overseas Chinese have for decades been supporting the construction of infrastructure in southern China, and in Viet Nam today the Viet Kieu are playing a significant role in the current development of the country. Their investment is much more than remittances, it is foreign direct investment, although as discussed above a clear distinction between the two seems elusive. The diaspora plays a much greater role than just financial investment. In the context of East Asia we have seen the return of many from the diaspora. Just looking at the highly skilled, we know that, in the 1960s, very few of the highly educated returned to Taiwan Province of China — perhaps 5 per cent. However, that proportion had increased markedly by the 1970s. Today, Taiwan Province of China, as well as the Republic of Korea and many other economies in the region, including China, have emerged as nodes in the global training of the highly skilled. The role that the returned student has played in Asian economies is remarkable. The father of modern Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, in the late 1940s wrote an article on the role of the returned student. If we look at the composition of the parliaments in the Asian tiger economies, and at senior servants in the administrations of all those economies, many, perhaps even the majority, of the officers and members have been trained or have experience overseas. Return migration and the democratization of political systems in eastern Asia are more than just coincidentally related. The discussion in this paragraph summarizes arguments made in Skeldon (1997: 108–112).

Two critical points need to be borne in mind when we look at the role of the diaspora and development in East Asia. First, there was something for the migrants to return to. It would be simplistic, if not just downright wrong, to attribute the development of East Asia to return migration or to the role of the diaspora. Return migrants certainly did contribute to that development but they did not cause it. Any thinking that all we need to do is to bring the highly skilled home and development will automatically come to Ghana, Chad or Burkina Faso is according a primacy to agency that seems totally misplaced. The underlying

structures need to be in place in order for the agency of the migrants to function. Where the structures are non-existent or weakly developed, the return of the highly skilled is likely to be ineffective. Development drives migration, not the other way round, although clearly migration can support development.

The second point to bear in mind is that the diaspora migration back to East Asia was part of a wider migration of the highly skilled from the developed world. The diaspora was not acting in isolation from other migratory currents. Skilled people from Europe, Australasia and Europe were also involved. But this point brings me to another strength of the diaspora concept, although one with perhaps sensitive implications. It does not deal just with migrants but with ethnic groups including descendants, first, second or later generations of children of migrants who may return to their ancestral home. For example, one of the largest concentrations of ethnic Korean international migrants in the world is to be found in Seoul itself. These are mainly American Koreans who have returned to the land of their parents to participate in the economic dynamism of that country, an economy that is experiencing labour shortages. But there are also BBCs (British-born Chinese), ABCs (American-born Chinese), CBCs (Canadian-born Chinese) and American-born Vietnamese who are returning to live and work in their ancestral lands. But are they Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese or are they Americans, Canadians or British? The concept of diaspora raises all kinds of difficult questions of identity and loyalty.

The diaspora is highly heterogeneous in terms of skill and education, and class but also in terms of origins and political persuasion. What is the Chinese diaspora, for example? A uniform transnational cultural grouping or a series of overlapping subnational Chinese ethnicities? (see Skeldon 2003) The diaspora cannot be thought of simply in terms of a resource to be easily mined. Many in the diaspora will not have the interests of current rulers in areas of origin in mind — in fact they may work to depose them overtly or covertly. Hence, diaspora becomes associated with security and geopolitical issues.

Ultimately, when we are dealing with development and the ways through which the millennium development goals are to be achieved, the emphasis must be placed on structures, on establishing the kinds of institutions that will led to improvements in human well-being. Once these are in place, migrants or the diaspora will participate and can play a significant role in the development. Trying to give primacy to the diaspora without first addressing the root causes of a lack of development is unlikely to bring success.

The skilled and issues of brain drain

The question of structures relative to agency brings us to the issue of skilled migration and brain drain. The emigration of the highly skilled was, and to a large extent still is, seen as negative for the countries of origin as they lose the people most likely to be able to generate their development (see Schiff 2006, for example; also Kapur and McHale 2005). A revisionist view has emerged in

recent years that argues that the brain drain can be positive for countries of origin. Perhaps best expressed in the ideas of Mountford (1997) and Stark (2003), this view focuses on the idea of perceived benefits to international migration being diffused through the population of a potential country of origin in the developing world. Individuals in those countries see a career in a certain skill as likely to lead to a position overseas and choose to be trained in that skill with the view to migrating abroad. However, increasing numbers of individuals choose this path that, together with the filtration process of immigration policy acting as a barrier, means that not all people trained in the skill will be able to migrate successfully. Hence, the country will be left with more people trained in that skill at the end of any period than at the beginning of the period. However, it is possible that the newly skilled are not productively utilized in the origin area and it has been argued that the actual possibility of migrating overseas might encourage them to remain as educated unemployed (Stark and Fan 2006).

Evidence to support the hypothesis that the possibility of emigration might influence the choice of training seems weak (Kangasniemi, Winters and Commander 2004; Lucas 2005). Nevertheless, the skilled do remit funds back to their families in origin areas and some return to contribute to the development of their country of origin. Thus, the skilled living abroad can be encouraged to return and, according to studies carried out by the World Bank, countries can "leverage" diasporas of talent (Kuznetsov 2006). Thus, brain circulation and the return of the highly skilled have become important themes in recent research into issues associated with brain drain. More generally, interpretations of the migration of the highly skilled have become associated with the ideas of remittances and of the diaspora discussed above.

However, again the danger exists that primacy is accorded to the role of human agency rather than of structure: that the skilled can be effective agents to promote development irrespective of economic, social and, most critically, political structures back home. Skilled migrants will generally only return home if something exists for them to return to that will allow them to prosper or make a profit. Recent research into the movement of the highly skilled has allowed us to look at certain groups that may have been overlooked in previous research and, in particular, students. Thus, over the last 20 years, research into brain drain issues has shifted away from the idea of loss of skilled personnel and issues of compensation to training. Where is the training carried out? Not all is carried out in countries of origin and there is brain creation or the refinement of brains in overseas destinations. Who is paying for the training? The government of origin; of destination; a private foundation; or the migrant him or herself? What type of training should be given, particularly in country of origin? Training that provides a global marketable skill or one that can only be sold in local markets? Or do we need to think of dual or even multi-level training systems always with the possibility to upgrade from one level to another? These are complex questions and ones that highlight the complexity of the brain drain issue. It is not a simple question of developing country loss and developed country gain. To attempt to

deny the right of the skilled to migrate is almost certainly going to force these innovative people to seek alternative channels through which to migrate. These channels may be irregular, which may mean that the migrants enter illegally into the labour markets of destination economies and cannot utilize the skills they have, thus leading to brain waste.

Most of the skilled originate in a relatively small number of countries, among which India and China figure prominently. However, this pattern does not mean to imply that small numbers of skilled migrants cannot have an impact on small economies of origin. Small island countries are a case in point. However, their loss always has to be balanced against whether they could have been productively absorbed into the economy of origin. This brings us back to the question of structure: institutions, economic and political, need to be in place in origin economies before skilled migrants can be productively absorbed and this is often not the case. Once these structures are in place, migrants will return, as we have seen in the economies of East Asia, from which large numbers of the highly skilled left. Yet, would these economies have developed any faster had their skilled stayed at home? Our hypothesis is that they would not and that it was their open attitude, as far as emigration to developed economies was concerned, that supported rather than slowed their development.

Looking forward

Where is research into migration and development likely to go? It is always difficult to predict accurately what is likely to happen. However, a few pointers may exist. As indicated earlier in this presentation, internal migration will need to be re-incorporated into the migration and development debate. Hence, research on urbanization and development will again come to prominence. However, perhaps more to the point, the whole migration and development debate is likely to shift. At the outset, it was suggested that a danger existed of trying to reify migration as something separate from development. In effect, a danger lies in making the migration tail wag the development dog. For example, migration is not one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), although a move exists to give migration a much higher profile through a continuing High-level Dialogue through the Global Forum. Giving migration a higher profile can but be welcomed but we also need to be well aware of the limitations. Elsewhere, I have argued that migration should not be an MDG as it is not amenable to target setting (Skeldon 2005a).

Migration is essentially a response of populations to changing development conditions and what governments need to do is to lose their fear of population migration. Migration needs to be accepted as an integral part of the development process, not feared as something unusual. Migration is certainly not new, but if our present time is indeed an “Age of Migration” (Castles and Miller 2003), it is so as much because of rising, although unequal, levels of development around the world. Rising prosperity brings increased population mobility and migration,

which essentially brings us back to Ravenstein's original proposition. The Philippines is often seen as the country of emigration par excellence with about 8.1 million migrants overseas in 2005 (Go 2006) or just under 10 per cent of the population in the Philippines. Recent research suggests that some 5.5 million migrants from the United Kingdom are currently overseas, or 9.2 per cent of the UKpopulation (IPPR 2006). Clearly, the types of migrants from these two economies are very different. Nevertheless, the basic point is that migration does not cease with development and part of our future research will be to chart how the types, as well as the volume and directions of human movement, vary through "migration" or "mobility" transitions (Zelinsky 1971; Skeldon 1997).

The preoccupation with international migration only has tended to see migration as somehow separate from rather than an integral part of development. It is not so much that migration can be used to promote development but that we need to be prepared for the kinds of population migration that development generates. Thus, accommodationist policies or those that seek to respond and accept the kinds of migration that are likely to occur in any particular development scenario are likely to be more appropriate than proactive policies that seek to channel migration in a particular direction to promote development. The generation of migration impact statements for the various types of development policies being promoted seems a logical way forward for applied research in the migration area. Hence, attempts to influence the volume and direction of population movement must start with development, not with migration or direct attempts to control the movement. The history of migration control, irrespective whether the movements have been internal or international, has largely been a history of unintended consequences at best (Castles 2004) or failure at worst.

Our recent research has drawn attention to two critical aspects of migration and development. First, that migration is not necessarily negative for development. However, care must be taken that we do not go too far the other way to be blinded by the positive aspects and, by so doing, overly promote the idea that by facilitating certain types of population mobility we will be promoting development. Second, attempts to slow migration by promoting development in areas of origin are almost certain to fail (see, for example, de Haas 2006). Migration is an integral part of all societies and those that have little movement of their populations are also likely to be stagnant economically. Developed societies are based upon systems of high mobility that are different from those in the developing world. More theoretically, we are likely to see a change in emphasis from research on migration and development towards migration in development, a small but nevertheless subtle shift in focus.

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NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Ivan Aleshkovski — Assistant at the Department of Population, Faculty of Economics Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia)

Jean-Claude Chesnais — Professor at the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) (France)

David Coleman — Professor of the Oxford University (UK)

Paul Demeny — Distinguished Scholar at the Population Council (USA)

Vladimir Iontsev — Professor, Head of the Department of Population, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia)

Irina Ivakhnyuk — Associate Professor, Deputy-Head of the Department of Population, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia)

Janez Malacic — Professor of the Ljubljana University (Slovenia)

Philip Martin — Professor of the California– Davis University (USA)

Douglas S. Massey — Professor of the Princeton University (USA)

Irina Pribytkova — Principal Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Ukraine)

Leonid Rybakovsky — Principal Researcher at the Institute of Socio-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Yelena Sadovskaya —President of the Conflictology Center (Kazakhstan); expert of the CIS & Baltics Migration Research Council, Russian Academy of Sciences

Uma A. Segal — Professor of the Missouri – St.Louis University, Chief Editor of the 'Journal for Immigrant & Refugee Studies'(USA)

Ronald Skeldon — Professorial Fellow at the University of Sussex (UK) and Honorary Professor at the University of Hong Kong

INFORMATION FOR FOREIGN READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

The book series "International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World" was founded in 1998 in view of the fact that there was not a single scientific periodical in Russia dealing with international migration of population. Due to this reason the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University made a decision to establish a book series aiming to raise both theoretical and applied aspects of contemporary trends of international migration of population as well as its determinants and consequences. The Editor-in-Chief is Professor Vladimir Iontsev, the Head of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics. The Executive Secretary of the series is Irina Ivakhniouk, Senior Researcher at the Department of Population.

The volumes of the series are published biannually. They can be either edited volumes or monographs. The series is in fact an active discussion on various dimensions of international migration in the world and in Russia in particular.

The **first volume** (1998) mainly consist of the papers of Russian scholars presented at the IUSSP General Population Conference at Beijing, China in October 1997. (Detailed information about the Conference is also presented.) These are the articles by Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamensky «*Russia and the International Migration of Population*» dealing with the entrance of Russia into the international community by means of migration and the allied problems — both for Russia and the world; and the article by Andrey Ostrovsky «*Labor Migration from China to Russia's Far East: Possibilities of Immigration Today and in Future*» concerning the turn of labor migration into permanent immigration at the certain region.

The other articles of the first volume are devoted to a very topical for Russia aspect of international migration — "brain drain": Igor Ushkalov — «*Intellectual Emigration from Russia: the Factors, Scale, Consequences, Ways of Regulation*», Irina Malakha — «*"Brain Drain" in the Central and Eastern Europe*». Besides, the issue included the digest of the well-known book by Julian L. Simon — «*Economic Consequences of Immigration*» (N.Y.: Blackwell, 1989). Reviews of noticeable publications of Russian and foreign specialists on international migration is an integral part of every issue of the series. Another important section of every volume is "Young Scholars' Viewpoints", where students and post-graduate students from the MSU and other universities are granted an opportunity to publish the results of their research in international migration.

The **second volume** (1999) included articles on a broad variety of themes related to international migration in Russia and in the world: Vladimir Iontsev, Aminat Magomedova — «*Migration between Russia and other Former Soviet states (Historical Review)*»; Irina Ivakhniuok — «*The Experience of State Regulation of Labor Force Emigration (Case of Turkey)*»; Andrey Kamensky — «*Labor Force Export and the Impact of Migrant Workers' Remittances on*

Balance of Payment of a Sending Country»; Igor Ushkalov — «*Emigration and Immigration: Russian Phenomenon*». Apart from the Russian scientists' articles the volume also includes contribution of Prof. Janez Malačič, (the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) — «*Labor Market and International Migration Situation in Central European Transitional Economies*». Starting from the second volume it has become a good tradition of the series to invite foreign colleagues to contribute because their papers can be hardly available in Russian.

The **third volume** (1999) presents the monograph of Vladimir Iontsev «*International Migration of Population: Theory and History of Studying*» dealing with the classification of main scientific approaches for the studying of migration. The analysis of principal concepts in the field of international migration that exist presently both in Russia and the world demographic science are presented. There is also a detailed analysis of international migration affecting Russia since the eighteenth century up to the present day, as well as a projection of possible future migration trends. The work includes a glossary of terms used in Russian-language demographic studies on migration. It is worth mentioning that this monograph contains a numerous bibliography of publications on international migration of population (1200 titles).

The **forth volume** (2000) presents a number of articles depicting both global trends in international migration of population and specific migration flows to and from Russia. The article by Prof. Sema Erder (The Marmara University, Turkey) «*New Trends in International Migration and the Case of Turkey*» presents the author's view on migration picture of contemporary Europe and the changing place of Turkey within this picture. The appearance of new migration space in the Eastern Europe has encouraged new migration flows in the region. That is the subject of two other articles — by Irina Ivakhniouk — «*International Labor Migration between Russia and Turkey*» and by Evgeny Krasinets and Elena Tiuriukanova — «*From-Russia–to–Italy Migration as a Model of Ethnically Neutral Economic Migration*». Ethnic aspect of international migration is presented by the article of Israeli demographer Mark Tolts (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) — «*Migration of Russian Jews in the 1990's*».

Among the book reviews presented in the forth volume one is worth to be stressed. That is the digest of the last publication of Igor Ushkalov — «*"Brain Drain": Scale, Reasons, Consequences*» (Moscow, 1999) which has gained special emphasis because of the untimely decease of the author in November 1999. Igor Ushkalov was undoubtedly among the best specialists on international intellectual migration.

The **fifth volume** (2000) has one common theme that penetrates all the articles — the impact of international migration on demographic development. The situation in three former Soviet Union states — Russia, Ukraine and Armenia — is presented in the articles of scholars from the corresponding countries: Vladimir Iontsev — «*International Migration of Population and Demographic Development in Russia»;* Alexander Khomra — «*International*

Migration and Demographic Development of Ukraine»; Ruben Yeganian — «*Demographic Realities and Perspectives of Armenia on the Eve of the 21st century*». The article by Mikhail Denissenko — «*Replacement Migration*» is analyzing the Report of the UN Scientific Project on Replacement Migration, in which the author had taken part. The article is trying to answer the question if the replacement migration could be a solution to declining and ageing populations. Besides, the paper by Michel Poulain, professor of the Louvain Catholic University (Belgium) — «*The Comparison of the Sources of Measurement of International Migration in the Central European Countries*» — can be evaluated as a contribution for promoting some common methodology in international migration studies.

The **sixth volume** (2001) is fully devoted to forced migration taking this chance to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Regional Office of UNHCR in Moscow has supported this publication. Naturally, all the articles of the sixth volume deal with forced migration: Vladimir Mukomel — «*Forced Migration in the Context of Migration Processes and Migration Policy in the CIS: Stages of Development»;* Marek Okolski (Poland) — «*Migration Pressures on Europe»;* Sergei Ryazantsev — «*Forced Migration in Europe: Current Tendencies and Problems of Regulation»;* Philippe Wanner (Switzerland*)* — «*Asylum-Seekers in Switzerland: Principal Socio-Demographic Aspects»;* Marina Kunitsa — «*Forced Migration of Population in Regional Development: Specific Problems in the Bryansk Region, Russia»;* Svetlana Gannushkina — «*Russia's Migration Legislation and Policy»;* Yakhya Nisanov — «*Totalitarian Traditions and Business in Russia: Law's Clashes Force to Migrate*».

The **seventh volume** (2002) is breaking up the chronology of the series due to the fact that it is timed to coincide with the jubilee of the Center for Population Studies at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University which includes the Department of Population as well. This volume is different from the others as it is presented by the annotated bibliography of publications on migration at the Center. It is titled *Migration of Population: 35 years of Research at the Center for Population Studies of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University (1967–2002).* (The author — Irina Ivakhniouk). This bibliography represents the scale and traditions of migration studies which have formed the theoretical background for developing the modern approach to investigation of the contemporary stage of Russia's migration history.

The **eighth volume** (2001) deals with the problems of international migration statistics and registration, which have national peculiarities in every country, and this fact seriously impedes the comparative analysis of the world migration flows. The article by Olga Tchoudinovskikh «*Present State and Perspectives of Current Migration Registration in Russia*» analyzes the shortages of the Russian system of migrants' primary registration that perform as an

obstacle for reliable migration estimates and studies. The article by Mikhail Denissenko «*Emigration from Russia According to Foreign States Statistical Data*» represents foreign states immigration statistics as an alternative, more exact source of estimation of emigration flows from Russia. A short contribution of George Tapinos «*International Migration of Population an the Factor of Economic Development*» contains valuable comments, very topical for contemporary migration situation in Russia and other former Soviet states. The article by Alexander Slouka «*International Migration of Population and Demographic Development of the Western Europe*» continues the theme which is meaningful for the editors — about the role of international migration in demographic development — started in the third and the fifth volumes.

The theme of the **ninth volume** (2002) is highly topical for Russia and the neighboring countries as well as for many other regions of the world — illegal immigration. The contributors to the volume are researchers and practical workers from Russia and other former Soviet Union states: Galina Vitkovskaya — «*Irregular Migration in Russia: Situation and Policy of Counteraction*»; Eugeny Krasinets — «*Irregular Migration and Latent Employment in the Border Territories of the Russian Federation*»; Elena Sadovskaya — «*Prevention of Irregular Migration in Kazakhstan*»; Lyudmila Shakhotko — «*Illegal Migration: Factors of Growth and Methods of Solution*»; Tatyana Kutsenko — «*Illegal Migration and Irregular Employment of Foreign Citizens and Apatrids in the Russian Federation*». Geopolitical position of the former USSR states and transparent borders between them have turned this vast territory into the corridor for transit migrants from Asia heading to Europe. All the authors stress on indissoluble relation between illegal immigration and irregular employment and on the importance of government control over illegal hiring of foreign labor force in the context of struggle against irregular international migration.

The **tenth, jubilee volume** (2002) is a collection of articles by distinguished experts in international migration from many countries. The papers deal both with theoretical issues of migration studies and migration overviews for certain countries and regions. The article of *Douglas Massey* (USA) «*A Synthetic Theory of International Migration*» is in fact an attempt to summarize existing migration concepts into a universal, general theory. *Dirk van de Kaa* (the Netherlands) in the article «*On International Migration and the second Demographic Transition*» emphasizes the role of migration in the analysis of demographic development and makes a serious theoretical step towards better understanding of the classical demographic transition theory. Different, but equally interesting views on contemporary skilled migration are presented in the papers of *Reginald Appleyard* (Australia) — «*Skilled Migration in the Globalized World*» and Irina Malakha (Russia) — «*On "brain drain" in Russia during the second half of the 1990's*». A new theoretical approach to understanding of the latest trends in international migration flows is presented by *Mary Kritz* (USA) in the paper «*International*

Migration to Multiple Destinations» where she argues that not only developing countries but also developed ones are to be considered as both labor force importers and exporters. The contribution of *Marek Okolski* (Poland) — «*The Incoming Civilisations, the Outgoing Civilisations on the Turn of the 20th Century. Reflection from the Perspective of Demography»* is especially engaging by depicting the role of demographic processes, and migration in particular, in evolution of human civilizations, e.g. in the forthcoming replacement of the present European civilization (if current demographic trends in Europe last) by Asian civilization. The replacement is already taking place as a result of Chinese immigration. This theme is developed and detailed in the paper of *Vilia Gelbras* (Russia) — «*Chinese Migration and Chinese Ethnic Communities in Russia».* Shifts in international migration trends in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet space are the focus of a number of articles: *Janez Malacic* (Slovenia) — *«International Migration Trends in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990's and ant the Beginning of the 21st Century»; Mark Tolts* (Israel) — *«Statistical Analysis of Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia»; Andrey Kamenskiy* (Russia) — *«Contemporary Russia in International Labor Migration»; Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhniouk* (Russia) — *«Russia in the World Migration Flows: Trends of the Last Decade (1992–2001)».*

The eleventh volume (2003) is entitled "Migration and National Security". It reflects an active discussion on security dimensions of international migration in the Russian society, in both academic circles and government, and in media as well. The article of *Leonid Rybakovskiy — Demographic Security: Geopolitical Aspects and Migration* is analyzing the role of international migration and reasonable migration management in counteracting demographic crisis in Russia that is by itself a threat to national security and sovereignty of the country. The same issue but from the perspective of foreign researchers is examined in the contribution of *Graeme P. Herd and Rosaria Puglisi* (UK) — *National Security and Migration Policy in Putin's Russia: a Foreign Perspective.* The analysis of the role of migration in counteracting depopulation trends is topical both for Russia (article of *Dalkhat Ediev — International Migration as a Way to Overcome Depopulation Trends in Russia*) and Ukraine (article of *Alexander Khomra — Migration of Population in Ukraine in 1989–2001: Input to Population Dynamics and Ethnic Structure*). Paper of *Irina Ivakhniouk and Ramazan Daurov — Irregular Migration and Security in Russia: Threats, Challenges, Risks* is focused on "multilayer" nature of the problem; the authors mention political, economic, criminal, and social aspects. Economic and ethno-cultural aspects of security are detailed in the paper of *Svetlana Soboleva and Olga Tchudaeva — Foreign Migrants in the Russian Labour Market* based on the results of the survey of migration in the eastern regions of Russia.

The **twelfth volume** (2004) is dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) and preliminary results of the 20-year Programme of Actions admitted at this

Conference, in the field of international migration. This volume was timed to the Russian National Population Forum "Present and Future of Population in Russia" held in Moscow on 3–4 November 2004. The paper of *Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamenskiy* (Russia) — *International Migration of Population: Lessons of the Cairo Conference* is based not only on the analysis of the ICDP Programme of Actions but also on personal experiences of the authors who were the participants of the ICDP. *David Coleman* (UK) in his paper *Europe at the Cross-roads: Must Europe's Population and Workforce Depend on New Immigration?* questions the possibility to achieve certain objectives framed by the ICPD in the field of migration, and besides, he touches upon long-run effects of numerous migration to Europe. The article of *Irina Pribytkova* (Ukraine) — *Modern Migration Studies: in Search for New Theories and Concepts* is an attempt to summarize theoretical approaches and methodological principles in migration studies, with special emphasis on inter-disciplinary research. The paper of *Sergey Ryazantsev* (Russia) — *Forced Migration in Russia: Ten Years Since Cairo* deals with the most topical for Russia international migration issue in the 1990s. Articles by *Liudmila Ponkratova* (Russia) — *International Migration of Population in the Far East of Russia: Transformation of Flows and Prevailing Trends* and *Svetlana Gribova* (Russia) — *Migration as the Element of the Integration Mechanism of Russia's Far East Region into the Chinese Economy* analyze important for Russia issue of Chinese labour migration. The paper of *Elena Tiuriukanova* (Russia) — *Labour Migrations in the CIS and New Practices of Labour Exploitation* based on concrete surveys, deals with a painful issue of migrants' human rights protection that is specially emphasized in the ICPD Programme of Actions.

The **thirteenth volume** (2005) "International Migration from the Perspective of Young Scholars" is fully made up of contributions by Master students, Ph.D. students and young research workers from Russia and other CIS states specializing in international migration studies.

The **fourteenth volume** (2005) represents the papers presented at two workshops organized by the Council of Europe in collaboration with the Department of Population of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University: "Economic Migration in Russia – Legal Protection of Migrant Workers' (Moscow, December 2003) and "Prospects of Labour Migration in Russia and Its Regions: Migrants' Rights in the Context of Economic and Demographic Development' (Saint Petersburg, July 2004). Over 20 papers analyze most topical issues of labour migration in Russia from the perspective of migration officials and experts, and from political, legal, economic, social, regional and ethnical points of view. Contributions by experts from European countries experienced in international labour migration management discuss the best possible ways for Russia to cope with increasing labour inflow, in particular by signing the European Convention on Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977).

The **fifteenth volume** (2005) is a collection of papers submitted to the Session on international migration trends at the XXV IUSSP Conference, 18-23

July 2005, Tours, France. The papers reflect most typical contemporary international migration trends, including globalization of migration flows, growing role of international migration in demographic development of receiving countries, qualitative shifts in the global migration flows, the increasing role of labour migration, expansion of irregular migration, feminization of migration flows, and dual role of migration policies.

The **sixteenth volume** (2006) is the Russian version of the fifteenth volume.

The **seventeenth volume** (2006) presents the monograph of Aminat Magomedova «*Economic and Demographic Aspects of External Migration in Russia*». The impact of international migration on economic and demographic development in Russia is regarded both from the historical perspective and from the viewpoint of modern migration concepts.

The eighteenth volume (2006) includes papers by Russian and overseas researchers dealing with theoretical and applied issues of interrelations between migration processes, on the one hand, and economic and political challenges, on the other hand.

The nineteenth volume (2007) is an annotated bibliography of publications on migration of professors and researchers of the Center for Population Studies of the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1967–2007. The bibliography gives the idea of the scale and traditions of migration studies that have grounded the contemporary approach to conceptualizing migration in the new stage of migration history of Russia. Author — Ph.D. Irina Ivakhnyuk.

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119991, Russia, Moscow, Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University, Leninskiye Gory, GSP-1, Faculty of Economics, Population Department (room 458).

Tel: +7 (495) 939 29 28; Fax: +7 (495) 939 08 77.

E-mail: iontsev@econ.msu.ru; ivakhniouk@econ.msu.ru.